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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of three essays on public and private borrowing on international
capital markets, with a focus on optimal policy for the government and international financial
institutions.
Chapter 1 focuses on sovereign debt and default. Recent sovereign default episodes have
been associated with substantial output costs, and the sovereign should take into account that
any default decision may exacerbate such costs. I construct a two-period model where sovereign
debt is held by both foreign creditors and domestic residents. Default on foreign lenders benefits
domestic consumption, but default on domestic residents generates an output cost that increases
with the extent of the default. I present two sets of optimal policy results. Firstly, I characterize
the optimal default decision and show that full repudiation of debt is not optimal when domestic
output costs are sufficiently high. A corollary is that the sovereign can issue debt even in the
absence of reputational mechanisms. Secondly, I show that it is optimal for the government to
render the domestic economy vulnerable to the adverse effects of default, in order to raise funds
cheaply from abroad. Economic fragility is an optimal response to the lack of commitment of
the sovereign.
Chapter 2 extends the results to an infinite horizon specification. If the default decision
does not lead to reduced capital market access in the future, the results from the two-period
model remain valid in the infinite horizon. I expand the framework to incorporate persistent
productivity shocks. For this case, an adverse productivity shock leads to a reduction in the
feasible set of debt levels today. I show that optimal borrowing may now be increasing, rather
than decreasing, in the productivity shock. Finally, I examine whether the government chooses
to issue debt in the long run. If the government is allowed to save abroad and simultaneously
issue government debt, then it is optimal for the government to have a positive gross debt
position even in the long run, irrespective of the discount factor. The results of chapter 1 are
therefore operative in the infinite horizon.
Chapter 3 concentrates on private rather than public borrowing. This chapter characterizes
optimal IMF policy in an environment with moral hazard followed by adverse selection. In my
framework, government actions to improve domestic productivity are not always effective, and
the government learns of the success of its actions before foreign investors. Without the IMF,
it is not possible for foreign investors to discern the quality of the domestic production sector.
There only exists a pooling equilibrium ex post, which leads to low government effort ex ante.
Optimal IMF intervention is the solution to a mechanism design problem in the presence of
imperfectly informed competitive markets. Optimal IMF policy is structured so as to reveal the
government's private information to foreign investors in a separating equilibrium. Government
effort ex ante is high. Countries with weak fundamentals ex post accept IMF transfers and
face high interest rates on private capital markets. Countries with strong fundamentals make
contributions to the IMF and receive low interest rates from foreign investors.
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Chapter 1
Sovereign Debt and Domestic
Economic Fragility
1.1 Introduction
When a sovereign government decides to default, it recognizes that such an action may have
adverse consequences for the domestic economy, specifically for the domestic financial sector. On
the other hand, default may improve consumption by reducing repayments to foreign lenders.
The optimal decision of the government balances the costs of default against its benefits. This
chapter focuses on the effect of domestic economic costs of default on optimal government
policy. Firstly, the consideration of such costs is important for determining whether or not the
government should default, and for deciding the scale of debt repudiation in the event of default.
The existence of output costs enables the government to credibly assure foreign lenders that it
will repay at least a portion of its debt, and this will enable the government to borrow ex ante.
Secondly, the government's ex ante debt issuance decision is shaped by its expectations about
the costs of default in future periods. If the government can structure its debt issuance policy
so as to manipulate the domestic economic costs of default in future periods, it may optimally
choose a high level of exposure of the economy to these costs. This enables the government to
borrow more ex ante, or to borrow the same amount at lower interest rates.
Evidence from recent default episodes suggests that sovereign default affects the domestic
economy. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) report that both domestic and foreign creditors
to the government suffer losses on their holdings of government debt in the event of default. De
Paoli et al. (2006) record that sovereign default is often associated with substantial output costs
for the domestic economy, especially when the default episode is mired in concurrent banking
and/or currency crises.
The survey of defaults and debt restructurings in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006) is
instructive. In the run up to the Russian debt crisis of 1998, domestic banks had increased
their exposure to government debt, so that in the first quarter of 1998 income from government
securities amounted to 30 percent of total bank income. The default by the government on
domestically held public debt was roughly equal to the economy's aggregate banking capital.
In the aftermath of the default, there were runs on some banks. Interbank transactions ground
to a halt and the payments system became non-functional. Real GDP fell by 5.3 percent that
year. In the Argentinian debt crisis of 2001-2005, 60 percent of the defaulted debt was held
by domestic residents. Forced pesification of dollar-denominated assets and liabilities of the
financial sector transferred resources from the banks to the government. The banking system
became insolvent. Output fell by 3.4 percent in 1999. After the default, it fell by 4.4 percent in
2001 and 10.9 percent in 2002. Clearly, not all the output costs in these default episodes arose
from the default decision - in both cases, the default decision was influenced by a prior negative
shock to the domestic economy. Nevertheless, the decision by the government to default on its
debt contributed to a worsening of the initial crisis, in particular through a disruption to the
financial system.
In this chapter, the government cannot contractually commit to repaying its debt in future
periods. In addition, we depart from much of the existing literature by considering a framework
where default does not lead to reduced access to international capital markets. On the contrary,
the government is not sanctioned by foreign creditors even in the period of default. However,
when the government defaults on its debt it is forced to default on both domestic and foreign
holders of government debt. Default on foreign lenders improves the asset position of the
country, but default on domestic lenders generates an output cost that increases with the
extent of the default. In a model with a benevolent government which borrows from abroad
on behalf of all of its citizens, the default decision trades off these benefits and costs. This
chapter produces two sets of results. Firstly, we explore the effect of domestic output costs
on the optimal government default decision. In particular, we show that the contemporaneous
output cost of default prevents full default, and therefore supports debt. More generally, the
fear of economic crisis is the mechanism that sustains sovereign debt in our model.
The second contribution of the chapter is to endogenize the vulnerability of the domestic
economy to crisis. Vulnerability of the financial system is a recurring phenomenon in emerging
markets (de Bolle et al. [2006]). The above argument suggests that foreign lenders are willing
to lend more to the country if they believe that default will have severe effects on the domestic
economy. Suppose that the government can manipulate the output cost resulting from default,
for example by influencing the exposure of domestic lenders to government-issued defaultable
debt. This chapter proposes that the government may well choose to increase this exposure
in order to raise more debt from abroad, or to raise the same amount of debt at lower cost.
Therefore, vulnerability of the economy is an optimal response to the underlying economic
problem (and market failure) of the sovereign's lack of commitment. In this case, advice to
reduce financial system vulnerability may have the counterintuitive side-effect of a reduction in
the ability of the government to borrow.
In our model, the event of default entails no punishment by foreign lenders. It is true that
recent defaulters have experienced a period of cutoff from international capital markets in the
wake of their default decision. However, the absence of any such denial of market access in our
model emphasizes that the result of the existence of debt does not depend at all on reputation
effects. To make this result even clearer, this chapter is devoted to the analysis of an economy
with a finite horizon, where there is by construction no possibility of future sanctions after
default.
Sovereign default generates a domestic output cost because default reduces the resources
available in the domestic economy for investment and production. This liquidity effect of
government default is captured in our framework as follows. At the end of the first period,
consumers decide on consumption and savings decisions. Savings are deposited in the banks,
which invest these funds and return the proceeds to the consumers at the end of the subsequent
period. In order to transfer resources between periods, banks must purchase government debt
because there is no storable good between periods (as in Woodford [1990]). Banks enter the
second period with holdings of both cash and defaultable government debt. Sovereign default
causes a deterioration in their asset position. By assumption, the banks cannot receive transfers
from the government (except via repayment of debt) or from consumers, which means that
default results in less resources in the banking system. This means that banks must restrict
lending to the domestic productive sector. The outcome is less production. The stark liquidity
constraint is an extreme assumption. It is true that most economies have instruments for
limiting the economic fallout from default crises. For example, the Argentinian government
stepped in to attempt a bailout of the banking system after the default decision and pesification
of 2001-2002 had rendered it insolvent. Nevertheless, such bailouts and insurance mechanisms
are rarely sufficient to insulate the domestic economy entirely. To the extent that the insurance
is imperfect, the mechanism in this chapter will be active. What is more, the logic of the chapter
suggests that in order to be able to sustain more debt, the government would want to commit
in advance to an institutional setup which provides poor insurance of the domestic production
sector, if indeed it can make such a commitment.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the government defaults equally on domestic and
foreign lenders. Clearly, there are incentives for it not to do so, since it is benevolent and
cares about the utility of domestic agents. The appendix considers possible justifications for
this setup. Equal haircuts I may result from an inability on the part of the government to
distinguish between holders of the debt in the period of repayment, or from a legal obligation
to repay all debtholders within an asset class equally. Even if the government can in principle
choose to make different repayments to different categories of debtholders, the existence of
secondary markets for debt may constrain its ability to do so. Broner et al. (2006) explore the
effects of introducing secondary markets on the ability of the government to issue debt in a finite
horizon model. They also consider a version of their model where the government can make
short term commitments within periods. It can credibly announce the haircut decision in the
final period a moment prior to executing the haircuts, and secondary markets are open in the
time interval between these actions. In the appendix, we present an extension of our baseline
model that draws upon the insights in Broner et al., and we show that equal haircuts on foreign
and domestic debt are an equilibrium outcome. The mechanism of the chapter operates under
the weaker condition that the haircuts on foreign and domestic lenders are positively related.
'The haircut on sovereign debt is the proportion of the debt that is not repaid.
Within our framework, the optimal haircut decision in a particular period is a function of
inherited debt variables and the current productivity shock. Inherited debt variables include
two key indicators: the level of exposure of the domestic economy to defaultable debt, and
the ratio of the defaultable debt held by foreigners to that held by domestic agents. Domestic
exposure of the economy is captured by the fraction of defaultable debt relative to cash in the
assets of the banking system. This exposure generates an output cost of default and prevents
full repudiation. The higher is the ratio of the debt held by foreigners to that held by domestic
agents, the lower the absolute volume of repayments. The optimal haircut is larger, the lower is
the productivity shock. In the low productivity state, the default decision then reduces output
further, amplifying the effect of the productivity shock.
The theoretical literature on sovereign default has long noted that the penalty of autarky
following default (the default event triggers loss of reputation) can induce the repayment of
debt (Eaton and Gersovitz [1981]). However, governments typically have access to savings
technologies abroad even if borrowing from international capital markets is no longer feasible.
Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that if this savings technology takes the form of cash-in-advance
contracts that can be indexed to the same variables as the implicit reputational contract, no
debt can be sustained. There have been a number of subsequent models that have proposed
mechanisms by which debt can be supported.
One class of papers has explored the direct sanctions available to creditors, such as inter-
ference with the borrower nation's trade (empirical evidence in Rose [2005]). Official trade
embargoes are not common, but governments would be wary of provoking such retaliation.
Another group of papers has expanded the scope of reputation. Cole and Kehoe (1995), Eaton
(1996) and Kletzer and Wright (2000) examine models where the default decision does adversely
affect the economy's future consumption possibilities. Amador (2003) considers how political
economy considerations may induce a government to repay when the event of default changes
the set of future feasible allocations. In these models, the event of default saves on repayments
in the current period, but brings with it costs for the domestic economy in the future. This
chapter abstracts from creditor punishments altogether, and instead focuses on domestic output
costs. We believe such costs are an important ingredient of a more general model of sovereign
borrowing.
Arellano (2008) presents a model and quantitative analysis with noncontingent sovereign
debt and endowment shocks, where default leads to temporary autarky. In related work, Men-
doza and Yue (2008) develop a model with output costs in the period of default and they obtain
that the scale of default is negatively related to a measure of the productivity shock in that
period. A theoretical framework incorporating output costs of default is presented by Dooley
(2000), who explores the role of output costs as a mechanism for sustaining debt. Our work
builds on these contributions, in a framework where the government is allowed to manipulate
the output cost.
The literature on financial systems has recorded that imprudent regulation of the banking
system can increase the vulnerability of the financial infrastructure to shocks such as default.
Burnside et al. (2001) show that government guarantees to banks and their foreign creditors
diminish the incentive of the banking system to hedge against exchange rate collapse, which
results in a fragile banking industry. Livshits (2007) presents a framework where the government
may wish to increase financial system exposure to its debt. The incentive to increase exposure
in our model derives from the need for the government to assure foreign creditors that default
will harm the domestic economy. Exposure helps to align the interests of the government and
foreign creditors more closely. A similar motive is present in spirit in the analysis of Tirole
(2003). He considers a different economic environment, where the government's actions have
an effect on the relationship between domestic firms and foreign financiers, and concludes that
the promotion of "safer" forms of finance may be insufficient to achieve the required match of
interests between stakeholders and the government.
Finally, this chapter is related methodologically to the optimal policy literature. In our
problem, the government chooses the most preferred rational expectations equilbrium out of the
set of feasible equilibria. The government's problem can be decomposed into two interdependent
subproblems. On the one hand, it must decide on the level of borrowing. On the other hand,
it must choose the optimal composition of debt and domestic economic exposure that supports
the level of debt chosen. The analytical decomposition draws upon insights in Werning (2003)
regarding the solution of the noncontingent debt problem of Aiyagari et al. (2002).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the model.
There are two specifications of interest. In the first specification, defaultable government debt
is not tradable between domestic and foreign agents in the period of issue. In the second
specification, it is tradable. Section 1.3 solves some benchmark cases of the model. Section 1.4
summarizes the construction of the program, the theoretical results and numerical simulations
for the first specification. Section 1.5 does the same for the second. Section 1.6 considers policy
implications arising from the model. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Preferences and Technology
The model has two periods, t = 1 and 2. There are five categories of actors in our framework:
consumers, firms, banks, the government and foreign creditors. There is a continuum of con-
sumers and firms, both of measure 1, and a continuum of banks. There is also a continuum of
foreign creditors.
Preferences Each consumer is identical, with preferences over consumption streams {cl, c2}
given by the expression
u(cl) + oEu(c2 )-
SE (0, 1) is the discount factor and the period utility function is continuously differentiable
and strictly increasing: u'(c) > 0.
The government is benevolent and maximizes the utility of the representative consumer.
Firms, banks and foreign creditors are risk neutral and maximize expected profits.
Technology In the first period, each consumer receives an endowment yl. In addition, it is
possible for the economy as a whole to borrow resources z from foreign creditors. There is no
domestic storable good between periods. Accordingly, the resource constraint for the economy
in this period is written:
C1 < yi + z
At the beginning of the second period, each consumer receives an endowment y2. Then the
economy has access to a production technology, operated by firms. Specifically, the economy
can invest x units of its endowment income in the production sector, which produces F (X, f)
units of output:
F (x, f) = x + Rf(x).
R is a stochastic productivity variable. Its value is realized at the beginning of the second
period. We assume R> 0, with highest and lowest values R and R respectively. The production
function f(x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave up to an input level 2, and is flat for
input levels beyond this:
f'(x) > 0, f"f(x) < 0 VX E [0, t]
f(x) = f(z) V X > t.
f(x) is twice differentiable. We impose limf'(x) = oo and f'(2) = 0. The output of the
x--O
production sector cannot be reinvested in the same sector.
In the second period, the economy makes repayments v to foreign creditors. The resource
constraint is derived:
c2 < Y2 + Rf(x) - v
Foreign creditors maximize profits from their lending to the domestic economy, and they have
access to an international riskless asset which yields the interest rate r between periods. This
imposes the following rational expectations restriction across periods:
z= 1 Ev
1+r
1.2.2 Market Structure
Figure 1.1 illustrates the order of events and actions in periods t = 1 and 2. This section uses
the timeline to describe the market structure we impose in our framework.
Figure 1.1: Model Timeline
Period 1
* Endowment yl realized.
* Government issues debt Ad, Bd, B1 and transfers proceeds Ti to consumers.
Consumers consume cl goods and save sl in banks.
Banks invest in government debt Ad, Bd.
Foreigners purchase government debt Bf.
Period 2
* Productivity shock R realized.
* Government imposes lump sum taxes T2 and applies haircut h on debt Bd, B f .
* Banks lend x to firms.
Firms borrow and produce F (x, ) = x + Rf(x).
* Consumers consume c2 goods.
Consumers Each consumer solves the following maximization problem:
max u(c) + IEu(c2 ) (1.1)
{ C,S1,C2)
subject to
c1 < yl + Ti - 1 (1.2)
c2 2 + T2 + IB + F + S(Sl,) (1.3)
cl, 2 > 0 (1.4)
In the first period, each consumer decides on its consumption and savings {cl, s}, taking
transfers from the government T1 and T2 as given. Savings are deposited in the banks, and
yield a gross investment return of S(si, R) in the subsequent period. Each consumer owns an
equal share in all the banks and all the firms that exist in the second period. LIB and IIF denote
bank and firm profits respectively.
Consumers, firms and banks cannot borrow from or save abroad.
Bank Deposit Contracts Banks compete for savings of the consumers in period 1. They
can offer contracts X to consumers of the form:
X : s 1 -- S(s1, R)
The contract takes sl from consumers in period 1 and returns S(sl, R) to consumers in period
2. No other transfers between consumers and banks are allowed. Consumers observe the set
of contracts available {x(sl)} and choose the contract that maximizes their expected utility.
In equilibrium, the banks will make zero profits (IB = 0) and they will invest in assets so
as to maximize consumer utility. Since there is no storable good between periods, the only
means by which the banking system can transfer resources between periods is via the purchase
of government-issued debt. The set of available assets is described next.
Government Debt In the first period, the government can issue two types of debt, cash
Ad and defaultable debt B. Of the defaultable debt, Bd is purchased by domestic banks and
Bf is purchased by foreign creditors. There is no government expenditure in this model. The
government may transfer to the consumers any resources raised from debt issuance:
T1  pAAd + PBBd + qBf, (1.5)
where positive quantities are used to denote debt. PA is the price of cash in terms of output. PB
and q are the prices of defaultable debt held by domestic banks and foreign creditors respectively.
If defaultable debt is not tradable between domestic and foreign agents in the period of issue,
these prices may differ. If the defaultable debt is tradable in the period of issue, then:
PB = q.
In the second period, the government observes the productivity shock and then decides on
its repayments to holders of the defaultable debt. In our model, the government cannot default
on cash, and it must default on all holders of defaultable debt by an equal haircut h. The
haircut is the proportion of the face value of debt that is not repaid. The government imposes
lump sum transfers on consumers in order to make repayments on its debt:
-T2 Ad + (1 - h) [Bd + Bf] (1.6)
The key feature of the government is that it cannot commit in period 1 to the level of the
haircut h in period 2.
Bank Holdings of Government Debt Cash and defaultable debt are issued by the gov-
ernment in the first period. Banks choose their holdings of these categories of debt in order to
maximize their profits, taking the prices {PA,PB, q} as given.
Foreign Creditors The rational expectations restriction imposed in the previous subsection
may now be rewritten in terms of the debt variables:
max E(1 - h)Bf - qBf
Bf 1+r
1
--> q = E(1 - h) (1.7)l+r
This equation determines the price of foreign-held defaultable debt.
Loans Market in Period 2 Since the banks enter the second period with holdings of
government-issued cash and defaultable debt, the government's haircut decision affects the
asset position of the banks. Let
X = Ad + (1 - h)Bd
denote the resources in the banking system after the default decision. We assume that the
government cannot transfer resources from consumers to banks except through repayment of
cash and defaultable debt, and that banks have no other means of raising funds from consumers
in period 2.
Banks can choose to either hold these resources X until the end of the second period, or
to lend these resources to firms in a competitive market for loanable funds. In the latter case,
firms use the loaned funds as inputs in production and repay the banks with interest before the
end of the period. The supply of loanable funds by banks takes the shape illustrated in figure
1.2. At the end of the second period, banks transfer the promised units of output S(si, i) to
consumers.
Firms take the loan rate for funds p as given and choose to borrow x units of input in order
to maximize profits:
(1.8)max {x + R f(x) - px}
-- 1 + Rf'(x) = p
The resulting demand curve is shown
given by
in figure 1.2. By inspection, the equilibrium loan rate is
p = 1 + Rf'(X)
Figure 1.2: Loans Market in Period 2
The key constraint that summarizes the market imperfection on the production side of the
economy is
x < Ad + (1 - h)Bd
In the final period, inputs into the domestic production sector are less than or equal to the
total value of repaid government bonds. Effectively, we have the following structure. In period
1, consumer savings are invested in government bonds. In period 2, inputs into production are
constrained by the gross return on these investments.
1.2.3 Equilibrium Definition
We use the following equilibrium definition in this chapter.
Definition 1.1 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium for this economy comprises sequences
for allocation rules {cl, Si, C2, (X} , x}, prices {pA,PB, q, p} and policies {Ad, Bd, Bf, h, T 1 , T2 }
that satisfy:
(a) Consumers choose {cl,s 1, c2} to maximize utility (1.1) subject to the budget constraints
(1.2), (1.3) and the nonnegativity constraints on consumption (1.), taking prices, bank
contract offers, government policies and the endowment as given.
(b) Banks offer contract schedules X : sl -- S(si, R) in period 1 to maximize expected profits,
taking prices and government policies in period 2 as given.
Banks choose lending quantity x in period 2 to maximize profits, taking the loan rate p as
given.
(c) Firms choose borrowing level x to maximize profits (1.8), taking the loan rate p as given.
(d) Government chooses {h, T 2 } in period 2 to satisfy the government budget constraint (1.6)
in that period, taking {Ad, Bd, Bf} and the shock R as given.
Government chooses {Ad, Bd, Bf, T1 } in period 1 to satisfy the government budget con-
straint (1.5) in that period, taking the price functions {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf) , PB (Ad, Bd, Bf) ,
q (Ad, Bd, Bf) , p(x)} and government policies in period 2, both h (Ad, Bd, B, ) and
T 2 (Ad, Bd, Bf, R), as given.
(e) All markets clear for the economy. In particular, the markets for cash, defaultable debt,
goods and loans clear.
(f) Bond prices for foreign debt follow rational expectatzons: q (Ad, Bd, Bf) = E {1 - h},
taking the government policy h (Ad, Bd, Bf, i) mn period 2 as given.
Now we turn to the optimal policy problem for the government. In the second period,
the government observes the shock to productivity R and then makes a haircut decision. The
government lacks commitment: it cannot credibly commit in period 1 to the haircut it will
impose in period 2.
Definition 1.2 The Government Problem is to maximize utility (1.1) over time consis-
tent rational expectations equilibria. In particular, we must satisfy not only the equilibrium
conditions above but also the additional optimization decisions:
(g) Government chooses {h, T2 } in period 2 to maximize u(c2 ) given {Ad, Bd, Bf} and the
shock R.
Government chooses {Ad, Bd, Bf , T,} in period 1 to maximize u(cl) + PEu(c2), taking the
price functions {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf) ,PB (Ad, Bd, Bf), q (Ad, Bd, Bf) , p(x)} and government
policies in period 2, h (Ad, Bd, Bf, i and T2 (Ad, Bd, Bf, ) , as given.
In this chapter, we consider two different scenarios. In the first specification, defaultable
debt is not tradable between domestic banks and foreign creditors in the period of issue. In the
second specification, defaultable debt is tradable in the period of issue. In the latter case, we
impose the additional restriction:
PB = q.
1.2.4 Discussion of the Environment
Our model has by construction ruled out the possibility of sanctions by foreign lenders in the
event of default. This helps to emphasize that the results regarding the feasibility of sovereign
debt obtained in the remainder of the chapter do not rely upon reputation effects.
In order to capture the fact that governments are typically unable to completely insure the
domestic productive sector in the event of default, we have utilized a model construction that
imposes a sharp liquidity constraint on the domestic production sector. After a default event, we
assume that the government cannot transfer resources from consumers to banks except through
repayment of cash and defaultable debt, and that banks have no other means of raising funds
from consumers in period 2. Our model mechanism will be operative whenever the productive
sector is adversely affected by the default event and its consequences.
All domestic debt is issued by the government in our model. It can issue both cash and
defaultable debt - the proportion of the latter in the portfolio of domestic banks captures the
exposure of the economy to sovereign default. Cash can only be held by domestic agents.
We do not consider debt types that can only be held by foreign creditors. In our model, the
government will obviously default fully on all such debt. In section 1.8.B of the appendix, this
result is derived formally.
Why does the government treat all holders of debt type B in the same manner? Section
1.8.D of the appendix considers possible justifications for equal haircuts for domestic and foreign
debtholders. One possible justification is that the government cannot observe who holds its debt.
Alternatively, even if the government can in principle choose to make different repayments to
different categories of debtholders, the existence of secondary markets for debt may constrain
its ability to do so. Broner et al. (2006) argue that the government would like to treat domestic
and foreign lenders differently in a setup where the government has no commitment power.
In the appendix we consider a model where the government can distinguish the residence of
debtholders, but where it still cannot effect transfers to the domestic productive sector except
by repaying debt. The government cannot commit in period 1 to make particular repayments
in period 2. But in period 2, just prior to default, it makes an announcement of the haircuts
for both domestic and foreign lenders. Following this announcement there is an opportunity
for domestic and foreign lenders to trade the debt with each other on secondary markets. Then
the government executes the haircuts for period 2, but it must fulfil the announcements that
it made earlier in the (same) period, i.e., there is "short-term (within-period) commitment" in
the terminology of Broner et al. We show that it is an equilibrium for the government to choose
the same haircut for domestic and foreign lenders.
For clarity of exposition, the model environment dictates that the government cannot con-
currently purchase debt issued by foreign institutions and issue defaultable debt. This as-
sumption rules out scenarios where the government both saves abroad and issues defaultable
debt to domestic and foreign lenders. Section 1.8.C of the appendix considers an environment
where this assumption is relaxed. The feasible set of debt levels is unchanged from the model
considered in this chapter.
For the remainder of this chapter, we consider two different specifications regarding the
tradability of debt in the period of issue. The aim of this exercise is to clarify the mechanisms
operating in our model. In both specifications, the exposure of the domestic economy to sov-
ereign default is the underlying mechanism that makes debt issuance feasible. In the case with
nontradable debt, this exposure channel for sustaining debt is the only mechanism in our model,
and can be analyzed in isolation. In the case with tradable debt, an additional restriction is
added - namely, that the valuation of the debt by domestic and foreign bondholders must be
equal. This reduces the size of the feasible set. In particular, unlike in the nontradable debt
case, the discount factor and risk aversion of the representative consumer are now relevant
for the characterization of the feasible set of debt values. Analysis of the latter case provides
us with an understanding of the overall model when the exposure mechanism and the equal
valuation restriction are combined.
1.3 Benchmark Cases
For the purposes of comparison with the setup developed in this chapter, in this section we
solve two benchmark cases of the model. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1.3.1 First Best Case
Suppose that the government can both (i) contractually commit in period 1 to the haircut
schedule in period 2 (full commitment), and (ii) save abroad and issue debt at the same time.
Then the first best is achieved.
The full commitment case is a major difference from the model with lack of commitment
studied in the subsequent sections. The requirement that the country also be able to save
and borrow at the same time allows the sovereign to make its debt repayment in period 2 fully
contingent, so that it may actually make net repayments in high productivity states and receive
net transfers from abroad in low productivity states. This configuration is not possible if the
government must either save or borrow.
Proposition 1.1 (First Best Case) Assume that y2 is sufficiently high. The optimal con-
sumption schedule (cl, c2) is the same whether debt is tradable or not. It has the properties:
1. Production by domestic firms is equal to t + Rf (1 ) when the productivity shock is R.
The optzmal allocation solves:
max (y+ Bf (1 - h) + IEu y2 - (1-h)B f ( ))Bf,{h} 1 + r
2. Consumption cl and borrowing in period 1 are chosen to satisfy the representative con-
sumer's Euler equation.
3. Consumption c2 is equalized across states of nature R in period 2 (by appropriate selection
of haircuts in period 2).
At the first best, the total output of domestic firms is at the maximum level in every
state of nature R in period 2. The output of this sector does vary due to the fluctuation
in the productivity shock value. The government fully insures the consumption of domestic
consumers against the productivity shock, via state-contingent transfers to and from foreigners.
The corollary is that repayments to foreigners in period 2 vary across different states of nature.
To achieve the allocation described, the government can issue Ad 2 .. Bf solves the
expression above. Bd is set arbitrarily in the nontradable debt case. In the tradable debt case,
Bd is equal to desired debtholdings by domestic banks at the optimal allocation.
1.3.2 Nondefaultable Debt
Consider the case where the government is not able to default at all on its debt issuance,
whether to foreign or domestic agents. In effect, h = 0 for all values of the productivity shock
R. The following proposition applies for this case.
Proposition 1.2 (Nondefaultable Debt) Assume that Y2 is sufficiently high. The optimal
consumption schedule (Cl, c2 ) is the same whether debt is tradable or not. It has the properties:
1. Production by domestic firms is equal to T + Rf (t) when the productivity shock is R.
The optimal allocation solves:
max [u (y + + 3Eu y2 - B + f ()
Bf E(-oo,y2] r
2. Consumption cl and borrowing in period 1 are chosen to satisfy the representative con-
sumer's Euler equation for noncontingent and nondefaultable debt.
3. Consumption c2 is increasing in the value of the productivity shock R.
Again, the total output of domestic firms is at the maximum level in every state of nature f
in period 2. The maximum output level varies with R. However, in this case the government is
not able to fully insure domestic consumers against the productivity shock, because the repay-
ments to foreign creditors are not state contingent in the final period. Therefore, consumption
in period 2 is increasing in the value of the productivity shock.
The government can choose Ad >_ t, with Bf as given above. Bd is set arbitrarily in the
nontradable debt case. For tradable debt, it is equal to desired debtholdings by domestic banks
at the optimal allocation.
1.4 Nontradable Debt
Formulation of the government problem follows directly from the equilibrium concept and the
assumption of lack of commitment on the part of the sovereign. In this section, we characterize
and solve the government problem. The crucial element of the analysis is the reduction of the
number of state variables to just one variable, the total level of real resources raised through
foreign borrowing in that period. On the theoretical front, the resulting program can be broken
up into two parts: an intratemporal component, which calculates the optimal combinations of
debt and exposure for any given level of borrowing from abroad; and an intertemporal compo-
nent, which determines the optimal level of borrowing in period 1. Both of these subproblems
will be analyzed. On the numerical side, the reduction of the number of state variables renders
the model more tractable for simulations.
The proofs for the results in this and subsequent sections are contained in section 1.8.A of
the appendix.
For the purposes of the remainder of the chapter, we make a variable transformation that
enables us to visualize more clearly the exposure of the domestic economy to government debt.
We may rewrite any combination of government debt issuance (Ad, Bd, Bf) as a combination
(a, D, Bf) such that:
D = Ad + Bd
where Ad = (1-a) D
Bd = aD
D is a measure of total face value of government-issued debt held by the banks at the beginning
of period 2, including cash and defaultable debt. a is the fraction of defaultable debt in total
bank assets.
The next subsection constructs the program for the government problem. Subsection 1.4.2
characterizes the optimal government default policy in period 2. A corollary of this result is
that it is feasible for the government to issue debt in our model (in the absence of reputation
effects). Subsections 1.4.4 to 1.4.7 analyze optimal government debt issuance policy in period
1.
1.4.1 Construction of Program
Let us apply Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 to derive the program for the government problem. In
period 1:
U= max {u(ci)+ EU2 ( a, D, Bj,R)}cl,a,D,Bf
subject to
cl = yi + qBj
ci > 0
q E 1-h a,D,B ,R
Bf <0 a = 0,
where the expression for the period utility in period 2 is given by
U2 (a,D, By, R) =max u(2)
c2,h
subject to
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
c2 > 0
y2 > (1 - a)D + (1 - h) [aD + Bf] (1.9)
0<h<1.
In period 1, the government may borrow or save abroad. Each combination (a, D, Bf)
corresponds to a default schedule across states h (a, D, Bf, R) in the next period, and hence to
the bond price function q = Q (a, D, Bf). This function is calculated using rational expectations
over the default schedule in period 2, and is taken as given by the government in period 1.
Expression (1.9) states that government debt repayments in period 2 must be less than or
equal to the consumer endowment in that period. For the remainder of this chapter, we assume
that Y2 is large enough so that this constraint is never binding. A sufficient condition on the
production function to ensure that this approach is valid is: limxf'(x) = 0. We assume that
x-*0
this condition is satisfied throughout.
An important observation to make from the program above is that the haircut decision in
the last period can be analytically derived. Simply apply the first order condition with respect
to the haircut for interior values of h, and apply the boundary condition as required for values
of h that are not interior. In the next subsection, we examine the expression for the haircut.
For the purposes of the analysis in this subsection, it suffices to note that the expression for
the haircut may be written:
h = H aD, Bf, ).
In turn, this means that we can also derive the expression for the bond price schedule:
Q (a, D, Bf) 1 E 1-H (a,D, Bf,
Observe also that consumption in period 1 depends upon the combination (a, D, Bf) to the
extent that it affects the total real resources raised by the government from foreign creditors
z = qBf. Therefore, we can rewrite the problem as one in which the government chooses how
much to raise from abroad z, and then decides the optimal combination (c, D, Bf) that achieves
this level of borrowing. The optimal combination is decided before the state of nature in period
2 is realized, therefore we may rewrite the government problem as follows.
Vi = maxE {u(ci) + 3V2 (z)}
C1 ,
subject to
C1 = Yi + Z
ci 2 0
z E G,
where we define V2 (z) as follows:
V2(z)= max E {u(c2)}
c2,,D,Bf
subject to
2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
h = H (a, D, Bi, )
z = Q (a:, D, Bf) - B
z <0 =~ a = 0
for some set G. Our notation suppresses the dependence of h on (a, D, Bf, R) in the consump-
tion equation. Note that the combination (a, D, Bf) is still chosen before the productivity
shock in period 2 is realized.
This formulation separates the problem into two subproblems. The intertemporal com-
ponent of the problem concerns how much to borrow in the initial period, z, in order to
smooth consumption between periods. The intratemporal component takes the default decision
h (a, D, Bf, R) in the final period as given, and uses this information in order to calculate the
optimal combination (a, D, Bf) for the chosen z value. Section 1.8.A of the appendix explains
the generation of the set of feasible debt values G. For sufficiently high y2, the set can be
characterized using only the relation Q(.).
1.4.2 Haircut Decision
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal haircut in period 2 as a function of the produc-
tivity shock and the inherited debt variables. Let us assume that the government has issued
debt to foreigners, i.e., Bf > 0. To begin, we state a simple lemma that allows us to focus on
a restricted subset of D values.
Lemma 1.1 Define D = t. For any combination C = (a, D, Bf) such that D > D, there
exists some other combination C' = (a', D', B) where D' = D, such that C' raises the same
revenues as C in period 1 and is equivalent to C in terms of repayments abroad, output and
hence consumption for all values of the productivity shock R in period 2.
Corollary 1.1 We can restrict our attention to combinations C = (a, D, Bf) such that D E
[0, D].
For intuition, let us consider the case with a = 1. In this case, if the quantity of total
domestic debt exceeds D in magnitude, the government can reduce its debt by defaulting on
the portion (D - D) for every realization of the productivity shock R in period 2 without any
adverse output effect. Indeed, it will exercise this option. Any issuance of domestic debt in
excess of the output-maximizing value D merely increases the haircut on debt for every shock
realization R, and therefore depresses the price of the foreign debt in period 1. The same total
revenues may be raised by issuing the output-maximizing level of domestic debt and a lower
volume of foreign debt. The appendix formalizes this intuition and shows that an amended
argument can be applied for any possible configuration (a, D, Bf). Therefore, we can restrict
our attention to the set {(a, D, Bf) : D E [0, D] }.
Proposition 1.3 (Haircut Decision) The haircut decision h = H (a, D, Bf, R) satisfies the
following formulation:
h = max{0, min{1, 0}}
where 0 satisfies
B = f ' ([(1- a)+ (1 - )a] D). (1.10)
RaD
1. The haircut is (weakly) increasing in the volume of foreign debt issued Bf.
2. The haircut is (weakly) decreasing in the productivity shock R.
The haircut is always selected to maximize consumption in the final period. An increase in
the haircut benefits consumption by reducing repayments abroad. However, for D E [0, D], it
also reduces the output of the production sector. This output cost is increasing and convex in
the scale of default. For an interior haircut, the marginal benefit is set equal to the marginal
cost. The haircut is either 0 or 1 when one of these marginal effects on consumption exceeds the
other for all h E [0, 1]. The model predicts that default will be highest when foreign holdings
of defaultable debt are very high relative to domestically held defaultable debt, and/or when
the productivity shock is low. The higher is the ratio of foreign to domestic defaultable debt
B, the higher is the marginal benefit of default, since an increase in the haircut of 1 percent
corresponds to a larger absolute reduction in debt repayment. When the productivity shock is
lower, the marginal output cost of default is lower. Therefore, the marginal costs of default are
lower and the optimal scale of default higher. According to the model, default occurs after a
poor productivity realization, and the act of default results in a further reduction in output.
This matches recent default episodes.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the haircut decision in this model. It may help provide some intuition
for the results that follow in this section and others, and is inspired by the first order condition
with respect to h, equation (1.10).
(1-a')D' D1
Bf(
0 x
[(1 -a)+(1 -h)a]D
Figure 1.3: Haircut Decision
Fix the ratio at some value. The sequence of horizontal lines on the figure captures the
values of Bf for different values of the productivity shock R, with lower lines corresponding
RaD
to states with higher productivity. The haircut decision in any state of nature is marked by
the point of intersection of the f'(x) function with the horizontal line corresponding to that
state. Assume first that the haircut decision is always interior, and ignore the vertical lines
on the diagram. Clearly, for higher productivity the intersection occurs for a higher value of
x = [(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D, which corresponds to a lower haircut. Note that a higher value
of x also corresponds to higher output f(x). A higher volume of foreign debt issuance Bf
shifts all the horizontal lines upwards, leading to higher haircuts across all states in period 2.
Now consider cases where the haircut decision is not interior. If the level of cash is equal to
(1 - a')DI , then h = 1 will be binding in the low productivity state. If the total debt level is
equal to D I , then h = 0 will be binding in the high productivity state.
In the specification in this chapter, default has no reputation effects. The optimal default
decision does not depend upon risk aversion. It does depend on the production function.
A corollary to this result is the ability of the government to issue debt in period 1. The
government does not always set h = 1 in period 2. Therefore, the government is able to borrow
from abroad in period 1.
Proposition 1.4 (Feasibility of Debt) It is feasible for the sovereign to issue debt in period
1.
The set G and the implied maximum level of debt depends on the production function in
our model framework. The above result states that the upper bound of the aforementioned
feasible set G is strictly positive.
1.4.3 Special Cases
The government does not default fully on all of its debt in period 2 if the domestic econ-
omy is sufficiently exposed to the adverse consequences of default. To illustrate this exposure
mechanism more clearly, we analyze some special cases of the model.
Case 1: a = 0 Domestic banks only hold cash, and all defaultable debt is held by foreigners.
Consumption in period 2 is given by
c2 = Y2 - (1 -- h)Bf + Rf (D)
The optimal haircut is h = 1 for all realizations of the productivity shock R. The price of debt
in period 1 is given by rational expectations:
11{1- h a,D, B y, 1)
= 0,
which immediately yields the result that z = 0. No debt can be sustained.
Case 2: a = 1, D = D, Bf > 0 Cash does not exist, so domestic banks must invest solely in
defaultable debt. Consumption in period 2 is given by
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h:)Bf + Rf ((1 - h)D)
The optimal haircut is h E (0, 1) for all realizations of the productivity shock R. The price of
debt in period 1 is given by rational expectations:
q E 1-h (a,D,Bf,R)}
> 0,
For Bf > 0, this means that z > 0. The sovereign can raise resources from abroad.
The special cases above illustrate that the government's debt issuance decision in period
1 affects default decisions in period 2. In the following subsections, we analyze the optimal
government debt issuance decision in period 1.
1.4.4 Feasible Debt Levels as a Function of the Domestic Exposure Level
In this and the next two subsections, we focus on the intratemporal dimension of the problem.
In other words, we take the level of z as given and find the optimal combination C = (a, D, Bf)
that raises this level of resources from abroad in period 1. The haircut decision in period 2 is
also taken as given. First, we characterize the relationship between domestic exposure of the
economy and the ability of the government to issue debt abroad.
The following proposition applies when the government chooses to save rather than borrow.
Proposition 1.5 (Saving) For z < 0, the government chooses: (i) a = 0; (ii) D = D; (iii)
Bf = (1 + r)z.
Foreigners can credibly commit not to default on the government's savings. The government
has no default decision of its own in the final period since domestic exposure is set to zero. It
chooses the total quantity of domestic debt to maximize domestic production. In other words,
the case where z < 0 is a version of the standard model with noncontingent debt and no
sovereign default.
Now let us focus on the case where z > 0. The sovereign can raise resources from abroad
in the initial period to the extent that it can be relied upon to make repayments in the final
period. The key result in this chapter is that the sovereign can issue debt abroad if domestic
agents also hold defaultable debt, because in that case the event of default has a concomitant
output cost, and this output cost prevents full default on debtholders. What level of domestic
exposure is needed in order to raise any given level of debt from abroad? The answer to this
question is characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.6 (Minimum Domestic Exposure) Fix D = D'. For any level of borrow-
ing in the set [0, Zmax(D')] to be achieved, it is required that the level of domestic exposure is
sufficiently high, i.e., C [ (z) , 1]. The necessary exposure level has the following properties:
1. a(0) = 0.
2. c (z) is weakly increasing in z.
3. a-(Zmax(D')) = 1.
This is a feasibility result: it is a description of the feasible set of combinations C =
(a, D, Bf) available to the government to raise any given level of resources from abroad z. The
shape of the function a (z) depends on the production function.
For fixed D = D', increasing the exposure of the domestic economy to the adverse effects of
default reduces the optimal haircut of the government, by raising the costs of default relative
to the benefits. This in turn sustains more debt in the first period. In other words, although
the government suffers from a problem of lack of commitment, it can effectively "purchase
commitment" by increasing the vulnerability of the domestic economy to a default episode.
This vulnerability is what sustains foreign debt issuance, and is a necessary side-effect of the
sovereign's lack of commitment. Recommendations from international financial institutions to
reduce financial fragility will also diminish the ability of the country to borrow from abroad.
Numerical characterization of the minimum domestic exposure function a (z) utilizes the
following production function:
x° -6x for x <_
f(x) = i, 
- 
_ 
x for x> <
r - for x > t
where 2 is set to the value that maximizes f(x), i.e., 2 = () -0 . This production func-
tion satisfies the assumptions in subsection 1.2.1. In addition, it satisfies the property that
limxf'(x) = 0.
x--+O
Parameter values are selected as follows. The riskless rate of return is equal to r = 0.05
and the production function parameters are 0 = 6 = 0.5. The implied V (and hence D) is
therefore equal to unity. In each period, there are ten possible values of the productivity shock,
which occur with equal probability. Possible values of the shock are located between R= 8
and Rt = 12, with equal intervals between the possible shock realizations. Figure 1.4 plots
the production function for different values of the shock. With the above parametrization, the
upper bound of the set G is Zmax = 1.1857. This is the largest value of debt the economy can
support.
Figure 1.5 plots the function a (z) for this production function, setting D = D. It satisfies
the properties described in the above proposition.
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1.4.5 Optimal Levels of Domestic Debt and Domestic Exposure
The optimal level of total domestically held debt (cash and defaultable debt) is given by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1.7 (Total Domestic Debt) It is an optimum to set D = D.
Consider figure 1.3. For any value of the productivity shock R, the government may default
on a portion of its defaultable debt to domestic and foreign lenders. This limits the level of
inputs into the productive sector in that state. In the specification with nontradable debt, the
government never wishes to constrain itself to produce less than the level mandated by the
intersection of the f'(x) function with the horizontal line corresponding to the productivity
shock R in period 2. For Bf > 0, it is possible to achieve this using a range of values of D. One
of these is the output-maximizing value, D. For Bf = 0, only the output-maximizing value of
D is optimal. So let us set D = D irrespective of the value of Bf.
What does this mean for haircuts? When there is any foreign debt, the government will
find it optimal to default on some of it in all states of nature. The economic reason is that at
h = 0, an increase in the haircut has a first order impact on reducing repayments, but only
a second order output cost (since f' (D) = 0). This is true for all values of the productivity
shock R. The effective interest rate facing the country will exceed the riskless rate owing to a
default premium.
In the previous subsection, we described the minimum domestic exposure level that is neces-
sary to raise any given level of debt z. This depended on the production function specification.
The actual level of domestic exposure chosen depends upon the risk aversion of the representa-
tive consumer. The next proposition states this result.
Proposition 1.8 (Optimal Domestic Exposure) Consider a combination C = (a, D, Bf)
which raises debt z such that a > c (z). At the margin, it is feasible to raise the same level of
debt z by reducing a and increasing -y = -. Whether this perturbation is optimal depends on
the risk aversion of the representative consumer.
If the domestic exposure level associated with a particular combination C = (a, D, Bf) is
above the value necessary to raise the level of debt z, it is feasible for the sovereign to reduce the
domestic exposure level and still raise the same amount of resources from abroad. For z > 0,
the perturbation described in the proposition raises the haircuts and reduces consumption for
the highest values of the productivity shock FR in period 2. The effect on average consumption
in period 2, and on consumption for the lowest values of R, depends on the production function.
There exist permissible production functions such that the perturbation reduces average con-
sumption but increases consumption for the lowest values of R. The latter effect arises either
via an increase in output (if h = 1 is binding for this productivity shock), or a decrease in repay-
ments abroad in excess of the reduction in output (if h is interior). Suppose that consumption
in the lowest states of nature does indeed increase as a result of the perturbation while average
consumption falls. Then the perturbation considered is analogous to purchasing an insurance
contract across states of nature in period 2. The desirability of such a perturbation then clearly
depends on the risk aversion of the representative consumer.
For the numerical exercise in this subsection, we utilize the same parameterization of the
production function that was used to illustrate the minimum domestic exposure result. The
following functional form is used for the utility function:
-e-CC
u(c) =
The value of the endowment income in period 2 is set to y2 = 9 and the discount factor is
f = 0.8. Figure 1.6 plots the optimal domestic exposure as a function of the debt level z, for
= 10, 60 and 100. As the coefficient of absolute risk aversion increases, the optimal domestic
exposure for any given debt level weakly decreases. For 4 = 10, the optimal exposure is a = 1
for all debt levels. For ' = 100, the optimal domestic exposure is very close to the minimum
feasible exposure level.
Consider the special case of u(c) = c, so that the representative consumer is risk neutral.
From the numerical simulations, it is clear that the optimal domestic exposure is a = 1 for all
debt levels z.
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Figure 1.6: Optimal Domestic Exposure Level
1.4.6 Foreign Debt Issuance
In the model with nontradable debt, it remains to determine the volume of foreign debt issuance
associated with any level of resources raised from abroad z. In general, the domestic exposure
and foreign debt issuance jointly comove as z varies. To help provide intuition for the movements
in Bj, the following proposition applies for cases where the optimal domestic exposure level is
always given by a = 1.
Proposition 1.9 (Foreign Debt Issuance) Let u(c) and f(x) be specified such that a = 1
is the optimal level of exposure for all levels of debt. Then for z E [0, Zmax]:
1. Bf is increasing in z.
2. The interest rate on government debt is increasing in z and the volume of foreign debt
issuance Bf.
The intuition for this result comes from an examination of the effects of an increase in
Bf. This pushes up the ratio of foreign-held to domestically-held debt, D. Such an increase
reduces output in every state because the optimal haircut on domestic debt rises. It has two
opposing effects on repayments. On the one hand, the rise in the ratio increases the optimal
haircut, and this pushes repayments down. On the other hand, the higher value of Bf raises
repayments for any given haircut. Because the haircut is optimally determined, an Envelope
Theorem argument establishes that the first of these effects on the repayment exactly offsets
the output effect, in terms of their respective effects on consumption in period 2. Therefore, the
effect of an increase in foreign debt issuance is a reduction in consumption c2 for every value of
the productivity shock R. A corollary of this result is that the government chooses the lowest
magnitude of B1 that achieves any given level of borrowing z. It is straightforward to prove
that this yields an upward-sloping relation between Bf and z.
Therefore, as z rises, so does the ratio of foreign-held to domestically-held debt. The optimal
haircut rises for all values of the productivity shock R in the final period. The increased default
risk is reflected in a higher default risk premium on government bonds.
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Foreign Debt Issuance and Interest Rates
Numerical implementation of the model utilizes the functional forms for utility and produc-
tion functions given above, with 0$ = 10. As mentioned above, the upper bound of the set G
is zmax = 1.1857. Panel a of figure 1.7 captures the evolution of foreign debt issuance Bf as a
function of the total level of resources raised z. There is a positive relation between the two
variables. As the level of debt grows, the magnitude of Bf required increases at a faster rate.
This is because as foreign debt issuance increases, the optimal haircut in period 2 increases for
all values of the productivity shock R, and the price of foreign debt in period 1 declines. This
is reflected in the interest rate schedule shown in panel b. The interest rate shown by the blue
line is the promised rate to be paid on all debt. The green line is the riskless rate.
1.4.7 Euler Equation
In this subsection, we focus on the intertemporal dimension of the problem. This subproblem
determines the optimal choice of z by the sovereign, taking the optimal combination schedule
C = (a, D, Bf) for any level of debt z as given.
The government problem may be written as follows.
maxE u (y +z)+ + 3u c 2 (z, ))
subject to
Yi + z > 0
c2 (z, ) > 0
zE G.
We define c2 (z, R) to be the optimal schedule of consumption across states of nature R in
period 2, for any given debt level z chosen in period 1. In other words, for any given debt
level z, we choose the optimal combination C* = (a*, D*, B) that achieves this debt level.
c2 (z, R) is the schedule of consumption across states of nature in period 2 corresponding to
the combination C*.
Let us now focus on the choice of z in the government's intertemporal subproblem, and
suppress the dependence of c2 on (z, R). The Euler equation is derived for z in the interior of
u' ( +z) = E u' (c2) d 2  (1.11)
where the equality is replaced with an inequality > for z at the upper boundary of G2 .
For z < 0, Proposition 1.5 applies and the Euler equation reduces to the standard formula
for nondefaultable noncontingent assets, with I = 1 + r.
In the range of debt z > 0, 2 depends on how the optimal combination C* (= *, D*, B
evolves as z changes. Proposition 1.7 states that we may restrict attention to optimal com-
binations where D* = D. To help us understand some basic properties of the government's
intertemporal problem, let us assume that the functions u(c) and f(x) are defined such that
the optimal domestic exposure a is equal to 1 for all levels of debt. We derive the following
result.
Proposition 1.10 (Intertemporal Problem) Let u(c) and f(x) be specified such that a = 1
is the optimal level of exposure for all levels of debt. Then for z E [0, max,]:
1. dz < 0 for all values of the productivity shock R.
3. 1 is increasing in the value of the productivity shock R.
Now to interpret these three findings. The sign of the derivative in the first result indicates
that an increase in the magnitude of z in period 1 necessarily involves a reduction in consumption
for every value of the productivity shock R in period 2. This result is to be expected. In our
environment, an increase in z necessitates an increase in foreign debt issuance B1 , and hence
the ratio -. This reduces consumption in all states of nature, as explained in the previous
subsection.
If the government has the ability to commit to repay, and only noncontingent debt is avail-
able, then the government simply repays the gross return of 1 + r on its debt at every state
of nature in the final period. In our environment, the sovereign does not have the ability to
2 It is possible that a marginal change in the value z causes a jump in the value of c2. We abstract from this
in the main text The appendix discusses the more general case.
commit to repay its debt. It must "purchase commitment" by exposing the economy to an
output cost in the event of default. The true cost of debt issuance in the first period of this
model is the reduction in consumption in the second period. Result 2 of the proposition above
states that the expected consumption cost of a marginal unit of debt exceeds the gross riskless
rate 1 + r. So in expected terms, foreign lenders receive the riskless rate on sovereign debt, but
the domestic economy pays a cost that exceeds this rate of return. In other words, the cost of
"purchasing commitment" is a series of deadweight losses across states of nature in the final
period.
Yet of course, the government does not pay the same consumption cost in every state of
nature. The third result establishes that although an increase in the magnitude of debt depresses
consumption across all states of nature of the final period, the reduction in consumption is
largest in the best states of nature and less severe in the worse states. Thus, the consumption
cost of debt issuance varies across states of nature in a direction that we would expect from fully
contingent debt. Our model supports the contention of Grossman and van Huyck (1988) that
default imparts a contingent property to noncontingent debt. However, note that there is no
reason why the variation in the consumption cost in our model should have the same magnitude
as that observed in the first best case. In particular, for fully contingent debt with government
commitment, repayments in a particular state of nature for a unit of debt would depend on
the productivity realization R and the maximum value of output f (2). In our environment,
repayments depend on R, and additionally on the ratio of foreign to domestic defaultable debt
and the marginal product schedule f' (x). The latter two are not relevant in the first best case.
Consider the special case when the representative consumer has an infinite elasticity of
intertemporal substitution between periods. For P(1 + r) > 1, the government's decision in
the standard case with nondefaultable noncontingent debt is to save the entire endowment:
z = -yl. This is still the optimal policy in our framework. However, the optimal policy in our
model differs from the standard case for 3(1+ r) < 1, for two reasons. Firstly, in our framework
it is not possible to borrow any more than Zmax. Secondly, the higher is the government's chosen
value of z, the lower is average consumption in period 2, and the expected consumption cost of
borrowing exceeds 1 + r. This may reduce the optimal level of borrowing z by the government,
if the expected consumption cost is large enough.
Numerical implementation of the model utilizes the functional forms for utility and pro-
duction functions given in the previous subsection. Figure 1.8 presents the optimal level of
borrowing as a function of yi, the endowment in period 1. For this specification, the govern-
ment borrows less when the endowment in the initial period is higher.
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Figure 1.8: Optimal Debt Level as a Function
of the Initial Endowment
How can we use the above findings to compare different economies? One simple comparison
between an emerging market and a developed country in the context of our model framework
proceeds as follows. For any given productivity shock distribution in period 2, the emerging
market economy has a lower endowment in period 1. In other words, its expected output growth
between periods is higher. Holding the discount factor / constant, the optimal response is for
the emerging market economy to borrow more in the initial period. In order to implement this
borrowing level, the emerging market economy finds it optimal to issue a greater fraction of
its debt to foreign as opposed to domestic debtholders - which means that it has a higher B
ratio.
The emerging market economy enters period 2 with a higher B ratio than the developed
economy. For any value of the productivity shock R in period 2, the emerging market economy
exhibits higher haircuts and lower output. In fact, because the haircut is higher for lower values
of the productivity shock, realized output in period 2 will be an amplification of the productivity
shock. Therefore, even if the shock process in period 2 is the same for all economies, the output
of the emerging market economy will appear to be more volatile.
1.5 Tradable Debt
When defaultable debt is not tradable in the period of issue, the government determines directly
the proportions of cash and defaultable debt in the portfolio of the banking system. This
enables us to focus exclusively on the exposure channel for sustaining debt. Foreign creditors
are willing to lend to the sovereign in period 1 because if the output cost of default in period 2
is sufficiently large, some debt repayments will be made. In this section, we consider a model
where defaultable debt is tradable between foreign creditors and domestic banks in the period
of debt issuance. This adds an additional restriction on the set of feasible debt values - namely,
that the valuation of the marginal unit of debt by domestic and foreign bondholders must be
equal.
The specification with tradable debt quickly becomes intractable. Therefore, the approach
we take is as follows. First, we construct the program for the government problem. Then we
provide some analytical results for a special case of the model: the linear utility case. Clearly,
the choice of the debt level z in this case is trivial, so we do not explore this. We focus instead
on understanding how the optimal combination C = (a, D, Bf) that raises any given level of
debt z differs from the nontradable debt case. The final subsection returns to the general case
with a concave utility function. In this section, we provide numerical simulations to illustrate
the results for the model with tradable debt.
1.5.1 Construction of Program
Definitions 1.1 and 1.2 may again be used to derive the program for the government problem,
under the additional restriction:
PB = q.
The government problem may be written as follows. In period 1:
U1 = max {u(c1 ) + EU 2 (o, D, Bf, R
c,a,D,Bf
subject to
ci = yl + qBf
C, > 0
q = E{1-h(a,D,Bf,R)} for Bf>0
S" for Bf = 0
qu'(cl) = OE{u'(c 2 ) - (1 - h) [1 + Rf'([(1- a)+(1 - h)a]D)] for aD > 0
> " for aD = 0
Bf <0 a = 0
where the expression for the period utility in period 2 is given by
U2 (, D, Bf, R) =max (c2)
c2 ,h
subject to
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
c2 _ 0
y2 _ (1 - a)D + (1 - h) [aD + Bf] (1.12)
0<h<1.
We again assume that y2 is large enough so that the constraint (1.12) is never binding (we
impose limxf'(x) = 0).
x---0
Since there is a continuum of domestic banks, all the gains from investments in period 1
accrue in the end to the consumers in period 2. The willingness of domestic banks to purchase
defaultable debt depends on the discount factor of the representative consumer and the hair-
cuts on defaultable debt in period 2. The Euler equation of the representative consumer for
defaultable debt must be satisfied.
In the specification with nontradable debt, it is necessary to satisfy the Euler equation for
domestic consumers regarding their holdings of the cash and defaultable debt. The prices of
these debt categories, PA and PB, do not appear in any other equation, and therefore the Euler
equations are redundant constraints for the government problem. In particular, it is possible to
solve the government problem and then derive the prices PA and PB as residuals of the exercise.
With tradable defaultable debt, the two Euler equations corresponding to the two types of
debt must also be satisfied for the representative consumer. The price of cash PA can again
be derived as a residual of the government problem. However, since the defaultable debt is
tradable in the period of issue, the same price q must be faced by domestic and foreign lenders.
Therefore, the Euler equation for defaultable debt is not redundant.
We continue using the (a, D, Bj) notation to characterize the problem. Of course, the
government can no longer select a, D and Bf arbitrarily. The government issues a quantity
B of defaultable debt, which is divided between Bd = aD and Bf according to the portfolio
decisions of domestic banks and foreign creditors. But since the government understands the
portfolio decisions and equilibrium conditions, it is equivalent to consider a problem where it
directly selects a combination C = (a, D, Bf), subject to the condition that this combination
is realized in a rational expectations equilibrium.
The problem in period 2 is unchanged. The haircut function h = H (a, D, Bf, R) will be
exactly the same as in the case with nontradable debt. This can be used to derive the bond
price schedule Q (c, D, Bf). Using similar techniques to those applied for the nontradable debt
case, we derive the following representation of the government problem.
Vi = maxE {u(cl) + V2 (z, A)}
Cl ,z
subject to
cl = Yi + z
c1 > 0
A = u'(cl)
(z,A) E G
for some set G.
t = 2':
V2 (z,A)= max E{u(c2)
c2,a,D,Bf
subject to
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
h= H (a,D, Bf, R)
For z < 0, combinations C = (a, D, By) satisfy: a = 0, Bf < 0.
For z = 0, combinations C = (a, D, By) satisfy: Bf = 0, aD = 0.
For z > 0, combinations C = (a, D, Bf) satisfy:
1 E(1 - h) = OE U '  (1 - h) - 1 + f'([(1 - )+(l - h)a] D)] (1.13)
Our notation suppresses the dependence of h on (a, D, Bf, ).
There are now two state variables for the problem, z and A, the marginal utility of con-
sumption in period 1. Relative to the nontradable debt case, we have added the constraint that
foreign creditors and the domestic representative consumer value the marginal unit of debt
equally. Equation (1.13) is the equal marginal valuation constraint.
For debt to exist, i.e., z > 0, both domestic banks and foreign creditors must hold defaultable
debt. If domestic banks hold all the debt, no resources are raised from abroad so z = 0. If
foreign creditors hold all the debt, the government defaults fully on the debt in period 2.
Defaultable debt will have price zero in period 1, so again z = 0. We can ignore combinations
C = (a, D, Bf) where defaultable debt is held solely by either foreigners or domestic banks:
they are allocationally equivalent to a configuration C' = ( D', , B) where no defaultable
debt is issued.
With tradable debt, the shape of the utility function and the discount factor 3 are relevant
for the characterization of the feasible set. The intuition for this result is as follows. The
valuation of defaultable debt by the representative consumer depends on the utility function
and the discount factor 3, from the Euler equation. This may differ from the valuation of the
foreign creditors for two reasons. Firstly, the expected return from holding defaultable debt is
different for domestic banks and foreign creditors, because domestic banks have the extra option
of lending their total post-haircut assets to the firms, and they receive a loan rate from this
market. Therefore, domestic banks receive a higher gross return from holding defaultable debt
than the foreign creditors. Secondly, foreign creditors have a linear utility function, whereas for
the representative consumer u"(c) < 0 is possible. This means that at the margin, the valuation
of defaultable debt by the representative consumer depends on the consumption level in periods
1 and 2. This is not true for the foreign creditor.
Subsection 1.5.3 assumes a linear utility function for the representative consumer and es-
tablishes a restriction on the discount factor 3 for debt to be sustained. The purpose of this
subsection is to examine the feasible set for debt when both the representative consumer and
foreign creditors have the same functional form for the period utility function u(c). The analy-
sis turns on the differences between the gross return on defaultable debt received by domestic
banks and foreign lenders.
After this, we consider the case where the representative consumer has a period utility func-
tion with declining marginal utility, u"(c) < 0. Relative to the linear utility case, this framework
adds the additional factor that a marginal unit of consumption is valued differently across dif-
ferent points in time and states of nature, depending on the consumption level. Numerical
simulations are employed to characterize the solution of the model.
1.5.2 Haircut Decision
The following proposition reiterates the observation regarding the haircut decision in this frame-
work.
Proposition 1.11 (Haircut Decision) The haircut decision h = H (a, D, Bi, R) in the
tradable debt case is exactly the same function as in the nontradable debt case.
1.5.3 Special Case: Linear Utility Function
We provide some analytical results for the case where the utility functions of both the domestic
representative consumer and foreign creditors are linear, i.e., u(c) = c. The state variable A
is always equal to unity and is redundant. Domestic banks are willing to purchase an infinite
quantity of defaultable debt at any price less than
PB= 3E {(1- h)- [1 + Rf' ([(1 - a)+ (1- h)a] D)]},
Foreign creditors are willing to purchase an unlimited quantity at any price below
1
q= 1E(1-h).
1+r
For the tradable debt case, PB = q:
E (1- h)= BE (1- h) - [1 + Rf'([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)]. (1.14)
This is the equal marginal valuation constraint in the linear utility case. The following propo-
sitions immediately follow.
Proposition 1.12 (Feasibility of Debt) If and only if the discount factor 0 E (O, 1+ , it
is feasible for the sovereign to issue debt.
Proposition 1.13 (Maximum Level of Debt) The maximum level of debt depends on 3
and is weakly lower than in the nontradable debt case.
For 0 = , equation (1.14) is inconsistent with a debt level z > 0. Consider any com-
bination C = (a, D, Bf) with Bf > 0. Debt can be raised in period 1, i.e., z > 0, if there
is repayment in some states of nature in period 2. For those states of nature where there is
repayment, it is also true that Rf' (x) > 0. The representative consumer receives a higher gross
return than foreign creditors from holding debt. If they both discount future periods at the
same rate, domestic debtholders value the defaultable debt more and will hold all of the debt.
Foreign agents are not able to hold any defaultable debt, so no resources can be borrowed from
abroad in period 1. Therefore z = 0. Debt cannot be supported in equilibrium. For P = 0,
equation (1.14) is again inconsistent with debt. The representative consumer places a zero value
on the debt. At any positive price, it will not hold any of the defaultable debt. Therefore, there
is no output cost of default in period 2. The optimal policy for the government is to default on
all of its debt in the final period, which means the price of debt in period 1 must be zero by
rational expectations. It is not feasible for the government to issue debt at a positive price in
the first period.
The arguments in the previous paragraph illustrate the new constraint in the tradable debt
case: it is important that domestic banks can be persuaded to hold some, but not all, of the
defaultable debt. If they want to hold all of the debt, foreigners cannot lend to the government.
If they want to hold none of the debt, the exposure mechanism examined in the previous
section of the chapter immediately gives us the result that government debt has no value to the
foreigners.
We turn to the optimal combination C = (a, D, Bf) chosen to raise a given level of debt z
in the linear utility case. If the government saves abroad, the combination C = (0, D, Bf) is
again given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1.14 (Saving) For z < 0, the government chooses: (i) a = 0; (ii) D = D; (iii)
Bf = (1 + r)z.
Next consider z > 0. An amended version of Lemma 1.1 holds for the specification with
tradable debt. This result allows us to focus on a restricted subset of D.
Lemma 1.2 Define D = t. For any combination C = (a, D, Bf) such that D > D, there
exists some other combination C' = ', D', B) where D' = D, such that C' raises the same
revenues as C in perzod 1 and is equivalent to C in terms of repayments abroad, output and
hence consumption for all values of the productivity shock R in period 2. C and C' satisfy the
Euler condition for defaultable debt for the same value of A.
Corollary 1.2 We can restrict our attention to combnations C = (a, D, Bf) such that D E
[0, D].
We seek to analyze how the feasible set of debt values is different relative to the nontradable
debt case. The next proposition establishes that the equal marginal valuation restriction reduces
the size of the feasible set.
Proposition 1.15 (Feasible Domestic Exposure Levels) Fix D = D'. The feaszble set of
(a, z) values is a subset of the feasible set in the nontradable debt case.
Figure 1.9 illustrates this result. Fix D = D'. The bold lines are the boundaries of the
feasible set in the nontradable debt case. For the tradable debt case, we show the feasible set
for a typical case. The set of feasible allocations is the line aT(z).
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Figure 1.9: Feasible Set in the Tradable Debt
Case
The intuition is as follows, for the case where the government issues debt such that in period
2, it repays debt fully in some states of nature and defaults on a portion of it in others. The
exposure mechanism explained in the nontradable debt case also operates here. Therefore for
fixed D = D', a reduction in the exposure level a causes an increase in the haircut in those
states of nature where the haircut was initially interior. This reduces the price that foreigners
are willing to pay for the debt. It also reduces the price that domestic banks are willing to
pay, but by a lesser amount. Therefore, in equilibrium the price q falls and the fraction of
defaultable debt held by foreigners, y = -, declines. Unlike in the nontradable debt case, it is
not possible to vary a and y independently, because of the equal marginal valuation constraint.
Therefore, the feasible set is reduced. However, the relationship between exposure levels and
the haircut is still given by the exposure mechanism described in the nontradable debt case.
Proposition 1.16 (Total Domestic Debt) Total domestic debt may be less than D at the
optimum.
Proposition 1.7 does not hold in the case with tradable debt. The intuition is as follows. Let
us begin with total domestic debt initially set to D, and suppose that the government wishes
to increase expected consumption in period 2. There are two means by which it can implement
this. Firstly, it can keep both D and the proportion of debt held by foreign relative to domestic
lenders = - fixed, and reduce the exposure level of the domestic economy. This reduces
repayments in period 2, hence increasing consumption in that period. However, the exposure
mechanism dictates that this policy necessarily reduces consumption in period 1 by reducing
the debt that can be raised by the government in period 1. The desirability of such a policy
depends on /3.
Alternatively, the government can reduce both D and -y. Let us consider a reduction in
D large enough to reduce output for the highest productivity state of nature. In this state of
nature, it also increases the loans rate in the market for loans in period 2. This increases the
return to holding defaultable debt for the domestic banks for this state of nature, which means
that the proportion of defaultable debt held by domestic banks rather than foreigners must rise.
Therefore, -y declines. This perturbation also increases expected consumption in period 2, but
in this case it is possible (although not certain) that the debt level z rises due to a price effect
on government debt. The higher proportion of debt held by domestic bondholders in period 1
reassures foreign creditors that repayments will be made by the government in period 2, and
this increases the price of government debt sufficiently to increase the debt level z. Therefore,
consumption in both periods may rise. In other words, in this case it is desirable (for any value
of 0/) for the government to constrict output in the second period in order to induce domestic
banks to hold debt, which reduces the interest rate on the debt.
For concave utility, additional factors work to reduce the total domestic debt level below D.
Firstly, suppose that the perturbation above reduces consumption in period 1 (via a change in
z). Such a perturbation may still be desirable for a risk averse representative consumer, because
consumption increases for the worst productivity shock values in period 2. The perturbation
offers insurance in these states of nature. Secondly, consider a reduction in D that does not
reduce output in period 2, because the haircuts are always strictly interior. Nevertheless, such
a perturbation changes haircuts in different states of nature. For the linear utility case, this
affects the valuation of debt by foreigners and domestic banks equiproportionately, so it does
not change the proportion of debt in the hands of foreigners. If utility is concave, the marginal
utility of domestic consumption varies across different states of nature, while the same is not
true for foreign creditors. This means that the proportions of government debt held by foreign
and domestic debtholders may indeed change, and this may be desirable.
1.5.4 Optimal Debt Issuance Policy for Concave Utility Case
For the concave utility case, the equal marginal valuation constraint is reproduced below. The
marginal unit of debt must be valued equally by foreign creditors and domestic banks:
- 1 ( h)= E (1-h)- 1+1f'([(1-a)+(1-h)a]D) .
1 + r u'(cl)
The difference from the linear utility case is that now, the valuation of defaultable debt by
the domestic representative consumer depends on the consumption levels in periods 1 and 2.
This is not true for the foreign creditor. This alters the feasible set and makes the levels of the
endowment yl and Y2 relevant, since they affect the marginal utility of consumption in the two
periods.
The analysis of the linear utility case was presented in order to provide some analytical
intuition for the tradable debt specification. For the case with concave utility, we present nu-
merical simulations rather than further analytical exercises. The numerical exercise utilizes the
same functional forms and parameter values for the production function presented in subsection
1.4.4. We use a constant relative risk aversion utility function
u(c) = log(c)
The discount factor is / = 0.8. We set yl = 15 and y2 = 9. For these parameters, it is not
possible to borrow more than Zmax = 0.3750 units of real resources from abroad in period 1.
Panel a of figure 1.10 shows how the optimal exposure of the domestic economy varies with
the asset level. For the region z < 0, a is set to zero and for z = 0, the level of a is irrelevant.
For the region z > 0, full domestic exposure (a = 1) is always optimal for the functional forms
and parameter configuration detailed above. The optimal level of total domestic debt is shown
in panel b. When the government decides to borrow from abroad, it finds it optimal to reduce
the magnitude of total domestic debt below the output-maximizing level D. The optimal level
of foreign debt issuance is monotonically increasing in the debt level.
How much does the government borrow from abroad? Figure 1.11 allows the initial endow-
ment yl to vary and displays the debt choice of the government as a function of this endowment.
The government borrows less if the initial endowment is higher.
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Figure 1.10: Optimal Debt Issuance Policy in the Tradable Debt Case
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Figure 1.11: Optimal Debt Level as a
Function of the Initial Endowment
1.6 Policy Implications
The model developed in this chapter provides an analytical framework within which to evaluate
particular policy recommendations to improve the welfare of the economy.
1.6.1 Enhance Commitment Power
If the government can commit in period 1 to a schedule of haircuts in period 2, and if it can
save abroad and issue debt at the same time, then the first best can be achieved. The key
observation is that the exposure mechanism no longer applies. The government can commit to
repay its debt even if domestic banks do not hold any of it. Therefore, there is no need for the
economy to subject itself to output costs in period 2.
In our model, repayments to foreign creditors are increasing in the productivity shock R.
Therefore, the debt repayments vary across states of nature in a direction that we would desire
from fully contingent debt. However, the first best case has higher welfare than the lack of
commitment case, for two reasons. Firstly, nothing ensures that the magnitude of variations in
repayment in our model are of the same magnitude as in the first best case. In particular, for
fully contingent debt with government commitment, repayments in a particular state of nature
for a unit of debt would depend on the productivity realization R and the maximum value of
output f (2). In our environment, repayments depend on R, and additionally on the ratio of
foreign to domestic defaultable debt and the marginal product schedule f' (x). The latter two
are not relevant for the first best case. Secondly, the government must expose the domestic
economy to output costs of default in order to be able to effectively commit to repay a portion
of its debt. But ex post, such a policy results in output costs in period 2. These output costs
are a deadweight welfare cost that is borne by the domestic economy.
Whether the first best can be implemented in the prevailing legal environment is question-
able. In essence, courts must be able to enforce contractual adherence by the government to
any promised repayment schedule. For example, the government could issue debt with court-
enforceable repayments that are contingent on the productivity shock or the output level.
1.6.2 Improving Creditor Rights
Suppose that international institutions can strengthen the courts such that debtholders are
able to enforce repayments of their claims on the sovereign, but that the government can only
issue noncontingent debt. We consider the limiting case where the haircut is zero for all values
of the productivity shock R. The model reduces to the framework with nondefaultable and
noncontingent debt. Again, the government is able to commit to repay its debt without having
to subject the domestic economy to output costs in period 2.
Such a policy has several distinct effects on welfare. Firstly, in the tradable debt case it
may be desirable for the government to restrict output. It is no longer optimal to do so, and
the economy benefits from this. Secondly, the economy may also benefit from an increase in
the debt limit in the nondefaultable debt case as opposed to the defaultable debt case. Thirdly,
the average consumption cost of borrowing falls to 1 + r. Borrowing is no longer associated
with a schedule of deadweight output losses borne by the domestic economy. The reduction in
the average cost of borrowing benefits the domestic economy and tends to increase the level
of borrowing in period 1. Finally, the policy may have one negative effect on welfare. In
particular, the repayments on debt are no longer effectively contingent on the state of nature
R. This hurts the domestic consumers in the case of concave utility, and tends to decrease the
level of borrowing in period 1.
Numerical simulations to evaluate the effects of improving creditor rights are presented be-
low in figure 1.12. The parametrization of the model follows the specification used in subsection
1.5.4. Utility is higher in the full repayment case than in the nontradable and tradable debt
specifications of the model in this chapter. The level of borrowing by the government is sub-
stantially higher in the case with improved creditor rights. This shows that the reduction in
the average consumption cost of borrowing dominates the removal of the contingency of debt
repayments.
Figure 1.12: Effect of Improving Creditor Rights
Full repayment Nontradable Tradable
Expected Utility 4.789 4.786 4.786
a/ 1 1
D 1 1 0.927
Bf 0.980 0.248 0.230
z 0.934 0.214 0.214
Average h 0 0.094 0.022
Average p 1 1.025 1.025
Zma x  8.571 1.186 0.357
1.6.3 Reduction in Domestic Exposure
Finally, international financial institutions may instruct the government to reduce the vulner-
ability of the domestic economy to defaultable debt. To analyze such a policy, see figure 1.9
above. Fix the total domestic debt level D. For the nontradable debt case, a forced reduction in
the level of domestic exposure a necessarily reduces the maximum level of debt zmax that can be
raised from abroad. For both nontradable and tradable debt cases, the domestic exposure level
in our model is an optimal response of the economy to the lack of commitment of the sovereign.
Therefore, any recommendation by outside institutions to reduce the level of domestic exposure
below the level chosen by the government is welfare-decreasing. It does not solve the market
imperfections that are the underlying reason for the high observed domestic exposure level.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed the government's optimal default and debt issuance decisions
within a model framework that incorporates lack of commitment of the sovereign and domestic
output costs of default. The assumed market imperfections generate an output cost from debt
repudiation which depends both on the fraction of debt held by foreign as opposed to domestic
lenders, and on the exposure of the domestic economy to government-issued defaultable debt.
Our results fall into two broad categories. Firstly, we examine the repayment decision. We
characterize the optimal default decision of the government and relate this decision to both the
inherited debt variables and the productivity shock. We obtain that the government may not
wish to fully default on its debt if the domestic output costs of default are sufficiently high on
the margin, relative to the marginal benefits. This in turn confirms that debt can be sustained
in this model by the output costs alone. Reputation effects are not required. Secondly, we
examine the optimal debt issuance decision in the period prior to repayment. The government
recognises that its debt issuance policy will affect the incentives to default in future periods,
both by affecting the domestic output cost of default and by determining the distribution of
losses from the default decision across domestic and foreign debtholders.
Two key mechanisms play an important role in the debt issuance decision. The exposure
mechanism captures the fact that the government can effectively "purchase commitment" to
repay its debt in future periods by exposing the domestic economy to severe output costs if
the government reneges on its repayment obligations. Indeed, if the government wishes to
borrow more resources from abroad, or if it wishes to raise the same amount more cheaply,
it may find it necessary to increase the exposure of the domestic economy to assure foreign
creditors of its intention to repay. We should expect that governments increase the fragility of
the domestic economic environment, making output more vulnerable to the default decision, in
order to be able to borrow more ex ante. This is an optimal response to the government's lack
of commitment. We should also observe that these output costs are in fact realized when the
government is confronted by adverse productivity shocks. In future states of nature where the
productivity shock realization is low, the government will still find it optimal to default, because
it can push some of the burden onto foreign creditors. Default imparts some contingency onto
debt repayments that are otherwise contractually noncontingent.
The exposure mechanism applies whether the defaultable debt is tradable or not in the
period of issue. When debt is tradable in the period of issue, a new restriction is imposed
on the feasible set for debt issuance. In particular, the government can no longer force the
domestic banking system to hold the quantities of cash and defaultable debt that the govern-
ment chooses. Banks choose their portfolios optimally. Specifically, there is an equal marginal
valuation restriction: both domestic and foreign lenders must hold debt and value the marginal
unit of debt equally, if debt is to be sustained. If domestic banks value the debt more highly
than foreign creditors, they purchase most of the debt and it is difficult for the government to
raise resources from abroad. If domestic banks are unwilling to hold much of the debt, then
foreign creditors will anticipate high defaults by the government in the subsequent period, and
the price of government debt will be low. This again constrains the ability of the government
to raise resources from abroad.
Whether the nontradable or tradable debt specifications are more accurate descriptions of
reality is debatable. If governments are able to mandate that domestic banks hold a certain
fraction of government or other assets in their portfolio, then the nontradable debt specification
may be more appropriate. In general however, if domestic banks have unhindered access to
secondary markets where they can purchase and sell government debt, it is more desirable to
examine the predictions of the tradable debt case. Possible justifications for the government
executing equal haircuts on foreign and domestic creditors include that the government cannot
observe who is holding the debt at the moment of repayment, or that the existence of secondary
markets imposes constraints on the government's ability to effectively execute different haircuts
on different groups of lenders. For these interpretations, it is more natural to assume that the
debt should also be tradable in the period of issue.
Since the exposure of the domestic economy is an optimal response to the underlying problem
of the sovereign's lack of commitment, recommendations by international financial institutions
to reduce the exposure of the economy to default may have the counterintuitive side-effect of a
reduction in the ability of the government to borrow from abroad, and in general may reduce
welfare if the advice is binding. This feature of the model derives from the benevolent govern-
ment setup, since it decides to impose costs on the domestic economy optimally. Improvements
in creditor rights reduce the average cost of borrowing because deadweight losses in output are
no longer necessary to induce repayment by the government. However, if only noncontingent
debt contracts are available, then the loss of contingency in repayments associated with such a
reform may hurt welfare.
1.8 Appendix
1.8.A. Proofs of Results in the Main Text
Proof of Formulations of the Government Problem in Subsection 1.4.1.
Let us consider conditions (a)-(f) of Definition 1.1. Since there is a continuum of banks, com-
petition between banks for the savings of the consumers will result in zero profits for the banks
(HB = 0), and all the gains from the banks' investments accrues to the consumers. Combining
the consumer and bank problems:
PAu'(cl) = iE{u'(c 2 ) . p} for Ad > 0
> " for Ad = 0
Pu'(cl) = E{u'(c2) (1 - h) . p} for Bd > 0
Si " for Bd = 0
The consumer budget constraints (1.2) and (1.3) hold with equality, and c1 , c2 > 0. For u"(c) <
0, the consumer problem is convex and these conditions are necessary and sufficient for a
maximum. For u"(c) = 0, banks wish to purchase an infinite quantity of cash if the price PA
is less than OE {p}, and none if the price exceeds this level. They wish to purchase an infinite
quantity of defaultable debt if the price PB is less than /E {(1 - h) - p}, and none if the price
exceeds this level.
As described in Section 2, equilibrium in the market for loans in period 2 establishes that
the loan rate is a function of the total post-haircut assets of the banking system:
p = 1 + Rf'(X)
Firm profits in equilibrium are given by
HF, = X + Rf(X)- + f'(X) X
Substitute the two government budget constraints, the expression for savings and firm profits
into the consumer budget constraint:
cl < yl + qBf
c2 Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf (x)
where
x < Ad + (1 - h)Bd
Given bank investments and firm profits, substituting the government budget constraints into
the consumer budget constraint yields the resource constraints. If we include the government
budget constraint and the resource constraint, we can drop the consumer budget constraint
from the problem.
Equation (1.7) determines the price q, and is included as the rational expectations constraint
on the problem.
Now let us apply Definition 1.2. It is an optimum for the government budget constraints
to hold with equality, so the resource constraints above will hold with equality. We do require
that the representative consumer's Euler conditions hold. However, the prices PA and PB do
not appear in any other equation, and therefore the Euler equations are redundant constraints
for the problem. In particular, it is possible to solve the government problem and then derive
the prices PA and PB as residuals of the exercise. Finally, it is not necessary to keep track of
T1 and T 2 for the problem (these quantities can be calculated as residuals from the solution
to the government program), so we drop the equations that define them. This yields the first
specification of the government program presented in the main text.
The condition limxf'(x) = 0 establishes that the optimal values of both D and Bj can be
x--- O
bounded from above. The upper bound on D follows from Corollary 1.1. The upper bound on
Bf follows from the existence of a maximum level of debt (shown in the proof of Proposition
1.6) and Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 1.9. See below. U
The second specification is derived from the first as follows. We assume that Y2 is large
enough so that constraint (1.9) is never binding. As mentioned in the text, a sufficient condition
on the production function to ensure that this approach is valid is: limxf'(x) = 0.
x---O
Let us consider the determination of the haircut h in period 2. Notice that the haircut
appears only inside the u (c2) expression in the final period. The first order condition with
respect to h in this period yields:
U' (c2) [Bf - Rf' ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) - aD= 0.
If h is interior, it must satisfy this first order condition. It is also possible for the haircut h to
be at the boundaries 1 or 0 if the expression inside the square brackets is always positive or
negative, respectively. The equation above provides the expression for the haircut in the main
text, expression (1.10). The key result is that the haircut may be written in the form
h= H (oa,D,Bf, 
.
Therefore the bond price can be derived:
lrE{1-H(a,D,Bf,R)}Q (O, D, Bf) = E 1 - H , D, B,
Replace the haircut decision and the bond price with the above expressions. Next we reduce
the number of state variables. Use the law of iterated expectations and define U1 = EU1 ,
U2 (q, Bf) = EU 2 (q, Bf). The government problem in period 1 can be written:
The government problem may be written as follows. In period 1:
= max E {u(ci) + 3U2 (q, Bf)
c ,q,Bf
subject to
cl = yl + qBf
cl > 0
(q, Bf) E C,
where the expression U2 (q, Bf) is defined by the program:
U2 (q, Bf)= max E {u (c 2 )}C2,a,D
subject to
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
h = H (a,D, B,i) .
q = Q (c, D, Bf)
Bf < O=ea =O
where G is the set of feasible (q, Bf) pairs generated by the q = Q (a, D, Bf) relation. Notice
that the second subproblem involves the government choosing (a, D) before the productivity
shock in the second period is realized.
Finally, define
V2 (z) = maxU2 (q, Bf)
q,Bf
subject to
qBf = z.
Then we derive the second version of the government program presented in the main text.
The set of feasible asset values G is unbounded below. It is bounded above by the maximum
value that can be achieved by the function Q (ce, D, Bf) - Bf. This value will depend upon the
specification of the production function and the range of possible values for the productivity
shock. U
Proof of Formulations of the Government Problem in Subsection 1.5.1.
This first specification of the government program is derived in a similar manner as above, but
with the new restriction: pB = q. The representative consumer's Euler equation for defaultable
debt is not redundant because the price in this equation q appears elsewhere in the government
problem. The representative consumer's Euler equation for cash is redundant. U
The second version of the goverment program in the main text follows the approach for
nontradable debt, but again with the new restriction: PB = q. It is important to check the
cases where the defaultable debt is held entirely by either domestic agents (in which case Bf = 0)
or foreign creditors (in which case aD = 0). We obtain the following government program.
Vi = maxE {u(cl) + 3V2 (z, A)}
Cl ,Z
subject to
Cl = yi + z
ci > 0
A = u'(ci)
(z, A) eG
for some set G, where the expression V2 (z, A) is given by
V2 (z, A)= max E {u(c 2 )}
c2 ,a,D,Bf
subject to
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
h= H (ca,D, Bf, k)
If z < 0, combinations C = (a, D, Bf) satisfy: a = 0, Bf < 0.
If z = 0, combinations C = (a(s), D(s), Bf(s)) satisfy one of:
(i) BI = 0, aD = 0;
(ii) Bf = 0, aD > 0 with
I I E(1- h) :p2)E ( (1-h)- [1+Rf'([(1-a)+(1-h)a]D)I + r A
(iii) Bf > 0 with
1
-- E (1- h) = 0l+r
If z > 0, combinations C = (a, D, Bf) satisfy:
z= B E (1-h)
1+r
zA = BfE {u'(c2) (1- h) -[1 + Rf'([(1- a) + (1- h)a] D)] }.
Our notation suppresses the dependence of h on (a, D, Bf, R).
Now consider cases (ii) and (iii) for the debt level z = 0. Case (ii) can be replicated by
issuing no defaultable debt and by issuing D units of cash instead. Case (iii) can be replicated
by issuing zero defaultable debt. Therefore, without loss of generality, we may ignore these
cases and assume that no defaultable debt is issued when the sovereign wishes to raise zero
debt. This yields the formulation in the main text. U
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
In the first best case, the economy has access to contingent debt. Assume that y2 is sufficiently
high so that the government wishes to make net repayments abroad in every state of nature in
period 2. Then the ability to save and borrow at the same time in period 1 is redundant, and
the government chooses only to issue debt. Also assume that y2 is sufficiently high so that the
government always has enough resources to repay all of its debt if it so wishes. Consider the
nontradable debt case. Output in period 2 is maximized by setting Ad d, Bd to any value
and the government problem reduces to the form written in the proposition. Results 2 and 3
of the proposition follow immediately.
For the tradable debt case, an additional constraint is added to the problem which reduces
the feasible set:
E I(1- h) > E ().(1 - h). -+Rf'(x) .
1 + r - u'(cl) [I+ )]
This ensures that domestic banks do not purchase all of the defaultable debt, so foreign creditors
hold some of the debt and the economy can borrow resources from abroad. It can be verified
that the first best optimum in the nontradable debt case remains in the feasible set of the
tradable debt case, now for some specific Bd > 0. The government sets Bd at this value and
issues total defaultable debt B = Bd + By. U
Proof of Proposition 1.2.
Assume that y2 is sufficiently high so that the government always has enough resources to
repay all of its debt if it so wishes. Consider the nontradable debt case. The government can
set Ad > x to maximize output in period 2 and Bd is set to any value. The government problem
for Bf reduces to the form written in the proposition. Results 2 and 3 of the proposition follow
immediately. For the tradable debt case, the additional constraint on the feasible set is now:
I u'(c2) [lfU Q (X)]
1 +- u'(ci)
The optimum for the nontradable debt case remains feasible in the tradable debt case, now for
some specific Bd > 0. The government sets Bd at this value and issues total defaultable debt
B = Bd+Bf. U
Proof of Lemma 1.1.
The optimal haircut by the government for any realization of the productivity shock R is derived
by the maximization of the expression for consumption in period 2. This helps us to understand
the output and consumption profiles in period 2. For any realization of the productivity shock
R, output is given by Rf (x), where x = [(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D. Consumption is given by the
formula
c2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bj + Rf (x).
Consider a combination C = (a, D, Bf) such that D > D, or equivalently, a combination
(Ad, Bd, Bf) such that [Ad + Bd] > D. We consider the possible cases.
Case 1: 0 < Ad < D.
Keep Ad unchanged. Reduce the magnitudes of Bd and Bj equiproportionately until [Ad + Bd] =
D. This combination C' raises the same revenues as C in period 1 and is equivalent to C in terms
of repayments abroad, output and hence consumption for every realization of the productivity
shock R in period 2.
Case 2: Ad > D.
Set Ad = D and Bd = Bf = 0. This combination C' raises the same revenues as C in period 1
and is equivalent to C in terms of repayments abroad, output and hence consumption for every
realization of the productivity shock R in period 2. U
Proof of Corollary 1.1.
This immediately follows from Lemma 1.1. U
Proof of Proposition 1.3.
The formula in this proposition follows from the following equation:
Bf= f' ([Ad + (1 - h)Bd]). (1.15)
RBd
and the restriction established by Corollary 1.1. Given the assumptions on the production
function, (f')- [7] is strictly decreasing in the argument y. This yields the comparative statics
listed. U
Proof of Proposition 1.4.
The first order condition with respect to the haircut h in period 2 yields equation (1.15), which
is illustrated in figure 1.3. This characterizes the solution for interior h. The upper bound for
the haircut is binding when
()f LdI< Ad.
RBd
This condition may hold for states of nature with lower productivity realizations R. Denote
these states by the set S1 = {R, ..., R*}. The zero bound for the haircut is binding when
SRBd AdB
This condition may apply for states of nature with higher productivity realizations R. Denote
these states by the set S3 = {R**,..., R}.
The first order condition determines the haircut when it is interior, i.e., for states between
R* and R** (non-inclusive). Let us denote these states by the set S 2 . The above argument
establishes the formula for the total real resources raised by the government as a function of
the combination (Ad, Bd, Bf):
z 1 E(1 - h)Bf - Pr(R)
RES
1+r
RES2
- Ad Pr(R) + 1 Bf Pr()
86s3
where we define y = B
The final step of the proof is to show that formula (1.16) can yield z > 0 for some choice of
configuration (Ad, Bd, Bf). Set Ad = 0 and Bd = D. Equation (1.16) reduces to
S +r (f')-1 R Pr(R).1+-r R
RES [
Choose any -y > 0. Then (f')- [i] E (0, 2). The absolute value of borrowing is positive, as
required. U
Proof of Proposition 1.5.
For negative debt values z < 0, i.e., saving abroad,
foreign institutions credibly commit to fully repay.
domestic residents. Therefore:
there is no default by foreigners because
The government can only issue cash to
f ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) = f (D)
Bf
l+r
It is straightforward to see that the proposition follows. U
(1.16)
Proof of Proposition 1.6.
Step 1: Attainment of a maximum z for each (Ad, Bd) pair.
Equation (1.16) yields
Z = 1 E - (fl)- - Ad Pr(R) + l+rPr(R)
RcS 2  RES 3
= (f') P r (fR)
1+r R
RESS 2 ES3
Fix Ad and Bd > 0 and treat this expression as a function of y E [0, oo). It is continuous in
y. First, consider Ad > 0. It can be shown that there exists a value YM(Ad, Bd) such that for
all 7 > yM(Ad, Bd), the sets S2 and S3 are empty and therefore z = 0. This feature means
that the supremum value of z must be achieved for -7 within the compact set [0, yM(Ad, Bd).
Apply the Weierstrass Theorem for the function defined on this compact set. This proves that
expression (1.17) attains a maximum for some -y in this set. All values of z between 0 and the
maximum value can be achieved.
Next, consider Ad = 0 and B d > 0. A different approach is required. The set S1 is now
empty, and equation (1.17) reduces to:
3z C (f ') Pr(!R) + + Bd Pr(R) (1.18)
1 + r $ 1+
Consider each of the functions for values of the productivity shock R:
R1
An increase in 7 corresponds to a reduction in x. The function g(, R) can be written as:
g(, R) = Rf' (x) - x for x = (f') 1 [].
We assume that limxf'(x) = 0. This establishes that lim g(y, R) = 0 V -, and hence that
x--O 7y--oo
lim Eg(y, R) = 0.
Whatever the value of Bd, as -y increases there eventually comes a point when the set S3
becomes empty. Therefore, the limit of the expression (1.18) as y - 00 is equal to the limit of
the same expression without the second term.
lim z(-y) = lim Eg(y, R) = 0.
-/--*o r--'oo
There exists debt for this case Ad = 0, Bd > 0. Choose any value -y > 0, and this yields a
positive value of debt, say zl. Let us pick a value of e E (0, zl). This value of e corresponds
to a number -YM (0, Bd) such that z is lower than e for all -y > -M (0, Bd). Then we know
that the supremum level of debt that can be attained lies in the set [0, 7YM (0, Bd)]. Apply the
Weierstrass Theorem for the continuous function (1.18) over this compact set. This establishes
that the maximum is attained. Furthermore, all values of z between 0 and the maximum value
can be achieved.
For Bd = 0, z = 0 irrespective of the value of Ad.
Step 2: Comparative statics with respect to a, given D = D'.
Fix D = D'. Consider an increase in Ad and an equal reduction in Bd. Furthermore, change
Bf so as to preserve the value of the ratio y = . This corresponds to a reduction in a.
The perturbation considered reduces the value of the function in expression (1.17) for any given
value of y, both through a fall in the second term and a possible reduction in the set of states S2
for which the upper bound on the haircut is not binding. Therefore, the maximum value of the
expression given by equation (1.17) must be lower (the maximum is still attained, by repeated
application of the Weierstrass Theorem). This establishes that a (z) is weakly increasing in z.
For z = 0, we may set y = 0. The value of Ad does not matter. Therefore a (0) = 0.
From the argument above, the highest value of the expression (1.17) is achieved when Ad = 0.
Therefore a (zmax (D')) = 1. U
Proof of Proposition 1.7.
There are two steps of the proof.
Step 1: The zero bound for the haircut is never binding at the optimal combination
C = (a, D, Bf).
Proof by contradiction.
Case 1: Bj > 0.
Suppose that the optimal combination C = (a, D, Bf) satisfies D < (f')-[ . The zero
bound for the haircut is binding for states in the set S3 = {R**, ... , R}. For these states:
( f- 1 [ ' > D
Bf
=- --- < f' (D).
RBd
Consider the following perturbation: an infinitesimal equiproportionate increase in the magni-
tudes of Bd and Bf that preserves the value of the ratio -y = . This perturbation is feasible.
Since Bd and Bf take positive values, the perturbation involves dBd, dBf > 0.
For states of nature in the set S\S3, the perturbation does not change repayments abroad,
output or consumption. For states of nature in the set 83, the perturbation does have an effect.
Note that
c2 (a,D, B,R) = y2 - (1 - h)Bf + +Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
where
h = H (a,D,B,i) 
.
We suppress the dependence of c2 on (a, D, Bf, R) in our notation. For values of the produc-
tivity shock R E S 3 , the perturbation has the following effect on c2:
dc2 = -d[( l-h)Bfl] + Rdf
B
= dBd + Rf' (D) dBd
> dBd + dB= 0.
Bd RBd
So the perturbation increases consumption c2 and increases repayments abroad for these states
of nature. The second effect increases z in the initial period, which means higher consumption
in period 1.
Therefore, the perturbation considered increases consumption in period 1 and weakly in-
creases consumption for every value of the productivity shock R in period 2. The original
combination cannot have been optimal. This argument means that we choose D such that:
D > (f,)-I [ 
.
Case 2: Bf = 0.
Suppose that the optimal combination C = (a, D, Bf) satisfies D < D. The optimal government
policy in period 2 is not to default at all. Consider the following perturbation: an infinitesimal
increase in the magnitude of D. This is feasible, and leaves the optimal policy unchanged. The
perturbation has the following effect:
dc2 = Rdf
= Rf'(D)dD>O0, R.
So the perturbation increases consumption C2 for all values of the productivity shock R in the fi-
nal period, while leaving consumption in the initial period unchanged. The original combination
cannot have been optimal.
Step 2: Completion of Proof.
This immediately follows from the above. U
Proof of Proposition 1.8.
We optimally set D = D, so the set S3 is empty.
The appproach in this proof is to take a given combination C = (a, D, Bf) which raises
debt z such that a > a (z), and to ask whether this combination is optimal. In particular,
one perturbation we consider is to reduce the level of domestic exposure a and adjust Bf
appropriately so that the same level of debt z is raised in period 1.
Step 1: Optimal size of Bj for any given exposure level.
Consider two combinations C = (D, D, By) and C' = (a, D, B) which raise the same level
of debt z. The exposure level is the same but for combination C', the ratio y' = - is larger
than ~ = --. It can be shown that the combination C' is not optimal. For any given level
of domestic exposure, we choose the lowest value of Bf that raises any given level of debt z.
For the basic idea behind this part of the proof, see the proof of Proposition 1.9. The corollary
of this result is that if we plot the debt level z as a function of -y for a given level of a, a
necessary condition for a combination C = (a, D, Bf) to be optimal is that it lies either (i) on
the upward-sloping portion of the graph, or (ii) at a local (non-global) maximum of the graph.
We assume this condition holds.
Step 2: Perturbation that reduces a and increases = .
Let us increase Ad by an infinitesimal amount, so that the exposure level a falls. This cor-
responds to a downward shift in the graph of z against -y described above, with a greater
downward shift for higher 7 values. From the information in Step 1 of this proof, it is therefore
only feasible to raise the same level of debt z by increasing y. The increase in -y is marginal if
the combination was initially on the upward-sloping portion of the graph, and it is a discrete
jump in y if the combination was initially at a local (non-global) maximum. In the latter case,
there is a discrete fall in consumption and the perturbation is not optimal. The remainder of
this proof concentrates on the former case. We split the perturbation into two stages.
Increase Ad, and reduce Bd and Bf equiproportionately to keep D = D and ~y =
constant. For states of nature R E S1, repayments abroad in period 2 are unaffected, but
output (and hence consumption) is affected in the final period:
dc2 = Rf' (Ad) dAd > 0.
For states of nature R E S2, output is unaffected, but repayments fall:
dc2 = f dAd > 0.
Bd
This perturbation reduces the debt level z.
Increase Bf until the debt level z rises to the initial level. For states of nature R E S1,
repayments abroad, output and consumption in period 2 are unaffected.
For states of nature R E S2, repayments rise and consumption falls. Adapting the expression
in the proof of Proposition 1.9:
dc2 {( 1 [] Ad} dY < 0.
Now combine the two components of the perturbation described above, and set dAd and dy so
that the level of debt raised z is unchanged as a result of the perturbation. For states of nature
RE 81"
dc2 = Rf' (Ad) dAd > 0.
For states of nature R E S2:
dc2 -1 7 + [(f,']' [i] Pr(R) -dy (fI - Ad.
RES 2
It is straightforward to prove that:
d
EC s2 {dc2} < 0, {dc 2} < 0 V R E S2.dR
Consider the set S2. Such a deviation depresses average consumption in the set S2, but con-
sumption is depressed less in states of nature which receive a worse productivity shock. For
permissible production functions f(x), it is possible that the combination of deviations actu-
ally increases consumption for the worst productivity shock realizations within S 2 in period 2.
This may apply even if set S1 is empty. If S1 is not empty, of course, consumption necessarily
increases for the worst realizations of the productivity shock R.
It follows that there exist some utility functions u(c) with sufficiently high risk aversion
such that the representative consumer finds this perturbation optimal. The sovereign finds it
optimal to reduce the level of domestic exposure because this perturbation enables the sovereign
to purchase some insurance across states of nature against the productivity shock realization
R. .
Proof of Proposition 1.9.
Step 1: Proof that it is optimal to choose the lowest level of y that achieves a given
debt level z.
We set D = D, and let u(c), f(x) and y2 be specified such that a = 1 is the optimal level
of exposure for all levels of debt. Then sets S1 and S3 are empty. Consider any combination
C = (1, D, B1 ) and define = f-. What is the effect of an infinitesimal increase in y on
consumption in period 2?
dc2 = -d [(1 - h)B/] + Rdf
where
-d[(1-h)Bf] = -d[(1-h)Bd.1]
= -- d [(1 - h)Bd] - (1 - h)Bd d7
and
R RR
Therefore
dc2 = (f')-1  - d <0. (1.19)
We have presented full details of the mathematical derivation, but since the haircut decision is
always interior and set in an optimal manner, the final result can be reached more concisely via
application of the Envelope Theorem. The expression dc2 takes the same sign for all - E [0, 00oo).
Thus an increase in the ratio -y always reduces consumption c2 for all values of the produc-
tivity shock R in period 2. Now suppose that the same level of z can be achieved for two levels
of the ratio B given by yi and 'Y2 > yl1. Both values of 7 achieve the same level of consumption
in period 1, but _Y2 results in lower consumption than yl in period 2. Therefore the lower value
of 7 must be optimal.
Step 2: Completion of proof.
Equation (1.17) reduces to
z = 1 (fw ) Pr(R).
1+r R
RES
The above expression is continuous in -y E [0, oo). Imposing that lim xf'(x) = 0, the relevant
x-*O
set for y is a compact set of the form [0, 'ymax] and the maximum value of z is attained on this
set). Step 1 of the proof implies that the optimal Bf value will lie within the region [0, -Ymax]
Continuity of the z(-y) function and application of the result in step 1 of the proof yields the
result that the optimal Bf is increasing in z.
From result 1 of Proposition 1.3, an increase in Bf increases the optimal haircut for all
values of the productivity shock R, and hence the interest rate on government debt. U
Proof of Proposition 1.10.
We set D = D. Let u(c), f(x) and Y2 be specified such that a = 1 is the optimal level of
exposure for all levels of debt. The condition lim xf'(x) = 0 means that the set of feasible
x--+o
debt levels takes the form [0, zmax]. Note also that the expression for z as a function of - is
continuous and differentiable. As the desired level of debt z varies, the optimal level of y (and
hence Bf) may exhibit discontinuities. The Euler condition needs to take this into account.
The left derivative takes the form:
Ac 2  - (1+r) (f)-I ]< 0,
Sdz (Efi [1] + [(fl'] []}
which approaches oo for y corresponding to a point of discontinuity). The right derivative takes
the above form at points when the optimal Bf schedule is continuous in z, but the following
form at points of discontinuity:
Ac 2  L(s)) = -dz < 0,d z 1E ( [') + f ') -1]R
where Aqy is the jump in y at the point of discontinuity.
The above argument proves the first claim in the proposition. The third claim follows from
the formulae presented above and equation (1.19), which can be used to prove that a downward
jump in -y improves consumption more for higher realizations of the productivity shock R.
The second claim in the proposition is proven as follows. First, consider the left derivative
and define
Y (zi) = q( 1 []
S{(f I [] -  [(f))-]' [
We prove that:
~ ~ = E{x}
,z, R > 1,
EX +x E f
which establishes the result desired. A similar argument applies for the right derivative, after
taking the points of discontinuity into account. U
Proof of Proposition 1.11.
This is identical to the proof of Proposition 1.3. U
Proof of Proposition 1.12.
Domestic banks are willing to purchase an infinite quantity of defaultable debt at any price less
than
PB = 3E {(1 - h) - [i + f'(1- a) + (1 h)a] D)]}
Foreign creditors are willing to purchase an unlimited quantity at any price below
1
q= 1E(1-h)
1+r
For the tradable debt case, PB = q:
E (1- h) = OE (1 - h [1 + Rf'([(1- a)+ (1- h)a] D)]} (1.20)
Only if:
Let p > - Consider any combination C = (a, D, Bf) with Bf > 0 and z > 0. Debt can be
raised in period 1 if there is repayment for some values of the productivity shock R in period 2.
For those states of nature where there is repayment, it is also true that Rf' (x) > 0. The right
hand side of the above equation exceeds the left hand side. Equation (1.20) does not hold, so
debt is not feasible.
Let = 0. Whatever the combination C = (a, D, Bf), domestic banks are not willing to
purchase debt at any positive price. Debt cannot be sustained.
If:
Let f0 (E , 1 .) We prove the existence of debt by construction. For this case, there exists a
finite B = > 0 such that:
1 = P (1 + r) [1 + y*]. (1.21)
Set Ad = O, Bd = D and Bf = * D > 0. For any value of the productivity shock in period 2,
the optimal haircut decision follows:
-* = Rf' ([Ad + (1 - h)Bdl). (1.22)
If conditions (1.21) and (1.22) hold, it is immediate that equation (1.20) is satisfied. It is feasible
for the sovereign to issue debt.
As required. U
Proof of Proposition 1.13.
In the nontradable debt case, the maximum debt level zmax is achieved for a = 1 and D = D.
We set y = EL so as to maximize the debt level for these values of a and D. Denote this level
as '. For the tradable debt case, it is possible to show that the maximum level of -Y is y*, as
defined in the proof of Proposition 1.12. If y* < 'i, the maximum level of debt in the tradable
debt case is clearly strictly lower than zmax. If y* > ', then it can be proven that a lower
level of -y can only be achieved for exposure level a = 1 if the total level of domestic debt D is
strictly less than D. In fact, it is achieved for a value of D such that the zero bound for the
haircut is binding. Again, the maximum debt level is strictly lower than Zmax. Only if y* = "
is the maximum level of debt equal for the nontradable and tradable debt cases.
Since -* depends on 0, it follows the maximum level of debt in the tradable debt case
depends on the the same parameter. U
Proof of Proposition 1.14.
For z < 0, foreigners credibly commit not to default on the government's savings abroad. The
government issues cash to domestic residents, and it chooses the value of D that maximizes
domestic production. The claims in the proposition follow immediately. U
Proof of Lemma 1.2.
For any combination C = (a,D, Bf) such that D > D, Lemma 1.1 establishes that there
exists some other combination C' = (a', D', BI) where D = D, such that C'raises the same
revenues as C in period 1 and is equivalent to C in terms of repayments abroad, output and
hence consumption for all values of the productivity shock R in period 2. We construct C'
from C = (a, D, Bf) in the same manner as described in the proof of Lemma 1.1. It remains
to prove that C and C' satisfy the Euler condition for defaultable debt for the same value of A.
Case 1: z < 0.
Construct C' from C = (a, D, Bf) in the same manner as in the proof of Lemma 1.1. None of
the defaultable debt is issued, so no Euler condition needs to be satisfied for this debt.
Case 2: z > 0.
Apply Lemma 1.1. Since C' raises the same revenues as C in period 1 and is equivalent to C in
terms of repayments abroad, output and hence consumption for all values of the productivity
shock R in period 2, it also follows that the expression f' (x) is also the same for C and C'
for all values of the productivity shock R. These results are sufficient to show that C and C'
satisfy the equation
A-I E(1-h) B i = E u ' ( c 2 ) (1 - h ) B f [l +Rf'([(1-a)+(1-h)a]D)
for the same value of A. U
Proof of Corollary 1.2.
This immediately follows from Lemma 1.2. U
Proof of Proposition 1.15.
Fix D = D' such that the zero bound for the haircut is binding for some values of the pro-
ductivity shock R in period 2. Consider an increase in Ad and an equal reduction in Bd. This
corresponds to a reduction in a. Furthermore, change Bf so as to preserve the value of the
ratio -y = . This perturbation was feasible in the nontradable debt case, but it is no longer
feasible in the tradable debt case. The exposure mechanism means that the haircut increases
for those states of nature where the haircut was initially interior. The price that foreigners are
willing to pay for the debt declines by more than the price that domestic banks are willing to
pay, because domestic banks still receive a high loans rate in those states of nature when the
debt is fully repaid in period 2. The right hand side of equation (1.20) exceeds the left hand
side. It can only be satisfied with equality again if the ratio 7 falls.
In the nontradable debt case, any value of -y is achievable for given a and D. This means
that for any given a and D, the entire set of debt levels [0, zmax(D')] can be achieved by varying
-y. In the tradable debt case, this is no longer true. The corollary of this result is that only a
restricted set of z values is achievable for any given a and D. U
Proof of Proposition 1.16.
Set D equal to the smallest value such that the zero bound on the haircut is not binding for
any value of the productivity shock R in period 2, i.e., D = D, where
RBd
The only value of y = f consistent with this value of D and equation (1.20) is *, as given
in the proof of Proposition 1.12. Let -y = -y*. Now consider alternative perturbations that
increase expected consumption in period 2. It can be shown that there are only two possible
perturbations. We consider the effect of each on consumption in periods 1 and 2.
Perturbation 1: Increase Ad, keeping D = D and -y = -y* fixed. Step 2 of the proof of
Proposition 1.8 establishes that this perturbation increases consumption for states of nature in
the sets S1 and S2. Set S3 is empty. Therefore, expected consumption in period 2 increases.
The debt level z is affected:
dz = Pr(fR) dAd < 0,1+r i
which means that consumption in period 1 falls by this same amount.
Perturbation 2: Reduce Bd and 7, keeping Ad fixed. Bd and y must be reduced in
a manner such that equation (1.20) is still satisfied. The reduction in Bd has no effect on
consumption for any value of the productivity shock. It does not affect output or the volume
of debt repayments for any values of the productivity shock lower than R. For the highest
productivity shock value, it reduces output and repayments equally at the margin, leaving
consumption unchanged. Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1.8 establishes that the reduction
in y improves consumption for all states of nature in the sets S1 and 52. It can be verified that
this is also true for states of nature in the set S 3. Therefore, expected consumption in period
2 increases. Let it increase by the same amount as in perturbation 1. The effect on the debt
level z is ambiguous. For the debt level z to rise, the condition that must be satisfied is:
ES2R R 
R
+Bd Pr(R) +1 (1 - h) Pr(R) < 0.
R f" (D ES2
The term in the square brackets is ambiguous in sign. Let it be negative. The interpretation
of this assumption is that in this range, an increase in the proportion of debt held by domestic
banks increases the price of debt sufficiently to increase the total repayments for all states of
nature in the set S2. If Pr(R) is very small, and /R and f" (D) are very large, then the
condition above may be satisfied. U
1.8.B. Division of Debt Categories into Cash and Defaultable Debt
In the environment studied in the chapter, the government can issue two types of debt: cash
(type A) and defaultable debt (type B). This section of the appendix shows that this delineation
of debt types is an equilibrium outcome of a slightly more general model. In this general model,
the government can issue three types of debt. Debt type A can be held by domestic residents
only, debt type B can be held by both domestic and foreign lenders, and debt type M can
be held by foreign creditors only. The government can choose different haircuts for the three
different types of debt: hA, hB and hc respectively. We prove that the government will choose
to fully repay all of debt A, to repay none of debt M, and to repay the fraction 1 - h of debt
type B. These results establish that the more general model reduces to the model presented in
the main text of the chapter.
Modifications to the Model
The maximization problem of domestic agents now takes into account that all debt is default-
able. Specifically, the Euler equations of the representative consumer will be modified in the
appropriate manner to take the haircuts into consideration. The government budget constraints
are altered to the following:
T 1  _ pAAd + pBBd + qBBf + qMMf, (1.23)
T2  (1 - hA)Ad + (1 - hB)[Bd + BI] + (1 - hM)Mf (1.24)
Prices of foreign-held debt follow the equations:
1
qB = E{1- hB} (1.25)1+r
1
qM = 1E{1 - hM}. (1.26)
1+r
The definition of equilibrium follows.
Definition 1.3 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium for this economy comprises sequences
for allocation rules {c 1 , sl, C2, {X} , }, prices {PA,PB, qB, qB , M and policies {Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf,
hA, hB, hM, T 1 , T2 } that satisfy:
(a) Consumers choose {c 1 , sl, c2} to maximize utility (1.1) subject to the budget constraints
(1.2), (1.3) and the nonnegativity constraints on consumption (1.4), taking prices, bank
contract offers, government policies and the endowment as given.
(b) Banks offer contract schedules X : sl - S(si, R) in period 1 to maximize expected profits,
taking prices and government policies in period 2 as gzven.
Banks choose lending quantity x in period 2 to maximize profits, taking the loan rate p as
given.
(c) Firms choose borrowing level x to maximize profits (1.8), taking the loan rate p as given.
(d) Government chooses {hA, hB, hM, T 2 } in period 2 to satisfy the government budget con-
straint (1.24) in that period, taking {Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf } and the shock R as given.
Government chooses {Ad,Bd,Bf, Mf,T1} in period 1 to satisfy the government bud-
get constraint (1.23) in that period, taking the price functons {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mj) ,
PB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) , qB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) , q (Ad, Bd, B f , Mf) , p(x)} and government poli-
cies in period 2, hA (Ad, Bd, B1 , M1 , ?, hB (Ad, Bd, B, Mf, ), hM (Ad, Bd, B1 , M, R )
and T2 (Ad, Bd, Bf M1 , ) , as given.
(e) All markets clear for the economy. In particular, the markets for cash, defaultable debt,
goods and loans clear.
(f) Bond prices follow rational expectations: both qB (Ad, Bd, Bf, M 1 ) = E {1 - hB} and
qM (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) = EI {1 - hM} taking government policies hB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf, )
and hM (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf, R) in period 2 as given.
The goods market clearing condition yields the resource constraints:
cl < yl + qBBf + qMMf
C2 Y2 - (1 - hB)Bf - (1 - hM)Mf + Rf ((1 - hA)Ad + (1 - hB)Bd)
Now we turn to the optimal policy problem for the government.
Definition 1.4 The Government Problem is to maximize utility (1.1) over time consis-
tent rational expectations equilibria. In particular, we must satisfy not only the equilibrium
conditions above but also the additional optimization decisions:
(g) Government chooses {hA, hB, hM, T2 in period 2 to maximize u(C2 ) given {Ad, Bd, B,  Mf }
and the shock R.
Government chooses {Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf, Ti} in period 1 to maximize u(cl) + Eu(c2), tak-
ing the price functions {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) ,PB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) ,qB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf) ,
qM (Ad, Bd, BI, M 1 ) , p(x) } and government policies in period 2, hA (Ad, Bd, Bf, Mf, ) ,
he (Ad, Bd, B1 , MI, R), hM (Ad, Bd, Bf, M, R) and T 2 (Ad, Bd, Bf , Mf, R), as given.
We consider two different scenarios. In the first specification, defaultable debt is not tradable
between domestic banks and foreign creditors in the period of issue. In the second specification,
defaultable debt is tradable in the period of issue. In the latter case, we impose the additional
restriction:
PB = qB.
We adopt the same approach to the problem described in subsections 1.4.1 and 1.5.1.
Nontradable Debt
Apply the methodology for the results in the main text, to derive the following formulation. In
period 1:
U, = max
cl ,a,D,Bf,Mf {u(ci) + f3EU 2 (a, D, Bf, Mf, R) }
subject to
cl = yl + qBBf + qMMf
c1 > 0
qB E
1+r
1
qM - E
1+r
- hB (a, D, B, Mf, )
- hM (a, D, Bf, Mf,)
Bf < 0 = a = 0
t = 2:
U2 (a, D, Bf, Mf,) = max u (c 2 )
C2 hA,hB,hM
2 = Y2 - (1 - hB)Bf - (1 - hM)Mf + ?f (- [(1 - hA)Ad + (1 - hB)Bd])
c2 > 0
y2 > (1 - a)D + (1 - h) [aD + Bf]
0 < hA <1
(1.27)
0 < hB < 1
0 < hM < 1.
We again assume that Y2 is large enough so that the expression (1.27) never binds. Let us
subject to
now focus on the haircut decisions in period 2. Firstly, raising hM to 1 improves the objective
function without violating any constraints. So it is optimal to set hM = 1 for all values of
the productivity shock R. The government never makes repayments on debt type M. It
immediately follows that qM = 0 and that the quantity of debt issuance Mf in the initial
period is payoff irrelevant for the representative consumer. We may set Mf = 0 without loss
of generality. Secondly, lowering hA to 0 improves the objective function without violating
any constraints. It is optimal to set hA = 0 for all values of the productivity shock R. The
government never defaults on any portion of debt type A.
So the only debt type with potentially variable haircuts is debt type B, held by both
domestics and foreigners. Let us define h = hB. Then the above program reduces to the
program in the main text of this chapter.
Tradable Debt
The argument for the nontradable debt case can be modified for this case. The same results
follow.
1.8.C. Concurrent Saving and Borrowing
In the environment studied in the chapter, the government cannot save in foreign assets abroad
and concurrently issue defaultable debt. Bf < 0 corresponds to saving abroad, and Bf > 0
captures the issuance of defaultable debt to foreign creditors. This section of the appendix
relaxes this restriction and allows the government to both save abroad and issue defaultable
debt at the same time. This is achieved by considering a slightly amended model where the
sovereign has access to a richer set of assets. It can still issue defaultable debt, which is denoted
by Bf > 0. In addition, it can save abroad in a third asset, Jf < 0, which yields a gross return
of 1 + r in every state of nature of the final period. The sovereign may choose any concurrent
combination of defaultable debt issuance and saving in foreign assets. The main result of this
section is that the feasible set of debt values G, and in particular the maximum level of debt
sustainable in a rational expectations equilibrium, remain unchanged from the case in the main
text.
Modifications to the Model
The maximization problem of the consumers remains unchanged, and domestic banks have
access to the same set of assets as in the main text. The government budget constraints are
altered to the following:
T1  < pAAd + pBBd +qBf + Jf, (1.28)
T2 > Ad+(1-h) [Bd Bf]+Jf (1.29)
The definition of equilibrium follows.
Definition 1.5 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium for this economy comprises sequences
for allocation rules {cl, s, , c2, X} , }, prices {PA, PB, q, p} and policies {Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf, h, T1 , T2 }
that satisfy:
(a) Consumers choose {cl, sl, c2} to maximize utility (1.1) subject to the budget constraints
(1.2), (1.3) and the nonnegativity constraints on consumption (1.4), taking prices, bank
contract offers, government policies and the endowment as given.
(b) Banks offer contract schedules X : sl -- S(si, R) in period 1 to maximize expected profits,
taking prices and government policies in period 2 as given.
Banks choose lending quantity x in period 2 to maximize profits, taking the loan rate p as
given.
(c) Firms choose borrowing level x to maximize profits (1.8), taking the loan rate p as given.
(d) Government chooses {h, T 2 } in period 2 to satisfy the government budget constraint (1.6)
in that period, taking {Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf } and the shock fR as given.
Government chooses {Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf, T1} in period 1 to satisfy the government budget
constraint (1.5) in that period, taking as gzven the price functions {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf, J1 ) ,
PB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf) , q (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf) , p(x)} and also the government policies in period
2, h (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf, i ) and T2 (Ad, Ed, Bf, Jf, f).
(e) All markets clear for the economy. In particular, the markets for cash, defaultable debt,
goods and loans clear.
(f) Bond prices for foreign debt follow rational expectations: q (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf) = IE {1 -h},
taking the government policy h (Ad, Bd, By, Jf, ) in period 2 as given.
The goods market clearing condition yields the resource constraints:
1
cl < yl + qBf + Jf
1+r
c2 < Y2 - (1 - h)Bf - Jf + Rf (Ad + (1 - h)Bd)
Now we turn to the optimal policy problem for the government.
Definition 1.6 The Government Problem is to maximize utility (1.1) over time consis-
tent rational expectations equilibria. In particular, we must satisfy not only the equilibrium
conditions above but also the additional optimization decisions:
(g) Government chooses {h, T2 } in period 2 to maximize U(C 2 ) given {Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf } and the
shock R.
Government chooses {Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf, Ti} in period 1 to maximize u(ci) + /3Eu(c 2 ), tak-
ing the price functions {PA (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf) , PB (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf ) , q (Ad, Bd, B,f Jf) , p(x)}
and government policies in period 2, h (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf, A) and T 2 (Ad, Bd, Bf, Jf,) , as
given.
In the first specification, defaultable debt is not tradable between domestic banks and foreign
creditors in the period of issue. In the second specification, defaultable debt is tradable in the
period of issue. In the latter case, we impose the additional restriction:
PB = q.
Again, we adopt the approach to the problem described in section 1.4.1.
Nontradable Debt
Apply the methodology applied to derive the formulation in the main text. The government
problem may be derived:
V1 = maxE {u(cl) + OV2 (z)}
C1 ,Z
subject to
C1 = Yi + Z
Cl 0
where the expression V2 (z) is defined by
V2 (z)= max E {u (c2 )}
c2 ,a,D,Bf,Jf
subject to
c 2 = Y2 - (1 - h)Bf - Jf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D)
h = H (a,D, B, R)
S= Q(a,D, Bf) Bf >0
1
z2 -Jf < 0S+r
for some set G. Our notation suppresses the dependence of h on (a, D, Bf, i) in the consump-
tion equation.
Let us briefly interpret this program. The government's problem may again be decomposed
into two components. The intertemporal component of the problem concerns how much to
borrow in period 1, z. The intratemporal component uses the functional form for the default
decision h in the final period in order to calculate the optimal combination (a, D, Bf, Jf) for
the chosen z value.
The intratemporal decision is more complicated in this model than in the main text. The
debt issuance decisions (a, D, Bj) correspond to a gross debt position, i.e., zl > 0. The saving
decision Jf corresponds to a gross asset value z 2 < 0. The net asset position of the economy at
the beginning of the final period is the summation of these two gross positions: z = z1 + z 2.
The feasible set of values for zl is the same as the positive region of the feasible set G from
the model of the main text. The feasible set for z2 is the non-positive real line. It follows that
the feasible set for z is the same as in the model studied in the main text of the chapter: G = G.
One corollary of this result is that the maximum feasible debt level is the same for this model
and the environment studied in the main text. Another corollary is that the maximum level of
debt Zmax is achieved with the same values of (a, D, Bj) as in the model of the main text, and
Jf set to zero.
Tradable Debt
The arguments provided above for the nontradable debt case can be adapted for the specification
with tradable debt. The feasible set of debt is the same as in the model in the main text.
1.8.D. Justification for Equal Haircuts
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the government defaults equally on domestic and
foreign lenders. The appendix considers possible justifications for this setup.
Unobservability of the debtholder
If the government cannot observe the residence of debtholders at the moment of repayment,
it cannot discriminate and offer different haircuts to different categories of lenders, domestic
or foreign. Even if the government can observe purchases of its own bonds in period 1, the
existence of secondary markets for government debt means that defaultable debt may change
hands over time. In period 2, the composition of the debt holders may be quite different.
Legal Restrictions
Governments may issue several different categories of debt, with each category classified as
having different risk characteristics and awarding different legal rights to the creditors. In this
case, it may be possible for the government to default on different debt categories in a differential
manner, but legal constraints may force the sovereign to treat all debtholders within an asset
class equally.
Equal Haircuts as an Equilibrium Outcome
The government may wish to execute different haircuts on different debtholders, but the exis-
tence of secondary markets may make this impossible or ineffective.
In the environment studied in the chapter, the government cannot distinguish whether the
holders of the defaultable debt are domestic or foreign. Let us now consider a model where the
sovereign can indeed discern whether the debt holders are domestic banks or foreign creditors at
the point of repayment, but where it is still impossible for it to direct transfers to the domestic
productive sector except by repaying government debt. The government has the option to select
different haircuts for debt owed to domestic banks and foreign creditors.
The timing of the model considered in this section is captured in figure 1.13. The stages of
the model highlighted in bold are the steps which are not present in the model in the main text
of this chapter. There is lack of commitment between periods: the government cannot credibly
make a commitment in period 1 regarding the extent of repayment of debt in period 2. However,
the process of default in period 2 has a particular structure. After the stochastic productivity
shock and the deterministic endowment are realized, the government announces haircuts of hd
and hf on debt held by domestic and foreign residents respectively. The government conditions
the haircut not on the holder of the debt at the point of the announcement, but at the point of
repayment. For example, hf is the haircut on debt held by foreigners at the time of execution
of the haircut, not on debt held by foreigners at the time of the announcement of the haircut.
Following this announcement, domestic and foreign holders of defaultable debt can trade it with
each other on secondary markets. After such trading is completed, the government must enforce
the haircuts that it announced earlier in the same period. In other words, the government
has short-term (within-period) commitment: when it comes to the execution of default, the
government must follow the haircut announcements that it has made at the beginning of the
period. Domestic and foreign lenders settle their secondary trading accounts before the loans
market opens in period 2.
Figure 1.13: Amended Model Timeline
Period 1
* Endowment yl realized.
* Government issues debt Ad, Bd, Bf and transfers proceeds T to consumers.
Consumers consume cl goods and save sl in banks.
Banks invest in government debt Ad, Bd.
Foreigners purchase government debt Bf.
Period 2
* Productivity shock R realized.
* Government announces hd, hf.
* Secondary market trades between domestic banks and foreigners.
* Government imposes lump sum taxes T2 and applies pre-announced
haircuts hd, hf on debt Bd, Bf.
* Domestic banks and foreigners settle their secondary trading positions.
* Banks lend x to firms.
Firms borrow and produce F (x, R) = x + Rf(x).
* Consumers consume C2 goods.
Let us specify the facilities available in secondary market trading. All holders of defaultable
government debt have access to secondary market trading accounts. These accounts allow
debtholders to borrow unlimited funds from abroad in order to purchase government bonds
from other debtholders, but these funds must be fully repaid before the loans market opens,
at a gross (within-period) interest rate of one. This feature of the secondary market trading
account means that it is possible for domestic (or, indeed, foreign) debtholders to purchase all
the government debt between the announcement and execution of haircuts, at a price equal to
1- h, where h is the haircut that corresponds to the purchaser of the debt. Foreign debtholders
may also purchase all of the debt. After the execution of the haircuts, the secondary market
trading markets must be settled, i.e., receipts from government debt repayments must be used
to repay all borrowed funds from abroad. Then the domestic productive sector produces output.
This timing of events preserves the liquidity constraint on the domestic production sector
in the event of non-repayment of sovereign debt.
Let us now analyze the response of domestic and foreign debtholders to government haircut
announcements. There are 3 cases to consider.
Case 1: hf > hd.
Foreigners value government debt at 1 - hf, which is lower than 1 - hd, the value of the debt
to domestic agents. Foreign creditors are willing to sell their debt holdings at any price above
1 - hf. Therefore the supply of bonds Sf takes the shape in figure 1.14. Domestic debtholders
are willing to purchase the debt at any price less than or equal to 1 - hd. Their demand for
debt Dd is horizontal at this price. Therefore, the secondary market price of debt is 1 - hd, as
shown in the figure.
Price
1-h,
1-h,
O Bf Quantity
Figure 1.14: Secondary Markets for Debt
At the time of the execution of the haircut, all the debt is in the hands of domestic debthold-
ers. The haircut of hd is applied. Domestic debtholders make no profit on secondary market
trades, since they must repay exactly this quantity to settle the secondary market trading ac-
count. Foreigners receive 1 - hd for their debt. So all agents suffer a haircut of hd on the debt.
The government achieves this haircut on all of its debt.
Case 2: hf < hd.
An analogous argument to that above establishes that after the announcement and before the
execution of the haircuts, foreigners purchase all of the debt from domestic debtholders at the
price 1 - hf. The haircut applied on all of the debt, and therefore the haircut achieved by the
government, is hf.
Case 3: hf = hd.
In this case, domestic and foreign lenders value the debt at the same price. Therefore whether
they purchase it from each other or not is irrelevant for the haircut imposed on the debt, and
for the payoffs of domestic and foreign debtholders. The haircut applied on all of the debt is
hf = hd.
Therefore, no matter the configuration of the haircuts announced by the government, both do-
mestic and foreign debtholders effectively suffer the same haircut on the debt h = min {hd, hf},
and the government achieves this haircut h on all its debt. For the rest of the model, it does
not matter who ends up holding the debt after secondary market trading. Thus, the above
argument proves the following result.
Lemma 1.3 Consider any equilibrium with configuration of haircuts t = {hd, hf } announced
by the government. Let h = min {hd, hf}. There exists another equilibrium where the govern-
ment announces the haircuts ?N = {h, h}, which achieves the same payoffs for domestic and
foreign debtholders and for the government.
We conclude this section with a short discussion of the applicability of this result. The
lag between haircut announcements and execution is designed to capture the fact that in re-
ality, secondary markets are nearly always open for trading. Typically in the event of default,
the institutional structure requires that governments announce haircuts in advance of making
(partial) repayments. Secondary debt markets are always active, and in particular they will be
open in the time between announcement and execution of haircuts (no matter how long this
interval is in practice, especially if the secondary market is liquid). Therefore, debt can change
hands in this interval. This is what we need for the mechanism in this version of the model to
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be functional. Given this mechanism and the tradability of debt between domestic and foreign
debtholders, haircuts are equalized across different categories of lenders.
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Chapter 2
Sovereign Debt and Fragility in an
Infinite Horizon Model
2.1 Introduction
Recent sovereign default episodes have been associated with substantial output costs. The
government may decide to default in order to reduce repayments abroad, but it should take into
account that debt repudiation generates output costs for the domestic economy. In the previous
chapter, we analyzed the effect of domestic economic costs of default on optimal government
policy in a two-period model. In the model, the government issues debt in the first period and
makes its repayment decision in the second. We characterized the optimal government default
decision in the final period as a function of the productivity shock realized in that period, as
well as inherited debt variables. The optimal haircut on debt is decreasing in the productivity
shock and increasing in the volume of foreign (as opposed to domestic) debt issuance.
Then we took a step backward and analyzed the optimal government debt issuance policy
in the first period. We allowed the government to manipulate three variables: the exposure
of the domestic banking system to government debt, the composition of debtholders between
foreign and domestic lenders, and the total level of domestic financial liquidity. The government
recognizes that exposure of the domestic banking system creates a commitment device for debt
repayment in the subsequent period, and it increases this exposure in order to be able to borrow
more resources from abroad in the initial period. For high productivity shocks in the second
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period, this commitment device works and the optimal haircut is low. For adverse productivity
shocks, the benefits of sharing the low productivity realization with foreign creditors dominates
the adverse domestic consequences of default. The government finds it optimal to default on
most of its debt, even though domestic output is adversely affected.
It is reasonable to ask whether the results of our earlier work extend to the infinite horizon
framework traditionally used in the default literature. This chapter addresses this question. We
construct an infinite horizon version of the model described above, and we use it to derive three
sets of additional results. We concentrate on the specification of the model with nontradable
debt.
Infinite horizon models have an infinite number of equilibria depending on how we specify
the coordination of foreign investors and the government to future continuation equilibria in
the aftermath of the default decision. We show that if the government is not sanctioned by
foreign creditors in either the period of default or future periods, the optimal haircut decision of
the government is unchanged from the two-period model. In addition, the optimal government
debt issuance decisions remain unchanged for the most part. The only difference is that the
optimal domestic exposure level chosen by the government may differ. This specification of the
consequences of default is closest to the spirit of chapter 1: we are interested in a framework
where default does not lead to reduced access to international capital markets.
The infinite horizon specification allows us to examine the effects of persistent shocks. With
independently and identically distributed productivity shocks, an adverse shock in a particular
period does not change the feasible set of debt levels available to the domestic economy. The
government wishes to borrow more in order to dampen the effect of the shock on domestic
consumption. If the shock is persistent, a poor productivity realization leads to a contraction
of the feasible set of debt levels, because it increases the expected haircuts in future periods.
Therefore, the government finds that the minimum level of domestic exposure increases for any
given level of resources borrowed from abroad. It may optimally choose to borrow less despite
the negative shock. A sequence of negative shocks may lead to a simultaneous contraction of
the feasible set of debt levels and an increase in the exposure of the domestic banking system
to government debt.
Finally, we examine whether the government chooses to issue debt in the long run. In
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an environment with noncontingent debt, the economy may find it optimal to accumulate a
buffer stock of assets so as to avoid the region of debt issuance. The option of default increases
the contingency of debt repayments, but the contingency is coupled with a higher expected
consumption cost of debt issuance. Consider the restriction that the government must either
issue debt or save abroad, but cannot do both. If the discount factor is low, then debt is
included in the long run invariant distribution. However, if the discount factor is sufficiently
high, debt is not observed in the long run.
What happens if the government can simultaneously issue domestic debt and save in assets
abroad? We prove that irrespective of the discount factor, it is optimal for the government to
both save abroad and simultaneously issue domestic debt in the long run. Savings allow the
government to insure itself against adverse productivity shocks, but there is no contingency
in interest repayments from this asset. Therefore, the government issues domestic debt and
utilizes its ability to default in order to enjoy contingency in interest repayments across states
of nature. The optimal pattern of debt issuance follows the same pattern described in the
baseline infinite horizon specification.
This chapter seeks to improve our understanding of sovereign default, and it is interest-
ing to contrast our results to other infinite horizon models in the literature. In the model of
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), the default decision by the country is followed by reduced access
to international capital markets. In such a model, default improves consumption in the current
period but reduces continuation utility. More recent theoretical analyses, such as the theo-
retical results in Arellano (2008), maintain the assumption that default is punished through
coordination of foreign creditors to permanently worse continuation equilibria. Arellano relaxes
this assumption in her numerical simulations. In the model considered in this chapter, default
is not followed by future punishment by foreign creditors. In the current period, the optimal
default decision benefits domestic consumption by reducing repayments abroad by more than
the loss of domestic output. Furthermore, the default decision allows the government to reduce
its debt level, which improves future continuation utility. Default benefits consumption in all
periods.
Persistence of shocks introduces additional dimensions to the problem. An adverse produc-
tivity shock leads foreign investors to expect worse shocks in future periods, which raises the
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optimal haircut in future periods. This leads to a contraction in the feasible set of debt levels in
the current period, which changes the optimal government debt issuance decision immediately.
In a different but related context, Aguiar et al. (2006) present a model of optimal investment
cycles with risk of capital expropriation by the government and, crucially, persistent shocks.
Following adverse productivity shocks, the government is less able to commit not to expropri-
ate future returns, and this depresses investment even if the first best level of capital remains
unchanged.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the baseline
model. We specify the punishment for default such that the insights of the two-period model
carry over to the infinite horizon case. Section 2.3 presents the analysis of the model with
persistent shocks. Section 2.4 considers the long run asset dynamics arising from the model.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Infinite Horizon Model
The purpose of this section is to present an infinite horizon version of the two-period model
developed in chapter 1. The precise nature of the equilibrium depends upon how we specify
the coordination of foreign investors and the government to future continuation equilibria in
the aftermath of the default decision. We show that if the default decision is not punished
by reduced capital market access in either the period of default or future periods, the optimal
haircut decision of the government is unchanged from the two-period model. In addition, most
of the results regarding the optimal government debt issuance decision are still valid. These
results are obtained despite the fact that it is more difficult to separate the intratemporal and
intertemporal dimensions of the decisions in the infinite horizon case.
2.2.1 Model Setup
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite: t = 0, 1, 2, .... There are five categories of actors
in our framework: consumers, firms, banks, the government and foreign creditors. There is a
continuum of all categories except the government. Consumers and firms both exist in unit
measure.
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Preferences Each identical and infinitely-lived consumer has utility function over consump-
tion streams {ct} o given by the expression
Eo Etu(ct)]
E (0, 1) is the discount factor and the period utility function is continuously differentiable
and strictly increasing: u'(c) > 0.
The benevolent government maximizes the utility of the representative consumer. Firms,
banks and foreign creditors are risk neutral and maximize expected profits. They each survive
for one period only.
Technology At the beginning of each period t, each consumer receives an endowment y.
Then the firms in the economy have access to a production technology. An investment of xt
units of the endowment in the production sector yields F (xt, Rt) units of output:
F (Xt, Rt = t + Rt f (xt)
R is the level of domestic productivity. Its value is realized at the beginning of the period and
is i.i.d. across periods. We assume Rt > 0, with highest and lowest values R and R respectively.
The production function f(x) is strictly increasing and strictly concave up to an input level 2,
and is flat for input levels beyond this:
f'(x) > 0, f"(x) < 0 V x E [0, 2]
f(x) = f (t) V x > 2.
f(x) is twice differentiable. We impose limf'(x) = oc and f'(d) = 0. The output of the
x--+0
production sector cannot be reinvested in the same sector.
The economy enters period t with inherited debt level zt. It makes repayments vt to foreign
creditors. In addition, it is possible for the economy as a whole to borrow resources zt+l from
foreign creditors. There is no domestic storable good between periods. The resource constraint
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in period t is derived:
ct < y + Rtf(xt) - vt + zt+l
Foreign creditors maximize profits from their lending to the domestic economy, and they have
access to an international riskless asset which yields the interest rate r between periods. The
rational expectations restriction across periods is as follows:
1
Zt = Et- 1vt.
1+r
Model Timeline Figure 2.1 illustrates the order of events and actions in each period t.
Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
Period t
* Endowment y realized.
Productivity shock Rt realized.
* Government imposes lump sum taxes T 2,t and applies haircut ht on debt Bd,t, Bf,t.
* Banks lend xt to firms.
Firms borrow and produce F (Xt, Rt) = t + Rtf (xt).
* Government issues debt Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l and transfers proceeds TI,t to consumers.
Consumers consume ct goods and save st in banks.
Banks invest in government debt Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l.
Foreigners purchase government debt Bf,t+l.
Consumers Each consumer solves the following maximization problem:
(2.1)
OO
max Eo 3tu(ct)
{ct,st}o'0 =
subject to
ct y - st + S(st- 1, Rt) + Tit 2,t + T B,t + nF,t
ct > 0
(2.2)
(2.3)
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In the each period t, each consumer decides on its consumption and savings decisions {ct, st}.
Transfers from the government T,t and T2,t are taken as given. Savings st are deposited in
the banks, and yield a gross investment return of S(st, Rtt+l) in the subsequent period. Each
consumer owns an equal share in all banks and firms. IIB,t and IIF,t denote their respective
profits in period t.
Consumers, firms and banks cannot borrow from or save abroad.
Bank Deposit Contracts In period t, banks offer contracts X to consumers in a competitive
market:
x : St - S(st, Rt+i)
No other transfers between consumers and banks are allowed. Consumers choose the contract
that maximizes their expected utility. In competitive equilibrium, bank profits are zero (IIB,t =
0) and their investment in assets in period t maximizes the expected utility of consumers. Since
there is no storable good between periods, the banking system transfers resources between
periods by purchasing government-issued debt. The set of government assets is described next.
Government Debt At the end of each period t, the government issues cash Ad,t+l and
defaultable debt Bt+l. Of the defaultable debt, Bd,t+l is purchased by domestic banks and
Bf,t+l is purchased by foreign creditors. Government expenditure is set to zero. The government
may transfer to consumers any resources raised from debt issuance:
Ti,t _ PA,tAd,t+l + PB,tBd,t+l + qtBf,t+l. (2.4)
Positive quantities are used to denote debt. PA,t is the price of cash in terms of output. PB,t and
qt are the prices of defaultable debt held by domestic banks and foreign creditors respectively.
Notice especially that for the model considered in this chapter, defaultable debt is not tradable
between domestic and foreign agents in the period of issue. Therefore, these prices may differ.
At the beginning of the next period t + 1, the government observes the productivity shock
and then decides on its repayments to holders of the defaultable debt. The government cannot
default on cash, and it must default on all holders of defaultable debt by an equal haircut ht+l.
The haircut is defined to be the proportion of the face value of debt that is not repaid. The
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government imposes lump sum transfers on consumers in order to make repayments on its debt:
-T2,t+l > Ad,t+l + (1 - ht+l) [Bd,t+l + BI,t+l] . (2.5)
The government cannot commit in period t to the level of the haircut ht+l in period t + 1.
Foreign Creditors The rational expectations restriction may be rewritten in terms of the
debt variables.
max { Et(1 - ht+1)Bf,t+l - qtBf,t+
Bf,t+l I + r
1
- t = Et (1 - ht+i) (2.6)
l+r
This equation determines qt, the price of defaultable debt held by foreign creditors.
Loans Market in Period t Banks enter period t with holdings of government-issued cash
and defaultable debt. The resources in the banking system after the default decision are given
by the expression
Xt = Ad,t + (1 - ht)Bd,t.
We assume that the government cannot transfer resources from consumers to banks except
through repayment of cash and defaultable debt, and that banks have no other means of raising
funds from consumers.
Banks can either hold these resources Xt until the end of the period, or to lend these
resources to firms in a competitive market for loanable funds. In the latter case, firms use
the loaned funds as inputs in production and repay the banks with interest before the end of
the period. At the end of period t, banks transfer the promised units of output S(st- 1, Rt) to
consumers.
Firms take the loan rate for funds Pt as given and choose to borrow xt units of input in
order to maximize profits:
max X + Rtf (xt) - Ptxt (2.7)
S+ RJtf'(xt)= Pt
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The equilibrium loan rate is given by
Pt = 1 + Rtf'(Xt).
The key constraint that summarizes the market imperfection on the production side of the
economy is
xt < Ad,t + (1 - ht)Bd,t
In each period t, inputs into the domestic production sector are less than or equal to the total
value of repaid government cash and bonds. Inputs into production in period t are constrained
by the gross return on investments made in period t - 1.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Definition
The equilibrium definition is as follows.
Definition 2.1 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium for this economy comprises sequences
for allocation rules {ct, st, {X}t ,xt }tO= prices {PA,t,PB,t, qt, Pt to0 and policies {Ad,t, Bd,t, Bf,t,
ht, T,t, T 2 ,t}= 0 that satisfy:
(a) Consumers choose {ct, st }o to maximize utility (2.1) subject to the budget constraint
(2.2) and the nonnegativity constraint on consumption (2.3), taking prices, bank contract
offers, government policies and the endowment as given.
(b) Banks offer contract schedules X : st -~ S(st, Rt+l) in period t to maximize expected
profits, taking prices and government policies in periods t and t + 1 as given.
Banks choose lending quantity xt in period t to maximize profits, taking the loan rate Pt
as given.
(c) Firms choose borrowing level xt to maximize profits (2.7), taking the loan rate Pt as given.
(d) Government chooses {ht, T 2,t} in period t to satisfy the government budget constraint (2.5)
in that period, taking {Ad,t, Bd,t, Bf,t} and the shock Rt as given.
Government chooses {Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+1, Ti,t} in period t to satisfy the government bud-
get constraint (2.4) in that perzod, taking the price functions {PA,t (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+1) ,
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PB,t (Ad,t+1, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l), qt (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+1, Bf,t+l) , pt(xt)} and government policies
in period t+1, ht+ (Adt+, Bd,t+1, Bft+1 Rt+1) and T2 ,t+l (Ad,t+1, Bd,t+1, Bft+l, Rt+),
as given.
(e) All markets clear for the economy for every period t. In particular, the markets for cash,
defaultable debt, goods and loans clear.
(f) Bond prices for foreign debt follow rational expectations: qt (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+1) =
lrEt {1 - ht+1}, taking the government policy ht+l (Ad,t+1, Bd,t+1, Bf,t+l, t+l) in pe-
riod t + 1 as given.
The optimal policy problem for the government is described next. The government lacks
commitment: it cannot credibly commit in period t to the haircut it will impose in period t + 1.
Definition 2.2 The Government Problem is to maximize utility (2.1) over time consis-
tent rational expectations equilibria. In particular, we must satisfy not only the equilibrium
conditions above but also the additional optimization decisions:
(g) Government chooses {ht, T2 ,t} in period t to maximize
Et 0S-tu(cs) , (2.8)
given {Ad,t, Bd,t, Bf,t}, the shock Rt and the behavior of foreign investors following any
default history t{h,}t0
Government chooses {Ad,t+1, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l, Ti,t} in period t to maximize expression (2.8),
taking as given the price functions {PA,t (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l) , PB,t (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l) ,
qt (Ad,t+l, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+1) , pt(xt)} and also the optimal government policies in period t +1,
ht+i (Adt+l1, Bd,t+1, Bf,t+1, t+ 1) and T2,t+l (Ad,t+1, Bd,t+1, Bf,t+1l Rt+ -
From these definitions we can immediately see that the set of equilibria is larger in the
infinite horizon case than in the two-period setup. In particular, notice that the gross expected
return to foreign investors from holding government debt is equal to the gross riskless rate 1+ r.
Foreign investors are indifferent between lending to the domestic government and investing in
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riskless assets. Therefore, Definition 2.1 part (f) is consistent with a continuum of levels of
borrowing, given any choice {Ad,t+1, Bd,t+l, Bf,t+l} by the government. In the aftermath of a
default episode, it is possible for foreign investors to sanction the government by coordinating
to a lower level of lending to the government. The precise specification of the punishment for
default is important for the determination of the optimal government haircut, and therefore the
optimal government debt issuance decision.
2.2.3 Optimal Policy Program
We rewrite any combination of government debt issuance (Ad,t, Bd,t, Bf,t) as a combination
(at, Dt, Bf,t) such that:
Dt = Ad,t + Bd,t
where Ad,t = ( - at) Dt
Bd,t = atDt.
Dt is equal to the total face value of government-issued cash and defaultable debt held by the
domestic banks at the beginning of period t. at is the fraction of defaultable debt in total bank
assets. This amended notation is used in the remainder of this chapter.
The default history of the government until period t is given by {h,) =0 . Consider a govern-
ment that has not defaulted until the current period. We write the program for the government
problem as follows. In the current period:
U( ,D,Bf, R max {u(c) + /3EU (a', D', B, R', h
subject to
c = y - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + qB (2.9)
c > 0 and 0 < h < 1 (2.10)
y > (1 -a)D + (1 - h) [aD + Bf] (2.11)
q = E 1 - h' (a/, D1 B I (2.12)
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B E (-oo, Bf(h)] , with B < 0 =+ a'= 0.
The government enters the period with inherited debt variables (a, D, Bf). It then decides
the optimal haircut. As in the two-period model, it takes into account both the contempora-
neous productivity shock R and the inherited debt variables. In the infinite horizon context,
it also takes into account the impact of its default decision on the economy's capital market
access. The upper bound Bf(h) on the feasible set of debt issuance in expression (2.13) captures
the possibility that default in this period leads to a restricted ability to issue debt this period.
Restricted access to capital markets in future periods is incorporated in the above framework
by making the expected continuation utility of the government EU (a', D', B, R', h) depend
on the current haircut h. The precise nature of foreign creditors' punishments determines the
shape of the function for continuation utility EU (a', D', Bf, R', h).
At the end of the period, the government decides on its debt issuance decision. Each
combination (a', D', B) corresponds to a default schedule across states h' (a', D', B1, R') in
the next period, and hence to the bond price function q = Q (a', D', B1). This function is
calculated using rational expectations over the default schedule in the next period t + 1, and is
taken as given by the government in the current period t.
Expression (2.9) shows that consumption depends both on the current value of the haircut
h as well as the government's debt issuance decision (a', D', B). The debt issuance decision
affects both the price and volume of foreign debt issuance. Equation (2.11) states that govern-
ment debt repayments must be less than or equal to the consumer endowment in that period.
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume that y is large enough so that this constraint
never binds. A sufficient condition on the production function to ensure that this approach is
valid is: limxf'(x) = 0. We assume that this condition is satisfied.
z-- o
Finally, the second part of expression (2.13) states that the government chooses either to
save abroad or to issue debt. If it chooses to save abroad, it does not issue debt, and therefore
the exposure level of the domestic economy is zero. This assumption is made to simplify the
model; it is relaxed in subsection 2.4.2 of this chapter.
Let us define the haircut and bond price schedules:
h = (a, D, B , F)
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(2.13)
and
( (a', D', B1) I - r 1 - H (a', D', B,
We now rewrite the problem in a form that is more amenable to theoretical and numerical
analysis. In the amended version of the program, the government first chooses how much to
raise from abroad z', and then decides the optimal combination (a', D', B1) that achieves this
level of borrowing. The optimal combination is decided before the state of nature in the next
period is realized. The government problem above is rewritten as follows.
V (z)= max E {u(c) + V (z', h)}
a,D,Bf ,z'
subject to
c = Y - (1 - h)Bj + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + z'
c>O
h = f 7 D, B , k)
z = Q (a, D, Bf) . Bf, with z <0 => a = 0
z' G (h).
What are the consequences of default in the general case? Firstly, it may lead to a reduction in
the government's ability to issue debt in the period of default, and this means that the set of
feasible debt values G (h) depends on the haircut h. Secondly, it may lead to reduced capital
market access in future periods. Therefore, the value function V (z', h) also depends on the
haircut in this period.
It is straightforward to show that Lemma 1.1 and Corollary 1.1 from the two-period model
are still valid. We can restrict attention to combinations C = (a, D, Bj) such that D E [0, D].
2.2.4 First Best Case
As in the finite horizon setup, the first best case is achieved when the government can both (i)
fully commit in period t to the haircut schedule in period t + 1, and (ii) save abroad and issue
debt at the same time. There is no adverse effect of default in terms of diminished current or
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future capital market access by the country.
The government's optimal policy program is stationary.
Proposition 2.1 (First Best Case) Assume that y is sufficiently high. The optimal con-
sumption schedule {ct}t=o is the same whether debt is tradable or not. It has the properties:
1. Production by domestic firms is equal to 2 + Rtf (2) when the productivity shock is Rt.
The optimal allocation solves:
maxtu y + ltf() - (1 - ht) Bf,t + Et (1 - ht+l)
2. Consumption {ct}t=o is chosen to satisfy the representative consumer's Euler equation.
3. Consumption is equalized across states of nature Rt in each period t (by appropriate
selection of haircuts in period t).
The total output of domestic firms is at the maximum level in every state of nature R in
period 2. The output of this sector does vary due to the fluctuation in the productivity shock
value, but consumption is fully insured against this shock by the government. To achieve this,
repayments to foreigners in period 2 vary across different states of nature.
2.2.5 No Punishment after Default
Let us return to the infinite horizon environment with lack of commitment, described in sub-
section 2.2.3.
Consider a specification of the model such that the government is not sanctioned by foreign
creditors in response to a default decision. This scenario is closest to the spirit of chapter 1:
we are interested in a framework where debt repayment is (partially) enforced by the domestic
output costs of default, not by punishments available to external creditors. Mathematically,
the consequences of this assumption can be written:
G(h) = G
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and
V (z', h) = V (z').
In words, the default decision does not affect capital market access by the country either in the
period of default or in future periods. V (z') is defined in a recursive manner.
The government problem described in subsection 2.2.3 can now be rewritten as a recursive
stationary problem. It can be written as follows.
V(z)= max E (u(c) + OV (z')}
a,D,Bf ,z'
subject to
c = y - (1 - h)Bj + Rf([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + z'
c>O
h = H (,D, Bf, I)
z = Q (a, D, Bf) • Bf, with z < 0 = a = 0
z' E G.
Note that we have replaced the general functions H, Q and G with their counterparts from the
two-period model: H, Q and G.
The proposition below immediately follows.
Proposition 2.2 (Haircut Decision) If default is not followed by reduced capital market ac-
cess, then the haircut function is the same as in the two-period model. The optimal haircut
decision h = H (a, D, Bf, R) satisfies the following formulation:
h = max{0, min{1, 0}}
where 0 satisfies
S= f' ([(1 - a) + (1 - O)a] D). (2.14)
RaD
1. The haircut is (weakly) zncreasing in the volume of forezgn debt issued Bf.
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2. The haircut is (weakly) decreasing in the productivity shock R.
Government default does not induce any kind of sanction by foreign creditors. Therefore,
the haircut is selected only to maximize consumption in the period of default, as in the two-
period model. The default decision depends on the domestic productivity shock and inherited
debt variables. Default is high when the domestic productivity shock R is low. The higher is
the ratio of foreign-held to domestically-held defaultable debt , the higher is the marginal
benefit of default. Domestic output is lower at the optimum. The haircut is increasing in the
volume of foreign debt issuance Bf.
How are current consumption and continuation utility affected when the government de-
faults? The haircut decision is selected to maximize consumption in the current period. For
any given debt level chosen in this period z', current consumption is higher owing to default.
Alternatively, default allows the country to maintain the same level of consumption as in the
case without default, but with a lower debt level z'. The lower debt level corresponds to higher
continuation utility. In our framework, the default decision can lead to both higher current
consumption and improved continuation utility. This contrasts with much of the theoretical
literature, which associates default with higher current consumption and lower continuation
utility. The latter effect comes from reduced capital market access in future periods.
For the remainder of the chapter, we maintain the assumption that government default is
not followed by any sanctions in the form of reduced capital market access.
Proposition 2.3 (Feasibility of Debt) It is feasible for the sovereign to issue debt in every
period. The maximum debt level is the same as in the two-period model.
What about the optimal government debt issuance decision? For the infinite horizon spec-
ification, it is more difficult to separate the intertemporal and intratemporal dimensions of the
problem.
The intertemporal government problem may be written as follows.
V (z) = maxE {u (X z, z', ) +z + /3V (z')
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subject to
X (z, z', R) + z' > 0
z' EG.
The expression X (z, z', R) comes from the solution to the intratemporal problem. It is the
optimal schedule of consumption across states of nature fR in the current period, given the
inherited debt level z and the chosen debt level this period z':
X (z, z', R) = y - (1 - h)B* + Rf ([(1 - a*) + (1 - h)a*] D*)
where (a*, D*, Bj) solves
max E u (y - (I - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + z + /V (z')
a,D,B \
subject to
h = H (, D, Bf, k)
z = Q (a, D, B) Bf, with z < 0 = a = 0
For the two-period model, z' equals zero by construction and the intratemporal problem can
be solved independently of the intertemporal decision. For the infinite horizon specification,
this separation result no longer holds. Nevertheless, Propositions 1.5 to 1.9 of the two-period
model remain valid. They are renumbered and reproduced below.
Proposition 2.4 (Saving) For z < 0, the government chooses: (i) a = 0; (ii) D = D; (iii)
Bf = (1 + r)z.
Proposition 2.5 (Minimum Domestic Exposure) Fix D = D'. For any level of borrow-
ing in the set [0, Zmax(D')] to be achzeved, it is required that the level of domestic exposure zs
sufficiently high, i.e., a E [a (z) , 1]. The necessary exposure level has the following properties:
1. a (0) = 0.
2. a (z) is weakly increasing in z.
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3. -a (zmax (D')) = 1.
Proposition 2.6 (Total Domestic Debt) It is an optimum to set D = D.
Proposition 2.7 (Optimal Domestic Exposure) Consider a combination C = (a, D, Bf)
which raises debt z such that a > a (z). At the margin, it is feasible to raise the same level of
debt z by reducing a and increasing -y - . Whether this perturbation is optimal depends on
the risk aversion of the representative consumer.
Proposition 2.8 (Foreign Debt Issuance) Let u(c) and f(x) be specified such that a = 1
is the optimal level of exposure for all levels of debt. Then for z E [0, Zmax]:
1. Bf is increasing in z.
2. The interest rate on government debt is increasing in z and the volume of foreign debt
issuance Bf.
A caveat is in order. Proposition 2.7 establishes that the optimal domestic exposure level
for the economy depends on the risk aversion of the representative consumer. The relevant
risk aversion in the infinite horizon case may be different from the two-period model. This is
because the choice of the debt level z' affects the average level of consumption, and the risk
aversion coefficient may vary with this average consumption level. In the two-period model, z'
equals zero by construction.
2.3 Persistent Shocks
Persistence of productivity shocks introduces additional dimensions to the government prob-
lem. In this section we characterize the government's optimal policy program with persistent
shocks, and present both theoretical and numerical results for this case. An poor productivity
realization increases the probability of adverse shocks in the future, and this increases the ex-
pected haircuts in the next period. Therefore, the feasible set of debt levels contracts today.
Furthermore, remember that the government's optimal debt issuance decision is made before
the productivity shock in the next period is realized. After an adverse productivity shock, the
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government revises upward the probability of future adverse shocks. Correspondingly, its opti-
mal debt issuance decision places greater weight on consumption in the worst states of nature
in future periods.
We maintain the assumption that government default is not punished by reduced capital
market access. The government problem described in subsection 2.2.5 was valid for a model
setup with independently and identically distributed productivity shocks. It can be amended
for the case for persistent shocks as follows. The value of the productivity shock realized in the
previous period R- is a new state variable for the problem.
V (z, R = max E u(c) + ,BV (z', ) | R
subject to
c= - (1 - h)Bf + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + z'
c>O
h = H aD, Bf, )
S= Q (a, D, Bf, R- Bf, with z < 0 = a = 0
z GR).
The haircut function H is unchanged from the case with independently and identically
distributed shocks. Consider any realization of the productivity shock R. All of the propositions
proved in subsection 2.2.5 are still valid conditional on the value of the productivity shock.
However, the feasible and optimal levels of domestic exposure vary across different realizations
of the shock. The bond price function Q now depends on the value of the productivity shock
realized in the previous period R-. The feasible set of debt levels G for the current period
depends on the current realization of the productivity shock R.
For concreteness, let us specify R E {R, R} such that productivity shocks follow the Markov
process:
Pr (Rt+1 = R I k Rt =R) Pr (it+1 = R I R = ) = 7
where we set 7 > 12*
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Proposition 2.9 (Minimum Domestic Exposure) Fix D = D'. Define a (z, R-) to be
the minimum domestic exposure level required to achieve debt level z after productivity shock
realization R-. For any level of debt z' that is feasible for R- E {R, R}:
a (z, R) > a (z, R) .
Any given level of domestic exposure a corresponds to a schedule of haircuts across states
of nature in the next period. An adverse productivity shock increases the probability of a low
productivity realization in the next period. Since the haircut is higher for the low productivity
shock, such a change in probabilities increases the average expected future haircut. This reduces
the maximum feasible debt level for any given a. A higher level of domestic exposure is necessary
in order to achieve the same debt level.
The maximum level of debt is achieved with a = 1 and D = D. The following proposition
immediately follows.
Proposition 2.10 (Maximum Debt Level) Define zmax (R) to be the maximum debt level
after the realization of productivity shock R. Then zmax (R) > zmax (R).
An adverse productivity realization in the current period increases the probability of a high
haircut in the next period. The average expected haircut increases for any given volume of debt
issuance to foreigners Bf. Therefore, the maximum feasible level of debt is lower following an
adverse productivity shock.
Following a low productivity shock, the government faces a reduced feasible set of debt levels.
It also recognizes that the probability of an adverse productivity shock in the next period is
higher. How does this affect the optimal government debt issuance decision? The government
places a higher weight on consumption in the worst state of nature in future periods. In
particular, the government may wish to reduce the exposure level of the domestic economy
in order to insure consumption in the worst future states of nature. Its ability to do so is
constrained by the fact that the feasible set G has changed, such that a higher exposure level
is necessary to raise any given level of debt.
We use numerical simulations to illustrate the effect of persistent shocks on the optimal
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government debt issuance decision. We utilize the constant relative risk aversion utility function
u(c) = log(c).
The following production function is employed:
() = z x for x < t
x - 6.t for x > X
1
where t is set to the value that maximizes f(x), i.e., t = () 1-. This production func-
tion satisfies the assumptions in subsection 2.2.1. In addition, it satisfies the property that
lim xf'(x) = 0.
x-*O
The parametrization of the model is as follows. The riskless rate of return is equal to
r = 0.05 and the discount factor is set to P = 0.8. We set y = 9. The production function
parameters are 0 = 6 = 0.5. The implied t (and hence D) is therefore equal to unity. In each
period, there are two possible values of the productivity shock, R= 8 and R = 12. We set
7r = 0.9. With these model parameters, the upper bound of the set G (R) is zmax (R) = 0.9951,
and the upper bound for the set G (R) is Zmax (R) = 1.3774.
Figure 2.2 shows the minimum levels of domestic exposure associated with raising any given
level of debt z. The minimum level is higher for the country experiencing the low productivity
shock. Notice that the maximum level of debt Zmax (R) is lower for the low productivity shock.
Figure 2.3 plots the optimal domestic exposure level, which for this specification turns out to
be a = 1 for all levels of debt. Figure 2.4 shows the optimal volume of foreign debt issuance By
to raise any given level of debt. The country that experiences the adverse productivity shock
issues a higher face value of debt Bj in order to raise any given level of real resources z, because
the adverse shock increases the expected haircut next period.
Finally, figure 2.5 plots the interest rate schedule as a function of the total volume of
government debt issuance to foreigners Bf. After an adverse productivity realization, expected
haircuts increase and this drives down the price of government bonds sold to foreigners. We
observe a corresponding shift upward in the interest rate schedule.
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What is the optimal level of borrowing by the country in the aftermath of a productivity
shock? The analysis in this case is more involved because of the inclusion of last period's
productivity shock R- as a state variable of the problem. Consider an inherited debt level
z from the previous period. This is consistent with different combinations C = (a, D, Bf)
depending on the value of the productivity shock in the last period. The optimal debt level
chosen in this period z' depends on the specific combination inherited.
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To remove this problem, we proceed as follows. We first set 7r = 0.5 (i.i.d. shocks) and
simulate the model. Then we consider two scenarios. The first is that the shocks continue in
an independently and identically distributed manner. The second is that there is a structural
break in the productivity shock process, so that it follows the Markov process with 7r = 0.9
from this period onward. Figure 2.6 plots the optimal debt levels z' for any inherited level z for
both scenarios. For the i.i.d. process, the productivity shock realization in this period conveys
no information about the probability of future realizations. The government decides to borrow
more following the low productivity realization, to partially insure consumption against the low
shock.
For the persistent shock process, a low productivity realization increases the probability of
low realizations in the future. For the parametrization above, the government actually decides
to borrow less following a low productivity shock. Why? Firstly, the feasible set of debt levels
contracts and it is more expensive to borrow. Secondly, the government anticipates that it will
experience low productivity realizations in future periods and needs to build up savings for
future insurance of consumption.
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Figure 2.6: Optimal Debt Level z' as a Function of
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127
2.4 Long Run Dynamics
The long run distribution of asset levels for the country depends on the productivity shock
process and the country's discount factor. In an environment with noncontingent debt, the
economy may find it optimal to accumulate a buffer stock of assets so as to avoid the region
of debt issuance. This will be the case in our framework when the discount factor is sufficient
high, because the savings technology is noncontingent. Subsection 2.4.1 describes this result.
Therefore, it may appear that the optimal government debt issuance and default decisions
described in this and the previous chapters are not observed in the long run. However, this is
an artifact of our simplifying assumption that the government must either issue debt or save
abroad, but cannot do both. If we allow the government to simultaneously issue domestic debt
and save in assets abroad, then it is optimal for the government to use both debt and savings
in the long run, irrespective of the discount factor. Savings allow the government to self-insure
itself against adverse productivity shocks, but there is no contingency in interest repayments
from this asset. Therefore, the government issues domestic debt and utilizes its ability to default
in order to enjoy contingency in interest repayments across states of nature. The analyses of
optimal government debt issuance and default decisions described earlier in this chapter are
still valid and relevant, since the government chooses to issue debt.
2.4.1 Evolution of the Debt Level
By construction, the savings technology available to the government is a noncontingent asset:
its return does not vary with the value of the productivity shock. Debt contracts issued by
the government are formally noncontingent, but the ability of the government to default on its
debt imparts contingency to actual debt repayments. For low values of the discount factor 6,
the government decides to borrow in response to poor productivity shocks, and positive debt is
part of the support of the long run distribution of assets.
Figure 2.7 presents the policy functions for the model parametrization described in section
2.3. The specification with independently and identically distributed shocks is used. The dis-
count factor is set to p = 0.8 and the riskless rate of return is equal to r = 0.05. Therefore,
03(1 + r) < 1. For these parameters, the numerical simulation shows that the long run distri-
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bution of debt levels has positive support only in the region of debt issuance, i.e. positive z.
Debt is observed in the long run.
Figure 2.8 shows the corresponding policy functions when we set 3 = 0.99, while keeping the
riskless rate unchanged. In this case, f (1 + r) > 1. For this value of the discount factor, the the
government wishes to accumulate savings. The interest payments on savings are noncontingent.
Therefore, the government faces the problem of self-insurance against uninsurable shocks using
noncontingent assets. The optimal policy is for savings to grow, and the probability of the
government remaining in the debt region in the long run is zero.
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2.4.2 Concurrent Saving and Borrowing
The analysis in the previous subsection might give the impression that our analysis of optimal
debt issuance and default decisions is relevant only in the short run, or only for countries
with a low discount factor. However, this conclusion is actually an artifact of our simplifying
assumption that the government must either issue debt or save abroad, but cannot do both.
In this subsection we allow the government to simultaneously issue domestic debt and save in
assets abroad. This case has been analyzed for the two-period model in the appendix of chapter
1. For the case where government default is not punished by reduced capital market access,
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the infinite horizon formulation of the government's optimal policy program is as follows.
V (z)= max E (u(c) + i3V(z')}
a,D,Bf,Jf,z'
subject to
c = y - (1 - h)Bf - J1 + Rf ([(1 - a) + (1 - h)a] D) + z'
c>O
h = H (a D, B f,)
z= z 1 + z 2
z = Q (a, D, Bf) -Bf > 0
z2= J f < 01+r
z' E G.
The net indebtedness of the economy at the beginning of the period is z. This value is the
summation of the gross debt position zl and the gross asset position z2 . Of course, the division
of z into zl and z 2 is determined optimally. The analysis of the gross debt position is exactly in
line with the results of the previous sections of this chapter, and with chapter 1. The haircut
function H and debt price function Q are the same functions as in the two-period model. The
ability of the government to default imparts some contingency to debt repayments. The return
on saving is noncontingent and equal to the riskless rate. The feasible set for debt levels in this
period is equal to the feasible set in the two-period model, G.
Proposition 2.11 (Positive Gross Debt) Assume u" (c) < 0. For any net position z < 0,
it is optimal for the government to choose zl > 0.
Even if the government has a net position amounting to negative indebtedness (a positive
net asset position), it is still optimal for the government to issue some gross debt. Consider the
case where the government starts with zl equal to zero. The government can issue marginally
more debt and save the additional resources raised abroad, so that the net debt position is
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unchanged. In expected terms, this perturbation has no effect on consumption. This derives
from the fact that starting from a zero gross debt position, it is possible to raise debt at the
margin in this period at an expected consumption cost of 1 + r units in the next period. This,
of course, is equal to the riskless rate. Although the perturbation has no effect on expected
consumption in the next period, it does increase expected utility. This is because the ability to
default induces some contingency in the pattern of debt repayments in the next period, which
is valuable to a risk averse representative consumer.
In the long run the discount factor of the country determines the evolution of net indebt-
edness. However, irrespective of the level of this net position, it is always optimal for the
government to have a positive gross debt position. The optimal issuance of this debt, and the
optimal repayments on it, follow the patterns explored earlier in this chapter and in chapter 1.
2.5 Conclusion
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the effect of domestic economic costs of default on optimal
government policy in a two-period model. We examined the implications of such costs for the
optimal government debt issuance decision, and on the optimal haircut decision in the event of
default. In this chapter, we extend the insights of the two-period model to an infinite horizon
context. In the infinite horizon context, there are an infinite number of equilibria depending on
how we specify the sanctions exercised by foreign creditors in the event of government default.
The sanctions available in our framework entail coordination by foreign investors to continuation
equilibria with reduced capital market access for the country. In our earlier work, we were most
interested in an environment where default leads to domestic costs, but not reduced access
to international capital markets. Therefore, this is the specification we adopt for the infinite
horizon model. For this specification, all of the results for optimal government debt issuance
and repayment derived in the two-period model are still valid for the infinite horizon case.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on dimensions of the problem that are easier to
analyze in the infinite horizon context as opposed to a two-period model. First, we examine the
effects of persistent shocks. We show that if productivity shocks are persistent, then an adverse
productivity realization in this period increases the probability of poor shocks in future periods.
This has a number of effects. Firstly, this increases the expected haircut in the next period,
and therefore leads to a contraction in the feasible set of debt levels. Secondly, the government
places more weight on consumption in the worst states of nature in the next period, when it
makes the optimal government debt issuance decision. It may even save more in response to a
poor productivity shock, because it expects a sequence of poor productivity realizations in the
future and wants to be able to insure future consumption against these shocks.
Finally, we address the long run dynamics of debt levels as predicted by our model. By
construction, the savings technology in our model is noncontingent, and a country with a high
discount factor may find it optimal to accumulate large savings accounts to partially self-insure
its future consumption against productivity shocks. In the long run, the probability that such
a country issues debt goes down to zero. We show that this outcome is an artifact of our
simplifying assumption that the government must either issue debt or save abroad, but cannot
do both. We analyze a more general model in which the government is able to both save abroad
and simultaneously issue domestic debt. For this model, the discount factor determines the net
asset position of the country, which may indeed rise to infinity. However, it is always optimal
for a country with risk averse consumers to maintain a positive gross debt position. The results
for optimal government debt issuance and optimal debt repayments that we have derived both
in this chapter and in earlier work are still valid for the analysis of the gross debt position. We
observe a positive gross debt position in the long run.
2.6 Appendix: Proofs of Results in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
This follows directly from the specification that there is no punishment after default, and from
the proof of Proposition 1.1 in chapter 1. N
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
If default is not followed by reduced capital market access, then the value of the haircut h has
no impact on future continuation utility except through is indirect impact on the optimal debt
level. The proof of Proposition 1.3 in chapter 1 can be amended for this case. U
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Proofs of Propositions 2.3-2.8.
These are amended versions of the proofs of Propositions 1.4 to 1.9 respectively in chapter 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.9.
The proof of Proposition 1.6 in chapter 1 establishes the attainment of a maximum for each
(Ad, Bd) pair, and the comparative statics with respect to a, given D = D'. The level of
resources raised from abroad z is given by the expression:
1
z = E - (1 - h)Bf Pr( R-
For an adverse productivity realization in the previous period R- = R, the probability of an
adverse productivity realization in the current period R = R increases. The optimal haircut is
higher for poor productivity shocks. Therefore, z is lower in the current period for any given
combination C = (a, D, Bf). This establishes the desired result. N
Proof of Proposition 2.10.
In order to achieve the maximum level of debt, set a = 1 and D = D. The claim in the
proposition follows from the argument in the proof of Proposition 2.9. U
Proof of Proposition 2.11.
Suppose that the country begins the current period with net indebtedness level z < 0, and
zl = 0. The representative consumer receives gross return - (1 + r) z > 0 in consumption units
from its asset position. Is this optimal? We prove not.
Consider a perturbation which maintains the net indebtedness level z, but increases zl and
reduces z 2 by equal amounts. A marginal increase in zi necessitates a marginal increase in
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S= from zero. Let us restrict ourselves to a perturbation such that a = 1, which is feasible.
From the proof of Proposition 1.10 in chapter 1, such a perturbation induces an expected gross
consumption cost of 1 + r units in this period. However, the equal marginal reduction in z2 has
an expected gross consumption benefit of 1 + r units. Therefore, expected consumption in this
period remains unchanged. However, the gross debt position is repaid across states of nature
according to the haircut function H. Although the expected repayment is the gross rate of 1 + r,
the country repays less in the worst states of nature and more in the best. This is valuable to
the representative consumer, if it is risk averse. Therefore, the perturbation increases expected
utility in this period, while keeping future consumption levels unchanged. U
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Chapter 3
Optimal IMF Policy with Private
Capital Flows
3.1 Introduction
What is the relationship between IMF intervention and country moral hazard? Governments
can take actions that reduce the probability of adverse macroeconomic outcomes, but these
actions are costly and difficult to observe. If governments know that IMF support is available
in the event of macroeconomic crises, they may exert suboptimal effort ex ante to avoid such
outcomes. Therefore, IMF policies may induce moral hazard, and this has been a reason for
much criticism of the institution.
This chapter analyzes optimal IMF policy in an environment with moral hazard followed
by adverse selection. Country welfare is determined by both IMF transfers and private capital
inflows. In particular, we present a framework where IMF transfers to the worst performing
countries ex post actually ameliorates the moral hazard problem ex ante. In the baseline model,
government actions to improve the productivity of domestic firms are not always effective, and
the government learns of the success of its actions before foreign investors. Without the IMF,
it is not possible for foreign investors to discern the quality of the domestic production sector.
Therefore, there only exists a pooling equilibrium ex post, which leads to low effort ex ante
because the returns to good macroeconomic performance are low.
Now we introduce the IMF. The IMF can structure its crisis intervention policy so as to
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reveal the government's private information to foreign investors in a separating equilibrium. The
IMF provides limited transfers to countries with poor domestic productivity ex post. These
countries face high interest rates on international capital markets. Countries which do not
accept transfers are identified as having strong fundamentals and are rewarded with low interest
rates on international capital markets. The key result is that IMF transfers to low productivity
countries ex post improve the consumption of high productivity countries. The difference
between ex post consumption in the high and low productivity states increases, which increases
government effort ex ante.
Optimal IMF policy is the solution to a mechanism design problem in the presence of
imperfectly informed competitive markets. We allow the IMF to implement redistributive
transfers from high to low productivity countries (or vice versa) ex post, subject to both its
budget constraint and to the rational expectations condition that foreign investors set prices
according to the information revealed in equilibrium. The optimal scheme for the mechanism
designer in this context must take into account that the zero profits condition for foreign
investors changes as a result of the scheme. Foreign interest rates respond to the separation
decision by country governments. The incentives for the government to self-select in a separating
equilibrium ex post depend on a combination of the IMF's policies and the contracts offered by
foreign investors. This is central to the result obtained. Countries with weak fundamentals ex
post choose to receive high IMF transfers and low private capital inflows, while countries with
strong fundamentals choose to refuse IMF transfers because this refusal is associated with high
private capital inflows.
So the IMF designs the optimal scheme taking the market structure as given. The specific
tool available to the mechanism designer is a system of redistributive transfers ex post. Can this
be implemented by competitive markets instead? Yes. If the government can purchase insurance
at actuarially fair rates before its effort decision, then it will choose a level of (partial) insurance
that corresponds exactly to the IMF scheme. However, if such contracts are only available after
the government's type is revealed, the government will not purchase the ex ante optimal level of
insurance. In this case, the IMF should commit ex ante to a schedule of redistributive transfers.
Finally, we generalize the result of our baseline model that ex ante insurance can be welfare-
improving because it expands the set of feasible separating equilibria. We consider an amended
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version of the model where foreign investors have sufficient tools to separate countries ex post
even in the absence of IMF intervention, but such separation is associated with output distor-
tions for the country with strong fundamentals. Ex ante insurance can still result in an increase
in welfare in this framework. In particular, with ex ante insurance it is no longer necessary for
output to be distorted ex post for any country in a separating equilibrium. However, ex ante
insurance results in lower effort by the government ex ante than the separating equilibrium
without IMF intervention. IMF transfers are a feature of the optimal mechanism if the benefits
of reduced output distortions outweigh the moral hazard costs.
This chapter contributes to the literature on IMF intervention and moral hazard. Some
empirical evidence on IMF-induced creditor and debtor moral hazard is summarized in Dreher
(2004). On the theoretical side, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004) argue that if the IMF provides
loans at an actuarially fair interest rate, then it cannot induce moral hazard because any changes
in government effort are efficient. The catalytic finance literature proposes a separate channel
by which IMF loans may affect country effort (Morris and Shin 2006, Corsetti, Guimardes and
Roubini 2006). If IMF intervention reduces the risk of inefficient liquidation of projects ex post,
then this sometimes induces governments to exert higher effort ex ante. IMF lending would be
associated with private capital inflows. However, the empirical evidence for such a catalytic
effect of IMF lending is far from conclusive (Bird and Rowlands 2002, Edwards 2006).
Our characterization of the IMF assumes that all private information is in the possession
of the government, and that both the IMF and foreign investors are equally uninformed. The
IMF uses its ability to make redistributive transfers, in order to reveal the information of the
government to foreign investors. This is a stark characterization of the role of the IMF, and
is one of many possible modeling approaches. Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004) model the IMF
as an institution that can extract higher payments from the country (as a fraction of output)
than private creditors. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) examine the role of conditionality in IMF
lending. Arregui (2009) models the IMF as having an imperfect monitoring technology that it
can use to certify the quality of a country.
The results in this chapter have implications for empirical work. We identify an environ-
ment such that it is optimal for the IMF to follow a scheme where official and private financing
are negatively correlated, and this correlation is crucial in terms of providing incentives to
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governments to reveal their type. Therefore, empirical findings affirming this correlation are
not evidence for poor IMF policy. Instead, the model predicts that such a scheme should have
a strictly limited size of transfers ex post, in order to minimize moral hazard concerns. Fur-
thermore, the model predicts that the full benefits of IMF intervention cannot be discerned by
looking solely at IMF program countries. IMF transfers to low productivity countries improves
outcomes for high productivity countries, because it enables the latter to reveal their type in
equilibrium. Countries that refuse IMF transfers benefit from the existence of the IMF, because
the refusal reveals their high productivity and induces high private capital inflows.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the baseline model in the absence
of the IMF. Section 3.3 introduces the IMF and analyzes the mechanism design problem de-
scribed above. Section 3.4 generalizes our result that ex ante insurance is welfare-improving, in
an environment where foreign investors have sufficient tools to separate countries ex post even
in the absence of IMF intervention. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model Without IMF
3.2.1 The Environment
The model has 3 periods. There are four categories of agents: consumers, firms, foreign investors
and the government. Each category of agents exists in unit measure, except the government.
Model Timeline The order of events and actions is detailed in the figure below.
Figure 3.1: Timeline without IMF
Period 1
* Government chooses effort level a E [0, 1].
Period 2
* Government learns its type p E {PL, PH}. It is a high type with probability a.
* Foreign investors offer set of lending contracts C, each contract specifying an interest rate R.
* Domestic firms choose lending contract C E C and level of borrowing k.
Period 3
* Output is realized and repayments made to foreigners. All remaining resources are consumed.
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The effort level a chosen by the government in period 1 is not observable to other agents.
In period 2, the type p is revealed only to the government and not to other agents. Foreign
investors compete in the provision of loans to domestic firms. Each lending contract specifies
the relationship between a foreign investor and a domestic firm. It specifies only the interest
rate R, and the firm can freely choose its borrowing level. Firms select their most preferred
choice out of the set of offered lending contracts, and choose their level of borrowing k. They
invest borrowed funds in their production technology. In period 3, the output of the firms'
production technology is realized. Repayments are made to foreign investors and all remaining
resources are consumed.
Payoffs for Agents The representative consumer has expected utility given by the expression
Ec - V(a),
where c denotes consumption and Vi(a) is the cost function for government effort level a C [0, 1].
4(a) is twice differentiable and satisfies: 'i'(a) > 0, V"(a) > 0, with '(0) = 0 and limP'(a) =
00.
The government is benevolent and maximizes the utility of the representative consumer. It
chooses a in period 1 so as to maximize the above expression for expected utility.
Each domestic firm has access to a project in period 2, in which it invests k units of capital
borrowed from abroad. With probability p, the project is successful and yields f(k) units of
output in period 3. The firm repays R to foreign investors. With probability 1 - p, the project
fails and output in period 3 is zero. No payments to foreign creditors can be enforced in this
case. f(k) is twice differentiable and satisfies: f'(k) > 0, f"(k) < 0 with limf'(k) = oo and
k--+0
lim f'(k) = 0. Given R, each firm chooses its capital level to maximize expected profits:
k-*oo
maxp [f(k) - Rk] == f'(k) = R.
k
By inspection, the firm selects the lending contract C E C that offers the lowest interest rate
R.
The probability of project success is independent and identical across firms, so there is no
141
aggregate uncertainty. Total consumption for an economy of type p is equal to p [f(k) - Rk].
We specify PH > PL. The type p of the country determines the proportion of projects that are
successful in period 3.
Foreign investors offer the set of lending contracts C, each contract specifying the interest
rate R. They can lend capital elsewhere at riskless rate r. The zero profits condition for foreign
investors can be written:
peR - r = 0 R 
= r
pe
where pe denotes foreign investors' beliefs about p.
3.2.2 First Best Benchmark
a and p are observable to all agents. Solve the model by backward induction.
Consider the actions of agents in period 2. For the high type, foreign investors offer con-
tracts with interest rate RH = '-, which is low because PH is high. Domestic firms accept these
contracts and choose kH such that f' (kH) = RH. Total realized consumption in the economy in
period 3 is equal to PH [f(kH) - RHkH]. For the low type country, foreign investors offer con-
tracts with interest rate RL = -1, which is high because PL is low. In response, domestic firms
choose kL to satisfy f' (kL) = RL. Total realized consumption in period 3 is PL [f(kL) - RLkL].
Denote FH = [f(kH) - RHkH] and FL = [f(kL) - RLkL].
Government effort level a in period 1 solves:
max a -pHFH + (1 - a) ' PLFL - V(a)}
a
= max pLFL + a. z F B - O(a)},
where zFB = [HFH - PLFL]. The solution to this maximization problem is effort level aFB
3.2.3 Imperfect Information Case
Again, solve the model by backward induction. Domestic firms in both high and low type
countries choose the lending contract that offers the lowest interest rate R. It follows that
foreign investors cannot offer contracts that induce the government to reveal its type.
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Proposition 3.1 (Separating without IMF) There exists no separating equilibrum.
Proposition 3.2 (Pooling without IMF) There exists at least one pooling equilibrium. In
any pooling equilibrium, effort level a* < aFB
In a pooling equilibrium, foreign investors offer lending contracts with interest rate Rp:
r
Rp = (3.1)
aepH + (1 - ae) PL'
given their beliefs of the government effort level ae. Domestic firms choose their capital level
kp such that f' (kp) = Rp. Total consumption for an economy of type p is equal to pFp, where
we denote Fp = [f(kp) - Rpkp]. In period 1, the government chooses effort level a to solve:
max{a- PHFp + (1 - a) PLFP - 0(a)}
a
= max{pLFp + a. z* - (a)}, (3.2)
a
where z* = [PH - PL] Fp and the beliefs of foreign investors ae (and hence Fp) are taken as
given. The solution to this maximization problem is effort level a*.
The beliefs of foreign investors are formed via rational expectations. Therefore, the pooling
equilibrium is a fixed point for the equations (3.1) and (3.2), such that ae = a*. It is straightfor-
ward to show that such a fixed point exists, and that a* E (0, 1). It follows that RL > Rp > RH
and FL < Fp < FH. Furthermore,
[PH - PL] FP < PHFH - PLFL
e: Z* < Z F B
Therefore, a* < aFB. Government effort in the pooling equilibrium is below the first best level.
Proposition 3.3 (Welfare under Pooling) The country is worse off ex ante with imperfect
information than with perfect observability.
In the pooling equilibrium, capital is misallocated in period 2. The capital level in the high
type economy is lower than the efficient level, and the capital level in the low type economy
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is higher than the efficient level. Since capital misallocation reduces the difference in ex post
consumption for high and low type countries, the government finds it optimal to exert less effort
than the first best level.
3.3 Model With IMF
3.3.1 The Amended Environment
We model the IMF as an institution that commits to a system of redistributive transfers between
countries. In period 2, it offers a menu of redistributive transfers T to the country. The
government then selects its most preferred level of transfers T E 1. The menu of transfers is
pre-announced in period 1 (before the government exerts effort a), and promised transfers are
delivered to the country after output is realized in period 3. The amended timeline is presented
in the figure below.
Figure 3.2: Timeline with IMF
Period 1
* IMF announces redistribution scheme that it will offer in period 2.
* Government chooses effort level a E [0, 1].
Period 2
* Government learns its type p E {PL, PH}. It is a high type with probability a.
* IMF offers menu of redistributive transfers 1T.
* Government chooses IMF transfer level T E T.
* Foreign investors offer set of lending contracts C (T), each contract specifying an interest
rate R (T).
* Domestic firms choose lending contract C C C (T) and level of borrowing k.
Period 3
* Output is realized and repayments made to foreigners. IMF transfers are made.
All remaining resources are consumed.
The IMF offers the menu of redistributive transfers T to a continuum of ex ante identical
countries with independent realizations of p. Any transfers made to a country by the IMF must
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be financed by contributions from other countries. In other words, the IMF's budget constraint
states that the aggregate level of net transfers is zero. This is equivalent to the condition that
in period 1, the expected level of transfers to any particular country is zero:
ET = 0.
Foreign investors first observe the government's choice of the transfer level from the IMF,
and then compete in the provision of loans to domestic firms. The set of contracts offered by
foreign investors can be conditioned on the transfer level chosen: C (T) = {R (T)}.
As before, the government is benevolent and maximizes the utility of the representative
consumer. It chooses a in period 1 so as to maximize ex ante expected utility. In period 2, the
effort cost (a) is a sunk cost and the government knows its true type p. It chooses the transfer
level T E T so as to maximize consumption in period 3. It recognizes that its choice can affect
the set of contracts C (T) offered by foreign investors to domestic firms.
Definition 3.1 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for this economy is a set of strategies
{a, T (p), C (T) , k(C)}, beliefs pe (T) and a menu of transfers T such that:
1. Government sets a in period 1 to maximize expected utility.
Government chooses T E 1T in period 2 to maximize consumption c in period 3, given
private information p, the expected set of contracts C (T) and the expected contract choice
by domestic firms k(C).
2. Foreign investors observe T and offer set of contracts C (T) = {R(T)} that maximize
expected profits given their beliefs pe (T) = E [piT], updated via Bayes' Rule on the equi-
librium path (and unrestricted otherwise).
3. Domestic firms choose the contract C E C (T) and capital level k that maximize expected
profits.
4. IMF satisfies its budget constraint. In period 1: ET = 0.
The last condition is needed to ensure that the perfect Bayesian equilibrium is feasible.
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3.3.2 Mechanism Design Problem
Given any system of redistributive transfers, there may exist equilibria as defined above. The
different equilibria correspond to different patterns of private capital inflows in period 2, and
different levels of government effort in period 1. The IMF takes into account that its policies
affect the revelation of information in equilibrium, and therefore (via rational expectations) the
zero profit conditions of foreign investors. It also takes into account the effect on government
effort. The IMF is benevolent and designs the redistribution scheme to maximize ex ante
expected utility of the country.
Therefore, optimal IMF policy is the solution to a mechanism design problem in the presence
of imperfectly informed competitive markets. Apply the Revelation Principle to derive the
following result. We define F (p) to be the net output of each successful domestic firm in a
country of type p in period 2. T (p) is the transfer received by the country from the IMF.
For simplicity, throughout this chapter we restrict attention to mechanisms that are imple-
mentable as pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Proposition 3.4 (Mechanism Design Problem) Optimal IMF policy is the solution to the
following mechanism design problem:
max W = {[PLF (pL) + T (PL) + a-z - (a)}
z,T(pH),T(pL)
subject to
z = [pHF (PH) + T(pH)] [LF (PL) + T (pL)
a = (')- 1 [z] (3.3)
a -T (pH) + (1- a)- T (PL) = 0 (3.4)
PH F (PH) + T (PH) > PHF (PL) + T (PL) (3.5)
PLF (PL) + T (PL) > pLF (PH)+ T (PH) . (3.6)
Pooling equilibria:
F (pH) = F (PL) = Fp. (3.7)
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Separating equilibria:
F (PH) = FH, F (PL) = FL. (3.8)
We have rewritten the objective function in terms of z, the difference in ex post consumption
between the high type and low type countries. Constraint (3.3) relates how the government's
optimal effort level is related to z. The IMF's budget constraint is given by equation (3.4).
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) are the incentive compatibility constraints for the high and low type
governments in period 2. No participation constraint for the country is given. This reflects
the assumption that the government must choose out of the menu of transfers offered by the
IMF in period 2. Equations (3.7) and (3.8) capture the additional constraints imposed on the
mechanism designer owing to the presence of competitive markets that are imperfectly informed
ex ante. We discuss these next.
Proposition 3.5 (Pooling with IMF) The set of pooling equilibria the IMF can achieve is
the same as in the model without the IMF. The government chooses effort level a*.
Pooling equilibria are achieved when foreign investors remained uninformed about the type
p of the country when they offer lending contracts. Therefore, they offer the same interest
rate R to domestic firms from all countries. The net output of each successful firm in both
types of country is Fp. The incentive compatibility constraints for the government in period
2 immediately imply that in a pooling equilibrium, T (PH) and T (PL) are equal. Substituting
into the IMF's budget constraint, we obtain:
T (pH) = T (pL) = 0.
The proposition above follows by inspection.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the pooling equilibrium in (T, F) space. The indifference curve of a
country of type p is a line with slope equal to - 1 ICH and ICL denote the indifference curves
of high and low type countries respectively. The point A is located at (0, Fp).
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Figure 3.3: Pooling Equilibrium
Next, we turn to the set of separating equilibria that the IMF can induce.
Proposition 3.6 (Separating with IMF) The IMF can induce a continuum of separating
equilibria, each corresponding to a particular level of government effort in period 1. The feasible
set of effort levels can be described:
a G [a, ],
where we define a = (') {[PH - PL FL and ()-1 PH - PL] FH}.
In a separating equilibrium, the type p of the country is revealed in equilibrium. Foreign
investors offer lending contracts at interest rate RH to firms in the high type country and
interest rate RL to firms in low type country. This explains the expressions for each successful
firm's net output given in constraint (3.8). Substituting these expressions into the incentive
compatibility constraints and rearranging, we obtain:
[PH - PL] FL < z < [PH - PL] FH. (3.9)
The lower bound for z is achieved when the incentive compatibility constraint for the high type
is binding, and the upper bound is achieved when the incentive compatibility constraint for the
low type is binding. These correspond, via equation (3.3), to a restriction on the set of feasible
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government effort levels as defined above:
a <a <-.
There is a continuum of separating equilibria, each corresponding to a different menu of
transfers T = {T (PH), T (pL)} offered by the IMF. In equilibrium, T (PL) > 0 and T (PH) =
- ( ) T (pL) < 0. Consider the contracts offered by foreign investors in a separating equi-
librium. Foreign investors condition the set of contracts offered to firms on the transfer level
chosen by the government. If the government chooses transfer level T (PH), it is identified as a
high type country. Foreign investors offer contracts at interest rate RH, and net output of each
successful domestic firm is FH. If the government chooses transfer level T (PL), it is identified
as a low type country. The interest rate offered is RL, which means that net output of each
successful domestic firm is FL.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the separating equilibria corresponding to effort levels a and d
respectively. Effort level a is achieved when the incentive compatibility constraint for the high
type is binding. At the other extreme, effort level I is achieved when the incentive compatibility
constraint for the low type is binding. For each of the figures, A = (T (PH) , FH) and B =
(T (pL) , FL).
F F
IC n IC H
SB
B
ICL
T(p,) T(p,) T T(PH) T(pL) T
Figure 3.4: Effort level a Figure 3.5: Effort level -
This completes the description of the feasible set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Which of
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these equilibria does the IMF choose? The most preferred outcome within the set of pooling
equilibria (if there exists more than one) is the equilibrium with the lowest offered interest rate
Rp, and hence the highest level of net output Fp per successful firm. Now consider the set of
separating equilibria. Notice that the objective function of the IMF can be written:
a - [HFH + T (PH)] + (1- a) . [PLFL + T (pL) - (a)
which, given the IMF's budget constraint, reduces to
a -pHFH + (1 - a) PLFL - 0(a).
This is the same objective function that the government faces in the first best case, and the
global maximum of this expression is attained for effort level aF B . It can be shown that the
maximum level of z that the IMF can achieve is below zFB. It immediately follows that
- < aF B . The separating equilibrium that maximizes expected utility in period 1 corresponds
to the highest effort level possible, which is a.
Proposition 3.7 (Optimal IMF Policy) The optimal allocation is a separating equilibrium
with effort level-d, where a* < a < aFB. The menu of redistributive transfers T = {T (PH) ,T (PL)}
offered by the IMF satisfies:
T (pL) = aPL [FH - FL]
T (pH)= T(pL).
The incentive compatibility constraint for the low type country is binding.
Optimal IMF policy takes into account that both foreign investors and the government
respond to the redistributive scheme T = {T (PH) , T (PL)} offered. In a separating equilibrium,
the interest rates offered by foreign investors responds to the government's choice of T E iT,
because this choice reveals the government's type p. Now consider the government's optimal
decision. The incentives for the government to self-select in a separating equilibrium in period 2
depends on a combination of the IMF's policies and the government's expectations of contracts
offered by foreign investors C (T) (in equilibrium, the expectations of the government regarding
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C (T) are fulfilled). This is central to the result. Countries with weak fundamentals in period
2 choose to receive high levels of IMF transfers. As a consequence, they face high interest rates
on international capital markets, which leads to low private capital inflows. Countries with
strong fundamentals in period 2 value access to international capital markets more than low
type countries. They choose to make contributions to the IMF and thereby receive low interest
rates on international capital markets. They enjoy high levels of private capital inflows.
It seems counterintuitive that at the optimum, the IMF should redistribute resources to-
wards countries with adverse realizations of economic fundamentals. However, notice that such
redistribution is implemented not to decrease the difference in ex post consumption between
high and low type countries, but to increase it. The IMF induces a separating equilibrium and
thereby reveals information about the government's type to foreign investors. This generates
capital reallocation on international capital markets from low type to high type countries in
period 2. In turn, this increases the optimal level of effort by the government in period 1.
By inducing a separating equilibrium, the IMF solves the capital misallocation problem in
period 2 that is associated with a pooling equilibrium. Within the set of separating equilibria,
the IMF chooses the lowest level of redistributive transfers possible, so as to maximize govern-
ment effort in period 1. The highest level of effort that can be sustained is i. If redistributive
transfers are reduced further with the intention of generating a higher effort level, the differ-
ence between ex post consumption of high type and low type countries would be too low to be
consistent with a separating equilibrium. In period 2, the low type government would mimic
the high type.
It can be proved that a* < - < aFB, which establishes the above result. The upper limit -
on the set of feasible effort levels yields the following corollary.
Proposition 3.8 (Welfare with IMF) The country is still worse off ex ante than with per-
fect observability.
3.3.3 Implementation using Ex Ante Insurance Contracts
Can the optimal IMF allocation be implemented using competitive markets? Yes. Suppose
that before the government chooses effort level a in period 1, it is able to purchase insurance
contracts at actuarially fair rates. An insurance contract specifies payoffs X (PH) and X (PL)
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for high and low type countries respectively. Define X = {X (PH), X (PL)}. After learning its
type in period 2, the government reports its type to insurance providers and claims its payoff
X E X. Foreign investors observe the government's report and then offer lending contracts
C (X) to domestic firms. The set of contracts offered can be conditioned on the government's
report. The payoffs from the insurance contract are delivered to the government in period 3,
after output is realized.
The zero profits condition of competitive insurance providers is given by the expression:
a -X (pH) + (1 - a) - X (pL) = 0. (3.10)
Equation (3.10) and the amended versions of the incentive compatibility constraints (3.5) and
(3.6) together indicate that any allocation achievable by the IMF is also achievable using feasible
insurance contracts. Given these constraints, it can easily be verified that the insurance contract
that maximizes expected utility in period 1 satisfies:
X (pH) =T (H), X (pL) = T (pL),
where T (PH) and T (PL) are the redistributive transfers offered by the IMF at its optimal
allocation. The government selects this contract.
Proposition 3.9 (Ex Ante Insurance) The optimal IMF allocation can be implemented via
ex ante insurance contracts.
It is worth drawing attention here to two features of the result above. Firstly, the insurance
contracts are feasible despite the fact that the type of the country p is not observable to the
insurance providers in period 2. The government is induced to truthfully reveal its type in
period 2, given the insurance contracts X = {X (PH), X (PL)} that it has signed in period 1
and the set of contracts offered by foreign investors as a function of the government's report,
C (X). Secondly, ex ante insurance is desirable for the country even though the representative
consumer is risk neutral. The optimal scheme involves partial insurance, in order to address
the adverse selection problem in period 2.
The role of ex ante insurance contracts is explored further in Section 3.4.
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3.3.4 Implementation using Government Debt
An alternative implementation of the IMF optimum can be achieved via issuance of government
debt with type-contingent interest rates. Before the government chooses effort level a in period
1, it can issue debt level D. The debt contract promises repayments B (PH) and B (PL) for high
and low type countries respectively. Define B = {B (PH) , B (PL)}. The government announces
its repayment choice after it learns its type in period 2, and delivers the repayments in period
3 after output is realized. Foreign investors observe the government's announcement and then
offer domestic firms the set of contracts C (B).
Let the riskless interest rate between periods 1 and 2 be zero. The government's debt
issuance problem in period 1 is isomorphic to the IMF's mechanism design problem, with
[D - B (PH)] replacing T (PH) and [D - B (PL)] replacing T (pL).
Proposition 3.10 (Government Debt) The optimal IMF allocation can be implemented via
government debt contracts with type-contingent interest rates.
At the optimum, the government decides to pay a higher interest rate on its debt after a good
realization of economic fundamentals, and a lower interest rate after the realization of adverse
economic conditions. It is optimal for the government to reveal its type because the decision
to make high debt repayments is associated with higher private capital inflows. Countries that
decide to make low debt repayments ex post face high interest rates on international capital
markets.
3.3.5 Timing of Contract Offers and Feasible Effort Levels
Now consider a version of the model with the second period modified as in figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Modified Period 2
Period 2
* Government learns its type p E {PL, PH}. It is a high type with probability a.
* IMF offers menu of redistributive transfers T.
* Foreign investors offer set of lending contracts {C (T)}.
* Government chooses IMF transfer level T E I'T.
* Domestic firms choose lending contract C E C (T) and level of borrowing k.
Immediately after the IMF offers the menu of transfers T, foreign investors offer a set of
lending contracts {C (T)}. Each element of this set specifies the set of lending contracts C (T)
that are available to domestic firms if (later in period 2) the government chooses the transfer
level T E T. The government observes T and {C (T)}, and then makes its choice of the transfer
level. The equilibrium definition is amended appropriately to take account of the change in
timing.
Definition 3.2 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for this economy is a set of strategies
{a, T (p) , {C (T)} , k(C)}, beliefs pe (T) and a menu of transfers T such that:
1. Government sets a in period 1 to maximize expected utility.
Government chooses T E T in period 2 to maximize consumption c in period 3, given
private information p, the set of contracts {C (T)} and the expected contract choice by
domestic firms k(C).
2. Foreign investors offer the set of contracts {C (T)} that maximize expected profits, given
any transfer level T and their beliefs as a function of T, pe (T) = E [plT]. Beliefs are
updated using Bayes' rule on the equilibrum path (and are unrestricted otherwise).
3. Domestic firms choose the contract C E C (T) and capital level k that maximize expected
profits.
4. IMF satisfies its budget constraint. In period 1: ET = 0.
What is the effect of this change of timing on the set of feasible equilibria? The set of pooling
equilibria achievable by the IMF is unaffected. However, the set of feasible separating equilibria
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is reduced. Figure 3.7 presents an example of an allocation which was feasible under the previous
timing but not under this one. Consider the timeline in figure 3.2. If the government expects the
set of contracts {C [T (PH)] = {RH , C [T (PL)] = {RL}}, then it decides to reveal its type as
shown before. Given this separation decision, foreign investors find it optimal to offer precisely
these contracts. In equilibrium, A = (T(PH) , FH) and B = (T (pL),FL). Now consider the
timeline in figure 3.6. Suppose that the same contracts are offered in period 2. It is then
profitable for foreign investors to offer the contract corresponding to point D. This is a pooling
contract conditional upon acceptance of IMF transfers T (PL). The amended set of contracts is
{C [T (PH)] = {RH}, CT (pL)] = {RL, RL - )}}, for some e > 0. Given this set of contracts,
both high and low type governments choose IMF transfers of T (PL) in period 2, and firms
choose the contract offering interest rate RL - E. High and low type countries prefer point D.
The initial allocation is not an equilibrium.
F
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Figure 3.7: Effect of Change in Timing
For the model timeline provided in figure 3.2, points A and B above correspond to the sepa-
rating equilibrium with the highest level of redistributive transfers. This configuration induces
the lowest level of government effort a in period 1. A reduction in the level of redistribution
promised by the IMF increases the relative ex post consumption of the high type country,
which makes it more difficult to tempt it to select a pooling contract. However, the reduction
in promised redistributive transfers also increases the effort level a in period 1, which reduces
Rp (and hence increases Fp) in the best feasible pooling equilibria. The latter effect makes it
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possible to offer a better pooling contract to tempt the high type country. These competing
effects yield the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11 (Feasible Effort Levels) The modification to the sequence of events in
period 2 reduces the set of effort levels consistent with a separating equilibrium. If the feasible
set of effort levels is non-empty, it can be described:
a E [al, a2] U [a2, a3] U ... U [an-, an],
where a, > a and an < -a.
The most preferred separating equilibrium is the one that corresponds to the highest level of
effort an.
The modified timing amounts to an additional restriction on the set of contract offers. Given
the set of offered contracts, there exists no other contract that, if offered, would both make a
positive profit and increase the utility of at least one type of country. This notion of equilibrium
is similar to the definition used in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In their framework, the
existence of separating equilibria depends upon the relative fractions of high and low types. In
our model, the possibility of a deviation using pooling contracts reduces the feasible set of effort
levels. If the feasible set of effort levels is non-empty, the separating equilibrium which induces
the highest level of government effort in period 1 is the most preferred. The IMF compares this
equilibrium to the pooling equilibrium, and chooses the equilibrium that maximizes expected
utility in period 1.
3.4 Ex Ante Insurance and Separating Equilibria
IMF redistributive transfers can be interpreted as (partial) ex ante insurance, as described in
subsection 3.3.3. In this section we generalize the result that ex ante insurance expands the
set of feasible separating equilibria, and thereby may improve country welfare. We examine an
amended version of the model where foreign investors have sufficient tools to separate countries
in period 2 even in the absence of IMF intervention. However, these separating equilibria are
necessarily associated with a distortion of output for the high type country. Then we consider
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optimal policy by the IMF. The possibility of IMF redistributive transfers increases the set
of feasible separating equilibria. The allocation in the absence of IMF intervention remains
feasible, because the IMF can always commit to offer no transfers at all. In addition, the IMF
can also achieve separating equilibria without any distortion of output ex post. However, these
equilibria involve nonzero redistributive transfers by the IMF, and induce lower government
effort in period 1. Which separating equilibrium is optimal? Nonzero IMF transfers are a
feature of the optimal mechanism if the benefits of reduced output distortions outweigh the
moral hazard costs.
3.4.1 Model without IMF
Figure 3.8 presents the timeline for the model considered in this subsection.
Figure 3.8: Timeline without IMF
Period 1
* Government chooses effort level a E [0, 1].
Period 2
* Government learns its type p E {PL, PH}. It is a high type with probability a.
* Foreign investors offer set of lending contracts {C (T)}.
* Government chooses the tax per lending contract T.
* Domestic firms choose lending contract C E C (T) and level of borrowing k.
Period 3
* Output is realized and repayments made to foreigners. All remaining resources are consumed.
In this framework, the government has an additional instrument. It can require that every
lending contract from foreign investors to domestic firms in period 2 is associated with a tax
payment of T units of output from foreign investors to the government in period 3. Of course, a
requirement of T < 0 corresponds to a subsidy. Foreign investors again compete in the provision
of loans to domestic firms, but they can condition the set of contract offers on the government's
taxation decision T. Each lending contract specifies an interest rate R (7).
Notice that the government chooses the tax per lending contract T after the foreign investors
offer the set of lending contracts. The equilibrium definition is amended appropriately.
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What is the feasible set of contract offers? The zero profits condition for foreign investors
can be written:
peRk - rk - 7 = 0
- T = (peR- r) k (3.11)
where pe denotes foreign investors' beliefs about p given T. Equation (3.11) determines the
level of R (T) consistent with zero profits. Domestic firms select the lending contract C E C (T)
with the lowest interest rate R. The net output of each successful domestic firm is given by the
expression:
F = f(k) - Rk, (3.12)
where k satisfies:
f'(k)= R. (3.13)
Equations (3.11) and (3.12), together with the restriction (3.13), describe the locus of the set
of lending contracts consistent with zero profits in (T, F) space.
For illustrative purposes, let us first characterize the equilibrium in period 2 when all coun-
tries are of the same type p. The equilibrium is shown in figure 3.9. The line ZP plots the
zero profits condition. All contracts to the left of this line are associated with positive profits,
and those to the right yield negative profits. The indifference curve of the country is tangent
to the zero profits line at point A. This denotes the lending contract with 7 = 0 and R = p
The zero profits line is steeper than the indifference curve to the right of this point, and it has
lower slope than the indifference curve to the left of it.
Point A represents the equilibrium allocation. The government chooses the tax payment
T, which corresponds to the horizontal position of the economy in (7, F) space. The choice
of lending contracts by domestic firms determines F, and hence the vertical position of the
allocation.
Now we return to the model described in the timeline above, with types PH and PL in period
2.
Proposition 3.12 (Pooling without IMF) There exists no pooling equilibrium.
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Proposition 3.13 (Separating without IMF) There may exist a separating equilibrzum.
Propositions 3.12 and 3.13 are the analogs of the results in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
A pooling equilibrium does not exist because the single-crossing property is satisfied by the
indifference curves of the high and low type countries. If a separating equilibrium exists, it takes
the form shown in figure 3.10. The lines ZPH and ZPL represent the zero profits conditions
for foreign investors lending to firms in the high and low type countries respectively. ZPL lies
everywhere to the left of ZPH. Lending contracts corresponding to points A = ((pH), F (PH))
and B = (0, FL) are selected by domestic firms in equilibrium. The incentive compatibility
constraint of the low type country is binding, and the net output of successful domestic firms
is distorted for the high type country. The high type country provides a subsidy to foreign
investors, who lend to domestic firms at an interest rate lower than the first best interest rate
RH. As a result, the net output of successful domestic firms exceeds FH. Since the subsidy from
the country is large enough to ensure that foreign investors satisfy their zero profits condition,
the subsidy is welfare-reducing relative to the first best allocation. The ex post consumption of
the high type country is lower in the imperfect information equilibrium than in the first best
case (represented by point C = (0, FH)).
This separating equilibrium generates a difference in ex post consumption between the high
and low type countries, which induces the government to exert effort level i in period 1. This
effort level determines the position of the zero profits line for foreign investors who offer pooling
contracts, ZPp. For the separating equilibrium described in figure 3.10 to exist, the line ZPp
must lie everywhere below ICH (following the argument from subsection 3.3.5).
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Figure 3.9: Zero Profit Line Figure 3.10: Separating Equilibrium
Assume a separating equilibrium exists. Figure 3.10 illustrates the properties of the equi-
librium. The high type country imposes a tax per lending contract of i (PH) < 0. Each firm
faces the interest rate R (PH) < RH and in the case of project success, generates net output
F (PH) > FH. As explained above,
PHF (PH) +T (pH) < PHFH.
The low type country's allocation is unchanged from the first best level: 7 (PL) = 0. Domestic
firms face interest rate RL and produce net output FL in the case of project success. The
incentive compatibility constraint for the low type country is binding:
PLFL = PL (PH) + (PH) -
Finally, the effort level d of the government in period 1 solves the equation:
max {a.- [pH (PH) + (PH)] +(1- a)PLFL -(a)
Smax{pLFL+a.z-?- (a)},
a
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where [= H - PL] F (PH). Notice that since F (PH) > FH, this expression also establishes
that & > a, where -d denotes the effort level with optimal IMF intervention in subsection 3.3.2.
However, ex ante expected utility is not necessarily higher under the current setup, since the
ex post consumption of the high and low type countries are different from those in the earlier
subsection.
3.4.2 Model with IMF
The IMF is introduced into the above framework in the expected manner.
Figure 3.11: Timeline with IMF
Period 1
* IMF announces redistribution scheme that it will offer in period 2.
* Government chooses effort level a E [0, 1].
Period 2
* Government learns its type p E {PL, pH}. It is a high type with probability a.
* IMF offers menu of redistributive transfers 1IT.
* Government chooses the IMF transfer level T E T1.
* Foreign investors offer set of lending contracts {C (T; T)}.
* Government chooses the tax per lending contract 7.
* Domestic firms choose lending contract C E C (7; T) and level of borrowing k.
Period 3
* Output is realized and repayments made to foreigners. IMF transfers are made.
All remaining resources are consumed.
Foreign investors offer a set of lending contracts {C (T; T)} after observing the government's
choice of the transfer level T E T. Each element of this set takes T as given and specifies
the set of lending contracts C (7; T), that are available to domestic firms if (later in period 2)
the government chooses the tax per lending contract T. The government makes its choice of
the transfer level given its type p and its expectations regarding the set of contracts offered by
foreign investors C (7; T). It then observes the set of contracts offered before making its taxation
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decision T. Finally, domestic firms make their contract choice. The equilibrium definition is
amended appropriately. The IMF must satisfy its budget constraint.
Again, optimal IMF policy is the solution to a mechanism design problem in the presence
of imperfectly informed competitive markets. Apply the Revelation Principle, and restrict
attention to pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria.
Proposition 3.14 (Mechanism Design Problem) Optimal IMF policy is the solution to
the following mechanism design problem:
max W= {[pLF(pL)+T(pL)+T (pL)1+ a.z- b (a)}
z,T(pH),T(pL)
subject to
S= [PHF (PH) + (PH)+ T (PH)1 [LF (pL) + T(pL) + T (PL)]
a = (i)- [z]
a - T (pH) + (1 - a) T (pL) = 0
PHF (PH) + (pH) + T PH) > pHF (PL) + (PL) + T (PL)
PLF (PL) + 7 (PL) + T (PL) pLF (PH) + (PH) + T (PH).
Pooling equilibria:
F (pH)= F (pL)
T (pH)= T (pL), T (pH) (pL)
Separating equilibria:
(i) Separatzon induced by foreign investors' contract offers (if such an equilibrium exists):
T (pH) = T (PL)
F (pL) = FL, 7 (pL) = 0
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and (F (PH) , (PH)) solve
max {pHF (PH)+ (PH) + T (PH)
F(pH),T(pH)
subject to
PLFL + T (pL) > pLF (pH) + T (PH) + T (pH) .
(ii) Separation induced by IMF transfer choice:
F (pL) = FL, F (pH) = FH, T (PL) = T (PH) = 0.
We now describe the set of feasible perfect Bayesian equilibria.
For a pooling equilibrium to exist, foreign investors must be unable to distinguish between
the high and low type countries. This necessarily implies that both the transfer levels and taxes
chosen by the two types of countries are identical. Suppose that the IMF transfer level chosen
is indeed the same, such that T (PH) and T (PL) are equal. From the IMF's budget constraint:
T (PH) = T (PL) = 0.
This takes us back to subsection 3.4.1, the environment without IMF intervention. Proposition
3.12 applies. Consistent with the result in the previous subsection, there exists no feasible
pooling equilibrium in period 2. If there exist any equilibria, they must be separating equilibria.
There may exist two categories of separating equilibria. In particular, the government may
reveal its type through its choice of the IMF transfer level T E T, or through its tax decision T.
Condition (i) considers the case where information revelation occurs via the taxation decision.
If both high and low type governments select identical transfer levels T (PH) and T (PL), the
budget constraint of the IMF again establishes that these transfer levels should be equal to zero.
We return to the model of international capital markets in the absence of IMF intervention.
There may exist one separating equilibrium in this case, as shown in subsection 3.4.1. The
diagram illustrating this equilibrium is reproduced as figure 3.12. The lending contracts are
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plotted in (S, F) space, where we define:
S = T- +T.
S is the sum of taxes and transfers received by the country. The government chooses the
position of the economy on the horizontal dimension. The choice of lending contracts by
domestic firms determines the vertical position. Lending contracts corresponding to points
A = (i (PH), F (PH)) and B = (0, FL) are selected by domestic firms in equilibrium. Notice
that for the separating equilibrium to exist, the line ZPp must lie everywhere below ICH.
Now let us turn to condition (ii), where the type of the country is revealed via its choice
of the IMF transfer level. In this scenario, foreign investors know the type of the country
when they make contract offers. Therefore, foreign investors offer all contracts that make non-
negative profits conditional upon the country type. The government then chooses the contract
that maximizes consumption. The optimal taxation decisions for both types of government are:
T (pL) = T (PH) = 0.
This establishes that the net output levels of successful domestic firms in the low and high type
countries satisfy:
F (pL) = FL, F (PH) = FH.
Therefore, the set of feasible separating equilibria satisfying condition (ii) is identical to the set
of separating equilibria that were feasible in section 3.3. Our analysis in that section proved that
the most preferred separating equilibrium in this set was the one which involved the lowest level
of redistributive transfers by the IMF. This equilibrium is illustrated in figure 3.13. Lending
contracts corresponding to points A = (T(PH),FH) and B = (T(PL), FL) are selected by
domestic firms in equilibrium. The line ZPp is plotted in the diagram, but it is not relevant
for this timing of actions and events.
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Figure 3.12: Separating Equilibrium with Figure 3.13: Best Separating Equilibrium
Output Distortion without Output Distortion
Proposition 3.15 (Optimal IMF Policy) The optimal allocation is one of two candidate
equilibria:
(a) The separating equilibrium induced by foreign investors' contract offers and zero IMF
transfers (if it exists):
T (pL) = T (PH) = 0
F (PL) = FL, T (PL) = 0
F (pH) > FH, T (pH) < 0.
The government effort level in period 1 is d.
(b) The separating equilibrium which is the optimal allocation in subsection 3.3.2, the envi-
ronment with IMF transfers but without taxes on lendzng contracts:
T (pL) = a ptL [FH - FL]
T (pH)= )T (PL)
F (pL) = FL, 7.(PL) = 0
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F (pH) = FH, T PH) = 0.
The government effort level in perzod 1 is -d < Z.
Which separating equilibrium is preferred depends on the relatzve importance of moral hazard
and adverse selection distortions.
IMF redistributive transfers increase the set of feasible separating equilibria. By setting all
of the transfer levels in its menu to zero, the IMF can still induce the separating equilibrium
that was feasible in the absence of the IMF. This separating equilibrium has high government
effort in period 1, and a distortion in the net output of successful firms in the high type country
in period 2: F (PH) > FH. In addition, the possibility of ex ante insurance via IMF transfers
makes other separating equilibria feasible. In particular, it is no longer necessary for output to
be distorted ex post for any country in a separating equilibrium. However, the elimination of
output distortions is necessarily associated with a lower level of government effort in period 1.
Which of the candidate separating equilibria are optimal? It depends on the relative wel-
fare costs of moral hazard and adverse selection. If the moral hazard problem is sufficiently
severe, then the government effort is substantially lower in the allocation with nonzero IMF
redistributive transfers. This adverse effect on welfare outweighs the benefit of reducing the
output distortions in the absence of IMF intervention. The optimal allocation involves no role
for the IMF.
Alternatively, the moral hazard problem may be small relative to the adverse selection
problem. For this case, the negative welfare effects of lower government effort may be outweighed
by the benefits of reducing output distortions ex post. The IMF offers a separating menu of
transfers as part of the optimal allocation. For the extreme case of a model with only adverse
selection, output is not distorted at the optimum.
3.5 Conclusion
Optimal IMF policy is the solution to a mechanism design problem in the presence of imperfectly
informed competitive markets. The IMF implements redistributive transfers between high and
low productivity countries ex post, subject to both its budget constraint and to the rational
expectations condition that foreign investors set prices according to the information revealed
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in equilibrium. The zero profits condition for foreign investors changes as a result of the
IMF redistribution scheme. The incentives for the government to self-select in a separating
equilibrium depends on a combination of the IMF's policies and the contracts offered by foreign
investors. This is central to the description of the optimal allocation chosen by the IMF.
Countries with weak fundamentals in the second period choose to receive high levels of IMF
transfers. As a consequence, they face high interest rates on international capital markets,
which leads to low private capital inflows. Countries with strong fundamentals in the second
period value access to international capital markets more than low type countries. They make
contributions to the IMF and thereby receive low interest rates from foreign investors. They
enjoy high levels of private capital inflows.
For the baseline model considered, the IMF's redistribution scheme is implemented not to
decrease the difference in ex post consumption between high and low type countries, but to
increase it. This is achieved by generating capital reallocation on international capital markets
from low type to high type countries in the second period. Therefore, government effort is
higher ex ante.
IMF redistributive transfers expand the set of feasible separating equilibria, and thereby
may be welfare-improving. This result holds in an amended version of the model where for-
eign investors have sufficient tools to separate countries ex post even in the absence of IMF
intervention. IMF transfers reduce the output distortions that are necessary for a separating
equilibrium to exist ex post. However, the government effort level ex ante is lower in the pres-
ence of IMF intervention. Whether it is optimal for the IMF to intervene and offer a menu
of nonzero redistributive transfers depends on the trade-off between moral hazard and adverse
selection concerns.
Markets can be used to decentralize the IMF's optimal allocation. In particular, the same
allocation is obtained if the government can purchase insurance at actuarially fair rates before
its effort decision. However, if such contracts are only available after the government's type is
revealed, the government will not purchase the ex ante optimal level of insurance. In this case,
the IMF should commit ex ante to a schedule of redistributive transfers.
Risk neutrality of the representative consumer simplifies some dimensions of the optimal
mechanism design problem. By inducing a separating equilibrium, the IMF solves the capital
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misallocation problem in the second period that is associated with a pooling equilibrium. This
is desirable ex ante under risk neutrality. However, the ex post consumption of the low type
country may lie below the level in a pooling equilibrium. In this case, a risk averse representative
consumer may prefer the imperfect information allocation to the first best configuration, even
from an ex ante perspective. Furthermore, the IMF encounters commitment problems with a
concave objective function. Specifically, it is tempted to renege on its schedule of promised
transfers ex post, and instead implement more redistribution. Commitment problems under
risk aversion are explored further in Netzer and Scheuer (2009).
Our model predicts that the full benefits of IMF intervention cannot be discerned by look-
ing solely at IMF program countries. IMF transfers to low productivity countries improves
outcomes for high productivity countries, because they enable the latter to reveal their type
in equilibrium. Countries that refuse IMF transfers benefit from the existence of the IMF, be-
cause the refusal reveals their high productivity and induces high private capital inflows. This
mechanism has implications for empirical work into the effects of IMF intervention, and for the
design of IMF programs (for detailed existing work, see Bird 2001).
3.6 Appendix: Proofs of Results in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Domestic firms' choice of capital level k does not depend on the type of the country p. Firms
from both types of countries prefer the contract with the lowest offered interest rate R. The
interest rate is the only variable of the contract that foreign investors can propose, and there is
no communication between the government and foreign investors. Therefore, it is not possible
for foreign investors to offer a separating contract. U
Proof of Proposition 3.2.
In a pooling equilibrium, foreign investors remain uninformed about the type of the country.
Therefore, they offer lending contracts with interest rate Rp given by expression (3.1) in the
main text, given their beliefs of the government effort level ae. The government chooses the
effort level a* in period 1 to maximize expression (3.2), taking ae (and hence Fp) as given.
168
Define
a* = F (ae )
to be the government's effort choice in period 1, given foreigners' beliefs ae . A pooling equilib-
rium is defined as the fixed point:
a = ae = aeFe) .
Now we establish the properties of F (a). The first order condition for the government's
maximization problem (3.2) is:
¢'(a*) = z*
= a* = ()-1 [z*]. (3.14)
Given the convexity of the cost function, this first order condition identifies the global maximum
for expected utility in period 1. Since the cost function is twice differentiable and convex, the
government's effort choice a* is continuous and increasing in z*. Twice differentiability and
concavity of the production function establishes that z* is continuous and increasing in ae.
Therefore, F (a) is continuous and increasing in a.
Even if foreign investors expect the government to exert zero effort, the value of z* is
positive. From the condition C'(0) = 0 and the property that a* is increasing in z*, we obtain
that F (0) > 0. If foreign investors expect the government to exert the maximum feasible effort
level of unity, the value of z* is positive and finite. Since lim4'(a) = oo, we derive F (1) < 1.
Therefore, there exists at least one pooling equilibrium. In any pooling equilibrium, a* E
(0, 1). a* < aFB from the argument in the main text. U
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Consider welfare in the pooling equilibrium, which we denote as W*.
W* = a* . pHFp + (1 - a*) -pLFp - V(a*).
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Add to this expression the expected profits of foreign investors from the pooling contract, which
is zero:
W * = a* pHFP + (1 - a*) - PLFP - b(a*)
+a* - [pHRPkp - rkp] + (1 - a*)- [pLRpkp - rkp]
= a* - [HFP + pHRpkp - rkp]
+ (1 - a*) - [pLFP + pLRPkp - rkp] - (a*)
By definition:
pHFP + PHRpkp - rk=
PLFP + pLRPkp - rk =
and
pHf (kp) - rkp
pH [f (kp) - RHkp] < pHFH,
pLf (kp) - rkp
PL [f (kp) - RLkp] < pLFL.
This establishes that
W* < a* -PHFH + (1- a*) PLFL -(a*)
< aFB . HFH + (1 - aFB) PLFL - V(aFB).
As required. U
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
This follows immediately from application of the Revelation Principle. For pooling equilibria,
foreign investors remain uninformed about the type of the country irrespective of the informa-
tion revealed by the country to the mechanism designer. Therefore, they must offer a pooling
contract:
F (pH) = F (pL) = F.P
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For separating equilibria, the type of the country is revealed to foreign investors. Therefore,
they offer lending contracts that satisfy their full information zero profit conditions:
F (PH) = FH, F (PL) = FL.
This establishes the result in the text. U
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
For pooling equilibria, foreign investors remain uninformed about the type of the country. Note
that in the model timeline, foreign investors observe the transfer level T E T chosen by the
government. We require that foreign investors do not learn the country's type from their choice
of IMF transfers. This requires that T(pH) and T(pL) are equal. From the IMF's budget
constraint, we obtain:
T (pH) = T (PL) = 0.
Substituting into the constrained mechanism design problem, we obtain the result required. E
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
For separating equilibria, foreign investors learn the type of the country. The incentive com-
patibility constraints may be rewritten:
PHFH + T (pH) > PHFL + T (pL)
PLFL + T (pL) > pLFH + T (pH)
These expressions yield the equations in the text. U
Proof of Proposition 3.7.
As shown in the main text, the objective function of the IMF is
a -PHFH + (- a) PLFL- (a).
171
We know that the unique stationary point and global maximizer of this expression is the effort
level aFB
From the argument in the text, the IMF-induced separating equilibrium that maximizes
expected utility in period 1 corresponds to the highest effort level possible, which is Th. It
remains to prove that this equilibrium dominates any pooling equilibrium that the IMF can
induce. Notice that
[pH - pL] F < [PH - pL] FH < PHFH - PLFL,
which establishes that
a* < d < aFB
In the proof of Proposition 3.3, we showed that the welfare in the pooling equilibrium W*
satisfies the following expression:
W* < a* -PHFH + (1 - a*) PLFL - O(a*).
The desired result immediately follows. U
Proof of Proposition 3.8.
This follows directly from the argument in the proof of Proposition 3.7. E
Proof of Propositions 3.9 and 3.10.
By inspection. U
Proof of Proposition 3.11.
The separating equilibrium does not exist if the point (T (PL) , Fp) lies above the indifference
curve of the high type country through the allocation A = (T (pH), FH). The shape of the
feasible set of effort levels follows from the argument in the text. The objective function of the
IMF is unchanged from Proposition 3.7, so the most preferred separating equilibrium is still
the one corresponding to the highest level of effort. In this case it is a,. U
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Proof of Proposition 3.12.
This follows immediately from the single-crossing property in the enriched contract space. U
Proof of Proposition 3.13.
The structure of separating equilibria follows from the single-crossing property. The separating
equilibrium does not exist if the point (T (PL) , Fp) lies above the indifference curve of the high
type country through the allocation A = (T (PH) , FH). 0
Proof of Proposition 3.14.
Apply the Revelation Principle. The formulation can then be derived by inspection. U
Proof of Proposition 3.15.
Condition (i) of Proposition 3.14 is satisfied by only one separating equilibrium (if it exists), and
it is summarized as candidate equilibrium (a). The set of feasible separating equilibria satisfying
condition (ii) is identical to the set of separating equilibria that were feasible in section 3.3.
The proof of Proposition 3.7 establishes that the best separating equilibrium in this set can be
written as candidate equilibrium (b).
For equilibrium (a):
T = [PHP (PH)+ I (PH)] + (1 - a) PLFL - V(a), (3.15)
where the difference in ex post consumption between the high and low types is given by
= [pH - PL] (pH) -
For equilibrium (b):
W= - PHFH + (1 -) pLFL - (), (3.16)
with difference in ex post consumption given by
Z = [pH - PLI FH
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The expression in square brackets of equation (3.15) is lower in the first term of equation (3.16).
However, the government effort level i is higher than a.
The difference between [PHF (PH) + (PH)] and FH depends on the production function
f (k) and the exogenous parameters of the model. The difference in government effort between
the two separating equilibria depends additionally on the cost function 0(a). Therefore, the
comparison is ambiguous and the statement in the proposition holds. U
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